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At the height of his power in 1923, the head of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU), 
Alexander Stamboliiski, summed up the significance of his politics for European history in the 
following way: “Today there are only two interesting social experiments: the experiment of Lenin 
and my own.”1 Taking the aspirations reflected in the quotation above seriously and rescuing the 
agrarian project from the enormous condescension of posterity is the foundation of this 
dissertation. Briefly, it is about unpacking and restoring the significance of the Golden Age of the 
European Peasantry between the two world wars by focusing on the paradigmatic cases of 
Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. The dissertation proposes a novel synoptic approach 
with regards to interwar agrarianism as a counterpoint to ideology driven classifications or 
structuralist synthesis. Its thematic chapters alternate between strategic probes of evocative micro 
histories and broader theoretically informed overviews in order to illustrate and clarify the 
analytical frame. The most radical expression of interwar agrarianism, that of Bulgaria, and the 
                                                 





man responsible for it, Alexander Stamboliiski, serve as the center of this dissertation. The 
juxtaposition of this center to the development of agrarianism in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, 
as well as to various oppositional formations such as the Communist International Peasant Union 
allows this dissertation to overcome the national parochialism that has contributed to the sidelining 
of the study of agrarianism. The innovative structure of the dissertation is above all a demonstration 
of the rich possibilities still open to researchers in this field to reinsert the study of agrarianism 
into contemporary theoretical debates and developments in the historiography. The dissertation 
explicitly engages agrarianism with the theoretical literature on nationalism, corruption, the 
subaltern, as well as makes possible the connection to the problematics of modernity, politics as 






Table of Contents 
 
List of Abbreviations                                                                                                                       ii 
Introduction                                                                                                                                    1 
Chapter 1. The Crucible of War                                                                                                 22 
Chapter 2. Projecting the Peasant on the World Stage                                                            52 
Chapter 3. Reimagining the Nation                                                                                            86 
Chapter 4.  Between Expectations and Limitations                                                                139 
Chapter 5. Delegitimizing the Agrarian Alternative: The Diptych of Stamboliiski's   
Corruption and Radić's Treason                                                                                  179 
Chapter 6. Drawing the Curtain                                                                                               231 
Recapitulation                                                                                                                            256 









List of Abbreviations 
 
BANU - Bulgarian Agrarian National Union -- Bulgarski Zemedelski Naroden Suiuz (BZNS) 
CPPP - Croat People's Peasant Party -- Hrvatska Pučka Seljačka Stranka (HPSS) 
CRPP – Croat Republican Peasant Party -- Hrvatska Republikanska Seljačka Stranka (HRSS) 
ECCI – Executive Committee of the Communist International  
IPC  – International Peasant Council, Krestintern 
MAB – International Agrarian Bureau, the Green International (Mezinarodni Agrarni Bureau) 
RPCC – Republican Party of the Czechoslovak Countryside -- Republikánská Strana 
Československého Venkova (RSČV) 








Even more so than the ancien régime, the casualty of modernity has been the peasantry. In 
Europe, it was squeezed, eroded, and relegated to the dust bin of history, even as its image as the 
repository of the nation was appropriated from the Left, Right, and Center.  The renewed interest 
in the study of the peasantry in the 1970s, which saw the creation of The Journal of Peasant 
Studies, included the work of Teodor Shanin, Eric Wolf, or James C. Scott, and was marked by 
the "rediscovery" of Alexander Chayanov's Theory of the Peasant Economy in 1966, sought to 
return agency to the peasantry ironically at the moment when the European peasantry had finally 
disappeared.2 The linkage of the peasant subject to resistance was thus explored in South-East Asia 
or the Third World where it still had radical potential. 
The relatively quick manner in which the destruction of the European peasantry occurred, 
however, has unfortunately strengthened the teleological orthodoxy that argues that the 
preservation of the peasantry was incompatible with the modern development of Europe. Given 
the often brutal means by which the countryside and agriculture were placed in the service of 
urbanization and industrialization, the arguments that slate the peasantry as doomed to extinction 
ring hollow. The circularity of these arguments often hinges on nothing more than the smugness 
                                                 
2 See for example Alexander V. Chayanov. The Theory of the Peasant Economy. In Thorner, D, et 
al. American Economic Association Translation Series. 1966; James C. Scott. The Moral 
Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1976; Theodore Shanin, ed. Peasants and Peasant Societies. Harmondsworth, 







of the victor over the inevitable loss of the vanquished. In this view, the interwar period cannot be 
anything but the graveyard for agrarianism, given that it did not survive the Second World War.  
Yet the enormous condescension of posterity is not easy to overturn, and definitely not via the 
route of counterfactuals. Historical inquiry obsessed by questions of peasant viability or the exact 
causes of its failure to survive, do not advance analysis in any meaningful way. Akin to debates 
such as those over the assignment of blame for the origins of the First World War, this type of 
inquiry produces a self-referential insularity that cannot hope to justify the reexamination of the 
past from the perspective of the present. 
This dissertation is above all an attempt to suggest an alternative approach to the 
unsatisfying neglect of the European peasant subject in the first half of the twentieth century. 
Rather than looking at the interwar decades as the nadir of agrarianism, I provocatively designate 
the years between the First and Second World Wars as the Golden Age of the European Peasantry 
in order to first rupture the premise that significance and achievement have to be necessarily tied 
to socio-political success. Second, the designation of a Golden Age is made necessary by the 
undisputable construction of a peasant subjectivity in that period that entered mass politics via 
peasant and agrarian parties, that made claims on the nation as an articulate citizenry, and that 
sought in some cases to elaborate and institutionalize a more ethical modernity, a third road 
between capitalism and communism.   
In insisting that the interwar period cannot be properly understood historically without 
taking peasant politics seriously, this dissertation consequently is also predicated on the claim that 
the peasantry's competitors in the political arena during the interwar period could not ignore it. 
Although the constitutive role of the peasant question on the policies and practices of bourgeois 






remains a foundation which runs through this work. The structure of this foundation is most visible 
in the choices not to examine agrarianism sui generis either in its own historical context, or in 
relation to historiography in the present. Attention to the broader context serves not only to enrich 
the reading of agrarianism and correct its unwarranted marginalization. Analytical 
complementarity also demands the localization and examination of those sites where an 
archaeology of the past grounded in agrarianism can inform or recast the current historiography of 
the interwar period. Thus, the present analysis of the Golden Age of the European Peasantry moves 
beyond history as just a corrective to omissions, to history conceived as a reexamination of the 
past that can contribute to and inform broader and current debates on topics such as nationalism, 
corruption, modernity, or the dualism of democracy and populism. 
The implication of this two-fold re-contextualization of peasant politics in the interwar 
period is a methodological solution to the problem of synthesizing agrarianism above the level of 
national politics. This dissertation situates itself within a literature and historiography that is at 
times staggering in its depth and at others astounding in its paucity. At the national level it has 
been impacted by the relative fortunes of the agrarian parties during the communist period, with 
the most developed being that of Bulgaria (Luiza. Reviakina, Tsanko Barev, Dimitrina Petrova, 
Nikolai Poppetrov, Tsocho Biliarski)3, and the least developed, that of Serbia (Momčilo Isić, 
                                                 
3 Luiza Reviakina, Kominternut i Selskite Partii na Balkanite: 1923-1931. Sofia: Akademichno 
Izdatelstvo "Prof. M. Drinov,” 2003; Tsenko Barev. Prinos kum istoriiata na Bulgarskiia 
Zemedelski Naroden Suiuz. Sofia: Bulvest 2000, 1994; Dimitrina Petrova. Bîlgarskiiat 
Zemedelski Naroden Sîiuz, 1899-1944. Sofia: Fondatsiia “Detelina,” 1999; Dimitrina Petrova. 
Samostoiatelnoto upravlenie na BZNS, 1920-1923. Sofia: Durzhavno Izdatelstvo Nauka i 
Izkustvo, 1988; Dimitrina Petrova. Aleksandur Stamboliiski – durzhavnikut reformator. Stara 
Zagora: Izdatelstvo “Znanie,” 1995; Nikolai Poppetrov. Fashizmut v Bulgaria. Razvitie i proiavi. 
Sofia: Kama, 2008; Nikolai Poppetrov. Sotsialno naliavo, natsionalizmut – napred: Programni 
I organizatsionni dokumenti na bulgarski avtoritaristki natsionalisticheski formatsii. Sofia: IK 
Gutenberg, 2009; Tsocho Biliarski. BZNS, Aleksandur Stamboliiski i VMRO: Nepoznatata 






Nadežda Jоvanović, Milan Gaković).4 In other cases, the national question has generated a body 
of literature on the HSS, Radić, and Maček in Croatia (Ljubo Boban, Bogdan Krizman, Branka 
Boban, Fikreta Jelić-Butić, Hrvoje Matković, Zdenka Radelić, Tihomir Cipek)5 or on Milan Hodža 
in Slovakia (Miroslav Pekník, Pavol Lukáč)6 that supplements the work in the Czech Republic 
(Vladimir Dostál, Jiří Šouša, Josef Kolař, Edoard Kubů).7 As the work of John Bell, Mark 
Biondich, and Dan Miller illustrate, these types of studies are reflected in the English language.8 
                                                 
 
4 Momčilo Isić. Seljaštvo u Srbiji 1918-1941. Belgrad: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 1995;  
Nadežda Jоvanović. Zemljoradnička levica u Srbiji 1927-1939. Belgrade, 1994; Milan Gaković. 
Savez Zemljoradnika (Zemljoradnička Stranka 1919-1941). Priredio Zdravko Antonić. Banja 
Luka: Akademija Nauka i Umjetnosti Republike Srpske, 2008. 
 
5 Ljubo Boban. Maček i politika Hrvatske seljačke stranke 1928-1941. Zagreb: Liber, 1974;  
Bogdan Krizman, Korespondencija Stjepana Radiča, 1919-1928, Zagreb: Institut za hrvatsku 
povijest, 1973; Fikreta Jelić-Butić. Ustaše i Nezavisna Država Hrvatska 1941-1945. Zagreb: 
Liber, 1977; Branka Boban. Demokratski nacionalizam Stjepana Radića. Zagreb: Zavod za 
hvtsku povijest Filozofskog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, 1998; Hrvoje Matković, Povijest 
Hrvatske seljačke stranke. Zagreb: Naklada Pavičić, 1999; Zdenka Radelić. Hrvatska seljačka 
stranka (1941-1950). Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 1996; Tihomir Cipek. Ideja hrvtske 
države u političkoj misli Stjepana Radiča. Zagreb: Alenea, 2001. 
6 Miroslav Peknik, ed. Milan Hodža: Statesman and Politician. Bratislava: VEDA Publishing 
House of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, 2007; Miroslav Peknik, ed. Milan Hodža: politik a 
žurnalista. Bratislava: VEDA, Vydatel’stvo SAV, 2008; Pavol Lukáč. Milan Hodža v zápase o 
budúcnost’ strednej Európy v rokoch 1939-1944. Ed. Štefan Šebesta. Bratislava: VEDA, 
Vydatel’stvo SAV, 2005. 
7 Vladimir Dostál. Agrární strana. Její rozmach a zánik. Brno: Atlantis 1998; Vladimir Dostál. 
Antonín Švehla. Profil československého státníka. Praha: Státní Zemedelské Nakl., 1990; Eduard 
Kubů, ed. Mýtus a realita hospodárské vyspelosti Ceskoslovenska mezi svetovými válkami. 
Praha: Nakl. Karolinum 2000; Jiří Šouša. “K vývoji ćeského zemědělství na rozhraní 19. století. 
Česká zemědělská rada 1891–1914,” In: Acta Universitatis Carolinae Philosophica et Historica, 
vol. XCVII. Prague: Universita Karlova, 1986; Jiří Šouša. “Zemědělská správa a některá 
východiska vzestupu agrární strany (1914 -1918),” In: Acta Universitatis Carolinae 
Philosophica et Historica, vol. IV-V. Prague: Universita Karlova, 1987. 
 
8 John Bell. Peasants in Power: Alexander Stamboliiski and the Bulgarian Agrarian National 
Union 1899-1923. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977; Mark Biondich. Stjepan Radić, 






What is notably missing, however, is a comparative monograph or one of synthetic scope. German 
literature has attempted to tackle this through collective projects that produced the volume edited 
by Heinz Gollwitzer,9 or the recently completed project on Agrarismus in Ostmitteleuropa at the 
Europa-Universität Viadrina.10 Although these are significant contributions, I position myself 
against the German scholarships’ tendency to do structural descriptions, like the ‘constellation’ of 
agrarianism or the binary of Bauern Agrarismus/ Aristokratischer Agrarismus, whose broad 
strokes obscure differences. In the stead of a unified movement to be described in its variations (a 
classificatory approach which also plagues treatments of agrarianism through populism)11 I focus 
on the particular socio-political conjunctures that allowed the peasant parties to stake out a space 
for themselves in national politics first, and on the international stage second. 
In order to better clarify the position of this dissertation within its field, a few words are 
necessary about its relation to prior scholarship and about the sources upon which it is based. The 
scholarship on the agrarian parties that was produced after the Second World War in Bulgaria, 
Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia was affected by the postwar political culture and the relationship 
of the communist parties to the agrarian ones. While this scholarship is in general solid and 
valuable, the skewing that affects it as a result of the conditions of its creation isolates it at the 
                                                 
of Toronto Press, 2000; Daniel E. Miller. Forging Political Compromise: Antonín Švehla and 
the Czechoslovak Republican Party 1918-1933. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1999. 
9 Heinz Gollwitzer, ed. Europäische Bauernparteien im 20. Jahrhundert. Stuttgart: Gustav Fischer 
Verlag, 1977.  
10 Eduard Kubů, Torsten Lorenz, Uwe Müller, Jiří Šouša, eds. Agrarismus und Agrareliten in 
Ostmitteleuropa. Berlin-Praha: Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag – Dokořán, 2013. 
11  Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner. Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics. New 






national level. For example, in Bulgaria, the coup against Stamboliiski in 1923 facilitated the 
construction of an instrumentalized historical narrative during the communist period that coopted 
Stamboliiski’s legacy as an imperfect precursor to the communist People’s Republic after 1944. 
Thus, at its inception after the Second World War, historical inquiry into agrarian politics in 
Bulgaria prioritized the radical program of Stamboliiski, downplayed the competition with the 
Communist Party, and skirted, when not outright attacking, the politics of the Bulgarian Agrarian 
National Union between 1923 and the start of the Second World War. The fact that the left wing 
of the BANU was preserved as an allied political party throughout the communist period in 
Bulgaria both illustrates why scholarship on a “bourgeois” political formation could develop with 
minimal hindrance, and why this scholarship was useful for, and thus was supported by, the cadres 
of the communist affiliated BANU.  
This narrative however, is based on a vision of Bulgarian exceptionalism, which 
discourages inquiry into the vibrant international exchange of ideas and cooperation between 
agrarians. As a consequence topics such as the Green International receive tangential mention that 
ends at the claim that the idea for the international originated with Stamboliiski. While the archive 
of the Bulgarian Agrarian Union’s Representation Abroad is one of the few well preserved 
collections that detail the international dimension of Bulgarian agrarian politics, until this 
dissertation it has virtually remained untouched. While the individual particularities in each 
country covered in this dissertation are different, the politics behind the scholarship has kept the 
question of agrarianism fractured and provincialized. For example, Croatian scholarship is 
dominated by Radić and the question of Croatian independence; similar is the interest in Hodža in 
newly independent Slovakia, while in Serbia the Savez Zemljoradnika is a footnote with only one 






It is my contention that the only way to restore the relevance and significance to the 
interwar agrarian experiment, is to change the basis of inquiry and to mine the relevant source 
material in a new way. The dissertation, therefore, is an experiment in how the national 
historiographies can be stitched together to provide a whole that is greater than the individual parts. 
One current in the dissertation accomplishes this qualitatively different integration at the level of 
international interaction between the agrarian parties and in relation to their international context, 
while the other either introduces new archival material or re-examines previously consulted 
sources with questions that reinsert the study of agrarianism into contemporary theoretical debates 
and developments in the historiography.  
The archival research which provides the basis of this dissertation is in itself a departure 
from the insularity of the national approach. It was conducted in four national archives and also 
contains material from the Russian State Archives. Besides the challenge of gathering similar 
material in these institutions that could provide a basis for comparison, the hunt for the archive of 
the Green International, which took me through the territories of Bulgaria, the former Yugoslavia, 
and the former Czechoslovakia, and which could not be found and was most likely destroyed, 
meant that I tried to reconstitute it from the personal archives of various agrarian figures from each 
of these countries as well as from interior ministry records concerned with the monitoring and 
suppression of agrarian activity. Research of such magnitude and duration inevitably transformed 
the nature of my project as the discoveries and gaps in one country changed the agenda and the 
questions asked in the next. Thus the nuanced and limited portrayal of agrarianism that this 
dissertation proposes is a direct product of the necessity to coordinate and reconcile the 






Since the reconceptualization of agrarianism that underlies this dissertation involves 
historiographical revisionism, its site is in the individual chapters where each instance of 
revisionism drives that chapter’s argumentation and structure. In some instances it calls to task 
certain concepts and evaluations that are present in East-European historiography. Just as often, 
however, this revisionism operates through the introduction of theoretical concepts present in 
historiographies and literatures that have not yet been incorporated in East-European studies. The 
challenges and nuancing I propose are always related back to a suitable and representative example 
of agrarian praxis. It is my hope and intention that this methodology of accomplishing a critique 
by means of the re-inclusion of a heretofore neglected and marginalized historical experience 
opens new directions of scholarship that can reinvigorate our field. It is a further conceit of mine 
that this approach has historiographical bearing on European history, in which East-European 
studies are relegated to the periphery. In this way I seek to do justice to the self-understanding of 
my agrarian subjects, who not only considered themselves European, but thought of their ideas 





The function of the foregrounding Chapter One, The Crucible of War, is to advance the 
argument that the agrarian movements of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia were forged 
in the revolutionary formation and transformation of these countries during the First World War. 






upheavals across the board and novel national and institutional construction in its aftermath. In all 
cases, the agrarian parties of these countries were propelled to the forefront of national politics. In 
comparison to their marginal positions prior to the war, with the exception of the Savez 
Zemljoradnika in Serbia which was formed immediately after the war, these parties were 
confronted with a radically transformed socio-political landscape in which pre-war forces and 
institutions were discredited, severely weakened, or even expelled.  
The war was not just a transformative context that left these parties untouched. On a second 
plane of commonality, the experience of war radically transformed the parties themselves. The 
articulation of a vision for the post-war order coupled with an enormous expansion of the parties’ 
base meant organizational and programmatic change so that these parties could adapt to their role 
as a major actor, if not the principal one, on the national stage. Further, the consequence of mass 
politics in the demographic context of half to three quarters of the population being engaged in 
agriculture produced a legitimacy and urgency in the parties based on the recognition that the time 
of the peasant as a subject has arrived and could not be squandered.  
While the war defined the central position of the agrarian parties in the postwar period, the 
individual positions that they adopted and the trajectories they took produced a rich variation. This 
chapter thus introduces the proposition that the four autonomous peasant movements that emerged 
out of the ashes of the First World War represent the three faces of the alternative modernity that 
was articulated in the Golden Age of the European Peasantry: agrarian radicalism in Bulgaria, the 







The momentous transformations in the crucible of war in the Balkans spanned nearly a 
decade given the foreground of the two Balkan Wars. The central component of this chapter, which 
details the anti-war position adopted by the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union and Alexander 
Stamboliiski is a treatment of the transformation of that position from a liability to an asset given 
Bulgaria’s series of “national catastrophes.” Opposition by the BANU in the war years and 
repression against it produced ideological clarification, republican radicalization, and provided it, 
alongside the Communist Party, with a monopoly on legitimacy when the traditional political 
forces were discredited in the defeat. The enormous numerical growth of the party in 1919 could 
permit its treatment as a novel political formation although that has to be tempered by the 
compelling case in favor of continuity given by its consistent praxis in the second decade of the 
twentieth century.  
The hegemonic position of the BANU at the start of the interwar period was a direct 
consequence of defeat and the imperative for rupture with the past and a delineation of a new 
course; its radical attempt to reorder the Bulgarian polity was framed by this condition and was 
both enabled and limited by the status of Bulgaria as a defeated country. The ruptures engendered 
by the war, which were the universal sine qua non for the creation of space for peasant politics, 
encompassed a variability that was expressed differently in the case of “victor” nations. In 
Yugoslavia, the newly formed Savez Zemljoradnika that had its base in Serbia could capitalize on 
the desire for land reform and a critique of the Narodna Radikalna Stranka, which had departed 
from its socialist and peasantist roots in the nineteenth century. Through the incorporation of other 
recently formed regional peasant parties such as the Savez Težaka u Bosni i Hercegovini (Bosnia 
and Hercegovina), Težački Savez (Dalmatia), and the Seljački Savez (Croatia) the Savez 






the war, the Savez Zemljoradnika had its largest electoral successes. In the long run it could neither 
supplant the dominance of Nicola Pasić’s Narodna Radikalna Stranka in Serbia nor could it 
challenge the democratic peasant nationalism of Stjepan Radić's Hrvatska Pučka Seljačka Stranka 
in Croatia. Nonetheless, it succeeded in articulating and occupying an alternative political space 
to the nationalist politics in interwar Yugoslavia.  
The war also transformed the Hrvatska Pučka Seljačka Stranka that had around 15,000 
members in 1914 into the preeminent party of Croatian nationalism, the Hrvatska Republikanska 
Seljačka Stranka, with a membership exceeding one million in 1921. This transformation, the 
insistence on Croatian rights, and opposition to Belgrade set the foundation for Radić’s party to 
become the dominant political force in Croatia in the interwar period. For both the Savez 
Zemljoradnika and the Hrvatska Republikanska Seljačka Sranka, the war was both the opportunity 
that projected them on the national stage, but also the limitation given Serbia’s victory. The initial 
social radicalism had to give way in the face of the resilience and dominance of Belgrade-centered 
nation building.  
 In the newly formed Czechoslovakia after the First World War, the Republikánská strana 
československého venkova had gained greatly in strength from its less than 100,000 members in 
1914. Even after its merger with the Slovak Slovenská národná a rolnícka strana its electoral 
strength was initially limited. Nonetheless, the centrist positions it adopted secured it a key role in 
the moderate parliamentary coalitions during the post-war revolutionary moment. This role was 
instrumental to the institutionalization of the “politics of compromise” in the First Republic and 
secured the position of the party as the guarantor of that order. In order to illustrate the transformed 
position of the agrarian parties after the First World War, this chapter concludes with a brief survey 






Chapter Two, Projecting the Peasant on the World Stage, is about contextualizing the 
projection of agrarianism on the world stage through its organization, the International Agrarian 
Bureau. This chapter is not an institutional history of the organization. Although this dissertation 
project began as a hunt for the archive of that organization, and sunsequently, when it could not 
be found, gathered as many extant traces of its correspondence in the organizational fonds of the 
agrarian parties and the personal fonds of its leadership in Bulgaria, Serbia, Croatia, and the Czech 
Republic, this material is insufficient to reconstruct the inner workings of the organization. At its 
best, it can periodically annotate and correct the self-representation of that organization through 
its official periodical, the Bulletin Mezinárodního Agrárního Bureau. For reasons related to the 
dearth of material, the negative evaluation from its communist affiliated competitor, the Moscow 
based International Peasant Council, better known as the Red Peasant International (Krestintern), 
its reactionary designation during the communist period after the Second World War that even 
generated show trials against its ‘agents,’ but also the scholarly neglect that has plagued the study 
of European agrarianism outside certain well-trodden aspects of national history, the 
historiography that touches upon this organization is plagued by mystification.  
Two monographs characterize the range of approaches, and incidentally, they are the only 
works of some length on the subject, although the second one devotes only half a chapter on the 
subject and a bit more in passim. The 1967 monograph of Maksim Goranovich, whose title 
translates to The Collapse of the Green International, is an ideological polemic against the 
organization that he portrays as a reactionary formation that cleared the way for fascism.12 The 
antecedents to this line of argumentation lie in the polemical battles between the Krestintern and 
                                                 






the International Agrarian Bureau that intensified in the mid-1920s. The dismissal of the Green 
International, as the Bureau was more commonly known, is motivated by the perceived hindrance 
it could exert on the Comintern’s strategy to penetrate the village and organize the peasantry in 
alliance with the workers towards opening a new front in the world revolution after the post-First 
World War revolutionary moment failed to produce the expected soviet republics. The focus on 
top down ideological polemic causes Goranovich to overemphasize the executive power of the 
organization in its representation as an instrument of class enmity. 
If this version of the Soviet scholarly orthodoxy towards the dismissal of the interwar 
agrarian rivals depends on the implicit question of why a reactionary organization could be robust 
enough to hinder the logical course of historical materialism, scholarship from across the Iron 
Curtain inverted the question to focus on the weakness and failure of the organization and 
agrarianism in general. George Jackson’s nearly contemporaneous monograph to Goranovich’s 
from 1966, Comintern and Peasant in East Europe 1919-1930, offers a polar distortion.13 While 
the book’s chief focus is on the Krestintern, its cursory treatment of the International Agrarian 
Bureau judges both organizations by the same yardstick. The Green International, according to 
Jackson, never had the resources of a revolutionary state apparatus behind it nor the organizational 
discipline of the communist parties nationally and internationally in the way the Krestintern did. 
Its aim was not to coordinate revolution, but through example and information exchange, to 
empower the national agrarian movements that composed its membership. Yet in the zero sum 
logic of winners and losers, the question of failure is overemphasized. While I believe much of 
this is related to a Cold War mentality that projects the onus of failure on agrarianism for its 
                                                 







inability to prevent the communization of Eastern Europe after the Second World War, fixating on 
agrarianism’s ‘failure’ to impose its maximalist program in the interwar period due to internal 
ideological and organizational factors produces a reductive de-emphasis of the contextual 
difficulties that brought even liberal democracy to its knees at the time. Incidentally, the 
Krestintern, with its logistical and organizational superiority, dissolved itself in 1931, while the 
disbanding of the International Agrarian Bureau followed the Anschluss of Austria in 1938 and the 
demise of Czechoslovakia in 1939. 
As a counterpoint to this unsatisfactory scholarship, my intention in this chapter is to 
foreground the potentialities and the alternative developmental streams that contextualize the 
founding of the International Agrarian Bureau. A more detailed treatment of the activities of the 
organization follows in Chapter Four, and it reappears again in Chapter Six. The second chapter 
begins with an appropriation of the idea of the Green International in the pages of The New York 
Times from 1921 that is indicative of an effort to tame and channel the agrarian challenge. This 
section begins a layering of three imaginaries that frame the function of the International Agrarian 
Bureau, the second being the 1927 internal Czechoslovak rewriting of the history of the formative 
years of the organization, and the third the expectations towards that organization by one of its 
founders, the head of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, Alexander Stamboliiski. 
 The chapter then argues that the history of the crystallization of the International Agrarian 
Bureau in 1923 is explained by multiple currents in the development and implementation of 
agrarianism and that two frames are useful for contextualizing that history: the federalist idea itself 
and the competition with the Krestintern. Further, the international stage, despite the hopes and 






The chapter examines Stamboliiski’s efforts to soften Bulgaria’s isolation after the Paris 
Peace Treaties. A survey of the federative idea in Southeast Europe contextualizes Stamboliiski’s 
proposal for a South-Slav federation. In turn, the rebuff of Stamboliiski’s diplomatic efforts 
contextualizes the birth of the International Agrarian Bureau as the pursuit of that idea by other 
means. While the coup against the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union and the death of 
Stamboliiski in 1923 submerged this course in the interwar period, this section completes the circle 
by discussing the 1942 revival of the federative idea by Milan Hodža, one of the Czechoslovak 
agrarian founders of the Green International and prime minister of the country from 1935-1938.  
The chapter then focuses on the other frame that contextualized the formation and activities 
of the Green International, namely the Krestintern, and provides a survey of that institution. The 
chapter concludes with the insistence that once the divergent trajectories represented by 
Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria resolved into the truncation of the decisive Bulgarian input, the 
International Agrarian Bureau developed according to the directives and interests of the 
Czechoslovak Republican Party. The ensuing recasting of the institution in the 1920s and 1930s 
can be better explained by focusing on the configurations of the international situation, as well as 
on the competition with the Krestintern, rather than on the questions of if or why the institution 
was a “failure.”  
Chapter Three, Reimagining the Nation, introduces the practice of alternating chapters 
between case study analysis and broader synthetic work. The agrarian movements of Bulgaria and 
Croatia in the interwar period receive a very different treatment in the literature. Whereas the 
Bulgarian case has been described as anti-national(ist), the Croatian is represented as the 
embodiment of a national movement. This polarity, however, ossifies and essentializes the 






moment when the character of that community was being transformed through the introduction of 
the peasant subject. The first part of this chapter illustrates how the different outward expressions 
of nationalism in the Bulgarian and Croatian agrarian movements are in fact based on very similar 
conceptions of the peasant rights and the peasant state. 
At the heart of this chapter is a case study of the conflict over the implementation of the 
Bulgarian Agrarian National Union’s orthographic reform in 1921. This micro-history is wrapped 
in several layers of analysis that contextualize this episode and permit its relation to several 
currents in nationalism studies. The chapter traces the correspondence between the conjunctural 
chronology of changes in Bulgarian orthography and the mutable nature of Bulgarian nationalism 
by opposing this inquiry to the continuing influence of the civic/ethnic antinomy in the scholarly 
literature of Eastern Europe. Showing that orthographic reform was an important element of the 
discourse of ethnic as well as civic nationalism not only fractures notions of structural continuity 
predetermined by the path to a nation-state, but is exemplary of the fluidity of national identity as 
it interacts with parallel discourses of modernity. The orthographic reform re-imagined the national 
community and in a significant, structural way paralleled a shift in the organization of the nation. 
It was intended to and eventually succeeded in recasting the role of the Bulgarian citizen. The 
detailed micro study of the language question culminating in the orthography debate of the 1920s 
proposes that the spelling reform was much more than a matter of sociolinguistics. It marked a 
fundamental change in the Bulgarian polity and was associated with a moment of restructuring, 
democratization, and reshuffling of elites, the rearrangement of norms that favored different social 
and cultural constellations. In other words, the picture of nationalism that it elicits is one that 
intimately grapples with one of the most central political processes of the modern Bulgarian state 






opening in the treatment of East-European nationalism that draws inspiration from the work of the 
Subaltern Studies Group. While a strict transposition of concepts is counterproductive given the 
contextual differences, the critical juxtaposition of East-European agrarian nationalism to the 
emancipatory project of Subaltern Studies facilitates the extraction of the former from the stale 
narratives that obscure and suppress the radical agrarian merger of the nation, the peasant state, 
and the peasant subject. 
Chapter Four, Between Aspirations and Limitations, pulls the lens back out. This chapter 
begins with a focus on the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union’s Representation Abroad in 
Czechoslovakia after the coup d’état against the Stamboliiski regime in 1923. It relates its activities 
to the politics of the Republican Party that was hosting it in Czechoslovakia. In exile, the 
Representation Abroad represents one of the lowest points in the political fortunes of agrarianism 
in the interwar period. Yet my analysis aims to show the significance and potentialities even there. 
The Representation Abroad’s biggest achievement was that at a time of seeming hopelessness that 
anything could be done to restore political normalcy and a semblance of democracy in Bulgaria, 
its members tenaciously kept the spark alive for themselves, the beleaguered BANU, their agrarian 
partners in the MAB, and in front of European public opinion. 
I illustrate this inspiration by examining an instance of history from below which involved 
the dispersed Bulgarian agrarian émigrés in Europe creating the Union of the Bulgarian United 
(zdruzheni) Agrarians Abroad and generating a critical resolution against the internecine conflicts 
in the BANU. This episode illustrates my definition of agrarianism as the expression but also 
establishment of a moral economy in the peasant that altered his relation to modernity from a 
transitory object into an agent with a stake in its constitution. I counterpose this approach to 






 As a result, my critique is differentiated from the classificatory approach to agrarianism in 
classical studies of populism as well as the recent effort to synthesize agrarianism in East-Central 
Europe that is hindered by a structuralist frame. While I argue that the fate of agrarianism was 
context-specific and that it produced the three faces of agrarianism in the national contexts that are 
the site of this dissertation, I still propose three universal initiatives that underwrite the agrarian 
project: parliamentarism, land reform, and the cooperative movement. As an illustration, this 
chapter then illuminates these initiatives in the radical agrarian phase of Bulgarian history. 
The chapter concludes with a summary of the activities of the Green International in the 
first three years of its existence. The merit of this exercise in presenting the work in the Bulletin 
of the International Agrarian Bureau lies not only in the fact that it has never been done before. 
Presenting its work in this way shows the varied initiatives and coverage it engaged in and in this 
way corrects the various holes, misrepresentations, and errors in the scant literature on the subject. 
Chapter Five, Delegitimizing the Agrarian Alternative: The Diptych of Stamboliiski's 
Corruption and Radić's Treason, discusses the delegitimation campaigns against the agrarian 
movements in Bulgaria and Croatia. This chapter returns to the method of case study investigation 
that is then layered in theoretical analysis. As in Chapter Three, the resonance of neglected 
moments of agrarian history in contemporary scholarship justifies the importance of this history. 
By manufacturing a posthumous charge of venal corruption against Stamboliiski, 
Tsankov's regime attempted to fundamentally discredit and erase the systemic alternative offered 
by BZNS' reforms up to 1923. I reconstruct a detailed micro-history of the corruption trial against 
Stamboliiski based on heretofore unutilized archival sources, not simply in order to correct a 






articulated, how they are directed, and the way they ultimately operate as a legitimizing tool in the 
context of systemic transition. The instrumentalization of corruption for political ends lends itself 
particularly well to the extension of vices from the personal to the systemic level. Analyzing the 
growing theoretical literature on corruption, this chapter reaches the conclusion that the obsession 
of the capitalist system with the particular type of corruption that involves personal pecuniary 
enrichment is far from coincidental, and is informed by the logic of capital accumulation within a 
free market economy. According to this logic, the private drive to amass is best protected from 
degenerating into corruption within the liberal market democracy. Therefore, it is imperative to 
delegitimize any alternative systems whose aim, at the very least, ideologically, is to excise that 
type of self-interest in the first place. 
The second case study looks at the charges of treason brought about by Radić's trip to 
Moscow and the entry of the CPPP into the Krestintern. The delegitimation campaign against 
Radić was designed to weaken the organizational strength and political prestige of the CPPP 
through the misrepresented association with the communist menace. It was essentially blackmail, 
a maneuver to force a differentiation between communism and agrarianism that, at its extreme, 
might cause the abandonment of the republican idea and the recognition of the monarchy. Terror 
and revolution were the monsters against which the interwar capitalist order was trying to protect 
itself. It succeeded in outlawing the disproportionately weaker communist parties in Bulgaria and 
Yugoslavia but was forced to accommodate the agrarian parties albeit under various degrees of 
repression.  
The concluding chapter, Drawing the Curtain, tackles the problem of the denouement of 
the agrarian moment during the Second World War and the years immediately following its 






elimination of the peasantry as a political subject in the West through the irresistibility of capitalist 
logic, and in the East, though Stalinist collectivization and terror, and calls to task the exclusion of 
agrarianism at the level of the survey literature in the East-European field. In marking the end of 
the agrarian alternative, this chapter refuses to locate it in a “tragedy” of communization. The real 
tragedy, it argues, was begun in the separation of the agrarian political elite from its base during 
and after the Second World War and is complete now, in the post-socialist period, in the grotesque 
revival of agrarian parties that struggle to speak for and exploit the memory of a peasantry that no 
longer exists. In marking the Second World War as the revolutionary and transformative moment 
that took away the relevance of agrarian politics, this chapter complements the treatment of the 
First World War as having created the conditions for its initial elaboration. Touching on recent 
work on collectivization, this chapter normalizes the socialist experience and proposes that the 
peasantry, having already constituted itself as a political subject in the interwar period, was 
transformed as much as it transformed itself in the encounter with state socialism.14 
To mark the erosion of agrarian relevance, this chapter contrasts the program of the 
Bulgarian Agrarian National Union from 1919 to that of BANU “Aleksandur Stamboliiski” from 
2008. In a similar mode it juxtaposes the pathos of Vladko Maček in 1949, when he provided a 
characterization of the International Peasant Union while acting as its vice-president, to the even 
more dismal politics of the Hrvatska seljačka stranka that was ‘reconstituted’ in 1990. A look at 
the post-socialist developments in Serbia, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia complete the picture. 
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Finally, this chapter examines the experience of Czechoslovakia in the years surrounding 
the Second World War in order to explain the fate of the Republican Party. It is a paradigmatic 
case of how the Second World War changed the terrain to the exclusion of agrarianism years before 
the communist takeover in 1948. Thus, when this chapter concludes with a description of the show 
trials against the agents of the Green International in 1952, it underscores the absurd element of 





















The Crucible of War 
 
 At the height of its power, yet barely two and a half months before the coup d'état which 
violently brought it down in the Summer of 1923, the majority government of the Bulgarski 
Zemedelski Naroden Suiuz, BZNS (Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, BANU) was still referring 
to the legacies of concussion and dislocation brought about by the First World War in order to 
frame policy. The official organ of the BANU proclaimed, "The world war caused an economic 
crisis in the life of countries, worsened international ties, tripped up the cultural progress of 
humankind - results equally bitter to victors and vanquished... The situation is tense for all - be 
they Germans, French, Turks, Serbs, or Bulgarians and united they cry out, under the pressure of 
social needs, for an end to murderous wars and economic slavery. The specter of a war, which will 
complete the destruction of the world, equally scares all nations and that is why lately there is talk 
of concessions and understanding in order in this manner to avoid new social tremors in 
international relations and to guarantee and strengthen the existing economic and agricultural life 
of individual nations. Especially for Bulgaria."15  
The rhetorical recourse to the trauma of the war should not be seen only as a means to an 
end in the political vocabulary of the agrarian movement; it articulated the resultant processes that 
propelled the agrarian movements of Eastern Europe to the center of the political stage in the 
postwar settlement. The First World War radically transformed the continent, and as such, the 
                                                 






experience of Bulgaria, the Triunine Kingdom, and Czechoslovakia is firmly imbedded within the 
larger European experience. Yet at the same time, the unique emergence of a powerful, center-left, 
agrarian moment requires a situating within the general European context that also illuminates the 
successes, but also limitations, of the agrarian movements to harness the legacy of the First World 
War to radical projects of social transformation and nation-building. Only through the lens of the 
First World War and the immediate postwar years do the momentous transformations in these three 
countries become intelligible. They include the transforming of the Bulgarski Zemedelski Naroden 
Suiuz into a pluralistic force for social revolution, the transcendence of Hrvatska Republikanska 
Seljačka Stranka, HRSS (Croat Republican Peasant Party, CRPP) beyond a party into the 
movement of the entire Croat people,16 the elevation of the Republikánská Strana 
Československého Venkova (Republican Party of the Czechoslovak Countryside, RSČV) into a 
keystone of Czechoslovak parliamentary order, and the emergence of the Savez Zemljoradnika, SZ 
(Union of Agriculturalists, UA) as a challenger to the Radical Party's hegemony in the Serbian 
village.  
 If European enthusiasm at the start of the First World War was mobilized towards the 
elimination of social tensions and national unity, this had evaporated by the war's end and set the 
stage for social and national revolution. The contributing factors were not restricted only to the 
enormous human and economic losses caused by the waging of total war. Decisive as well was 
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labor discontent, for the mobilization of the workforce into the war machine resulted not only in 
the increased bargaining power of labor unions and the transformation of labor markets and social 
institutions that guaranteed rights to strike, the eight-hour workday, and eventually significant 
expansions of welfare policy, but also labor militancy in the last years of the war that flowed into 
the postwar period. Demobilization added to the demands of returning soldiers for a voice in the 
policies of the state, and this in particular put enormous pressure for land redistribution when 
combined with the demands from the agricultural sector and the village. At the level of state- and 
nation-building, the redrawing of the map of Europe, particularly in the lands formerly held by the 
Habsburg, Romanov, and Ottoman Empires, bequeathed upon the interwar period a difficult 
calculus pitting national self-determination against territorial integrity.  
 The vast literature on the cultural memory of the First World War underscores the 
disillusionment and cultural rejection that set a generation apart. But more often than not, in the 
short term, this meant either a discrediting or marginalization of the traditional political forces that 
had either been implicated in national catastrophes for the defeated states, or else in the senseless 
slaughter that engulfed the victors as well. One could then argue that the experience in the First 
World War, which had brought down the very system that it had sought to maintain and strengthen, 
was transformed into the cautionary tale that underwrote the efforts to ensure stability in the early 
1920s. 17 
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 In trying to overcome the shortcomings of scholarship encumbered by "the habit of 
thinking in terms of national quarrels," Fritz Fellner has sought a corrective through the emphasis 
on continuities.18 In his argument one can see an antecedent to the crucial scholarship of Charles 
Maier in Recasting Bourgeois Europe, yet it is precisely this work that complicates facile 
distinctions between rupture and continuity.19 The political space opened up by the First World 
War introduced for the first time agrarian political actors on the national stage that either had direct 
or potential access to the transformation of their societies. Within the limits imposed by the 
particularities of each country, these agrarian formations provided a buffer against the expansion 
of social revolution along the lines of the October Revolution. In this sense they served as a buffer 
to socialist or communist expansion. But this holds true only in conjunction with the statement that 
their role as a buffer went hand in hand with their own programs for fundamental transformation. 
To put this differently, the claims advanced by the agrarian parties at the very least articulated a 
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political agenda that had to be taken seriously and either incorporated or confronted by any rival 
political entity in the interwar period. This would describe the position of the Savez Zemljoradnika 
or the Republikánská Strana, even if one were to retrench around the myopic refusal to 
comprehend the unique parliamentary stability of Czechoslovakia throughout the interwar period, 
of which the latter party was a guarantor, as a revolutionary achievement. As far as the Naroden 
Suiuz or the Seljačka  Stranka are concerned, however, there is no other way to describe their 
activity but as politics in a new key. 
 While the argument so far has emphasized the commonalities in the transformative 
experience and legacy of the First World War, attention to the different ways in which political 
space was occupied by the agrarian parties in no way undercuts the broader framework. In what 
follows, a history is presented of the trajectory to prominence that each agrarian party took during 
and immediately after the war. To temper the teleology inherent in such a reading, special attention 
will be paid to the way the war and its aftermath effectuated transformations in these agrarian 
political parties themselves. 
 
The war decade and the BANU 
 
  In the case of Bulgaria, the experience of the First World War is intimately tied to the 
Balkan Wars, and not only insofar as it offered a possibility of reversing the territorial 'losses' 
incurred in the Second Balkan War. The casualties in the First World War, which amount to 






the Balkan Wars.20 The territorial gains made in the First Balkan War were lost in the Second, 
ncluding Southern Dobrudzha, Eastern Thrace, and most of Macedonia. Western Thrace, which 
had been retained with much difficulty at the Treaty of Bucharest was lost following the First 
World War at the treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine. Between 1915 and 1919 the grain harvest fell by 
almost half, while inflation between 1900 and the beginning of 1919 stood at 1100%.21 The 
national catastrophe discredited both the bourgeois parties and the throne, Tsar Ferdinand being 
forced to abdicate in favor of his son Boris in October, 1918, but the rise of the Agrarian Union 
was not due to simply occupying a power vacuum. 
 Already from the run up to the First Balkan Wars, the Agrarian Union had staked an antiwar 
stance. Alexander Stamboliiski and the BANU MP, Stoian Omarchevski, who would later become 
Stamboliiski's Minister of Education, made the case in the party organ, Zemledelkso Zname, that 
the question of Macedonia was used to distract from domestic social reforms and that, "the real 
enemies of the Bulgarian people... were absolutism, reactionary social policies, and blind 
nationalism, against which all peoples, Bulgarians, Turks, Serbs, and Greeks, should unite."22 
Military censorship, which came into effect with mobilization, deprived the agrarians of their 
tribune as Zemledelsko Zname was forced to shut down. 
 The perorational character of Stamboliiski is visible in two confrontational 'meetings' that 
he had with Tsar Ferdinand at the immediate start and end of the First World War. These 
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conversations are worth examining in greater detail as they not only bookend the war and reveal 
Stamboliiski's position vis-à-vis the conflict, but they also reflect the changed position and 
authority of BANU by the end of the war. The meetings were first published and presented with a 
commentary by Nikola Petkov, the former editor of Zemledelkso Zname, who would take over the 
leadership of BANU "Alexander Stamboliiski" during the Second World War and would later 
mount the most serious resistance to the communization of Bulgaria after 1944.23  
 On 28 August, 1915, driven by the rumors that Bulgaria's entry in the war on the side of 
the central powers was imminent, a delegation of the agrarian parliamentary group, composed of 
Stamboliiski, Dimitur Dragiev, and Aleksandur Dimitrov, sought to dissuade the prime minister 
Vasil Radoslavov from this course.24 Despite the arguments, the delegation was sent away after 
being told that everything already has been decided and that there would be no turning back. 
Suspecting that this decision had been made at the court, a meeting was called of all the 
parliamentary oppositional groups (Broad Socialist, Narrow Socialist, Democratic, Radical 
Democratic, Progressive Liberal – Danevist, National - Geshovist, and BANU) to determine a 
course of action. It should be remembered, that BNZS was the second largest party in parliament 
after the November 24, 1913 elections, which had given it 48 deputies and 20.9% of the vote to 
the 95 deputies and 38.2% of the vote for the Liberal Coalition. As I have already argued, the crisis 
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of the Balkan Wars links to that of the First World War in the case of Bulgaria, and as John Bell 
has written in discussing the 1913 electoral results, "This swing of the Bulgarian electorate away 
from the established parties [is] a movement that Bulgaria's defeat in the First World War was to 
complete."25 Based on the BANU's oppositional strength and its consistent condemnation of the 
First World War already from 1914, the meeting of the oppositional groups tasked Stamboliiski to 
lead representatives of most of the groups to an audience with the king on September 4, 1915. 
 Stamboliiski's speech to the king was at first a very daring exposition of the arguments 
against entry into the First World War. Given the specific Bulgarian context, Stamboliiski summed 
up the planned entry into the war as baseless adventurism with no hope of success. He 
distinguished the Tsar's adventurism from popular national action to stress its complete 
unrealizability: "But every adventurism, when it has the essential element for its broadest 
realization, i.e. when it is a popular and attractive action to the national masses, it achieves the 
unassailable epithet "Народно дело" [patriotic act] and can bravely present itself at the 
international market and can bravely defend its correct or incorrect cause."26 Assuming the mantle 
of a tribune for the Bulgarian people, Stamboliiski enumerated five characteristics of the Bulgarian 
people: 
1. Its feelings toward Russia have not disappeared. That is sad, but a fact. 
It is sad because it limits the free rein of the Bulgarian statesman. 
2. Its horrible impression of the pogrom it survived [sic - referring to the 
Second Balkan War] also has not disappeared. 
3. Its faith in the rulers is dead. 
4. The fear of war, and especially an unpopular war, and at that a war on 
several fronts, is a terrible nightmare in its consciousness and constantly 
stifles it. 
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5. And most importantly, its faith in You, Your Highness, is completely 
shaken and killed. In its eyes, in the eyes of the nation, after the pogrom 
of 16 June, 1913, you have been stripped of the renown of being a fine 
diplomat.27 
 
 If the King were to persist with his course, Stamboliiski warned him of the consequences: 
 
In 1913, immediately after the demobilization of the army, we began to 
receive letters, delegations from all corners of Bulgaria began to appear 
before us, through which the bitter and dishonored Bulgarian people 
implored us to lead the struggle for the quick and decisive finding and 
punishing of those culpable for the pogrom, of which, first and foremost, 
are You. Indeed, those gentlemen around you wholly attempt to elude 
responsibility, but we have never separated them from you. And well, since 
we believed then that the pogrom was not a malicious action by you and 
your ministers, and since we were afraid about the fate of Bulgaria from 
the Rumanian invasion, we decisively positioned ourselves against that 
brutal popular feeling and we succeeded in diverting it. Remember though, 
that if tomorrow you perpetrate the same criminal act, we, the people of 
the Agrarian Union, not only will not halt the national resentment against 
You, but we, ourselves, will become its expression, when we serve You its 
harsh but just sentence.28 
 
 The audience did not end well in two respects. First, when Stamboliiski reiterated that the 
king's course would lead to the loss of his head, Ferdinand replied, "Don't worry about my head, I 
am old, think about yours, as you are still young."29 Indeed, on 13 September, 1915 a warrant for 
Stamboliiski's arrest was issued and he was incarcerated on 15 September, 1915.30 Second, 
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Stamboliiski's intervention in no way halted Bulgaria's entry in the war. The day after the meeting, 
Radoslavov signed the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between Bulgaria and Germany, thus 
placing the country on the side of the Central Powers. Mobilization followed on 21 September, 
and Bulgarian troops moved into Serbia on 11 October, 1915. 
 A military court initially sentenced Stamboiiski to death for treason, but this sentence was 
commuted to life in prison. Petkov quotes Stamboliiski as saying that he was pressured initially to 
sign a declaration that he approved the foreign policy course and military action in order to 
preserve his life, but with the latter's refusal, incarceration was preferred in order to avoid revolts 
in the army.31 Stamboliiski spent the war years in prison and although he had been relegated to 
strict confinement for life, the conditions of political prisoners in the Central Prison of Sofia 
allowed a softening of the blow against the BANU. Kosta Todorov was also incarcerated with 
Stamboliiski and he relates how the cells were unlocked and prisoners could walk around freely 
and visit each other. In addition, they read the Bulgarian and French press and were allowed 
"dentist visits" in town twice a week.32 Only in 1918, when Stamboliiski's efforts to prepare 
agrarians in the army for a possible coup d'état was discovered did Radoslavov decide "to break 
up the Agrarian ‘General Staff’ in the Central Prison."33 This treatment very much resembles that 
of Raskolnikov, Trotsky, Kamenev, and Lunacharky in the Crosses Prison after the July Days in 
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Petrograd.34 Until then, Stamboliiski was engaged with providing direction and managing disputes 
within the BANU, as well as writing materials.  
 In the brochure, "Power, Anarchy, and Democracy" that he wrote in prison in 1917, 
Stamboliiski prepared the ground for the agrarians to take the reins of government. Written 
seemingly as an abstract theoretical treatise, it is in fact a manifesto: "The democratic regime will 
call to the stage those hidden and until now sleeping national forces, will bathe them in the light 
of general enlightenment from school education, will temper them in the impetus of struggle, and 
will utilize them in the whirlpool, the swarm of creative political life.... Power wielded by the 
people can undo the evil that has been caused by power wielded by monarchs and oligarchies."35  
Stamboliiski's intervention prevented the fractioning of the BANU’s parliamentary group 
between the incarcerated leadership and those that had remained at liberty, and the united front 
allowed the resumption in the publication of Zemledelsko Zname from August 1917, although 
under strict censorship. When the Radoslavov government fell from the added weight of reversals 
in the war, the activities of the Opposition Bloc, which the BANU had joined, and the failure to 
recover Dobrudzha, the BANU did not join the Malinov cabinet when it was formed on 21 June, 
1918. Indeed, although the Opposition Bloc parties gave their support to the new government, 
Stamboliiski used the platform of Zemledelsko Zname to critique his colleague's, Dragiev, call for 
BANU to enter into a government of national unity. He was banking on his conviction that Malinov 
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would not last and that the BANU would be able to take power, and so all efforts went into agitation 
amongst soldiers at the front and organizational preparations to rule when the war ended. 
 The collapse of the Bulgarian front at Dobro Pole on 15 September, 1918 set the stage for 
Stamboliiski's release from prison and his second meeting with Tsar Ferdinand. The Bulgarian 
soldiers mutinied on their retreat to Sofia and only the fact that Bulgarian forces were able to hold 
their fortified positions at Dojran on 18-19 September prevented occupation by the advancing 
Greek and British Forces. The meeting of Stamboliiski and the King on 25 September, 1918 
completes the saga that began with the first audience in 1915. After exchanging a few initial 
"pleasantries" in which the King accused Stamboliiski and the BANU of stabbing the country in 
the back and destroying the front, while Stamboliiski reiterated that the blame for the national 
tragedy lay with the throne, the personal attacks mounted when the question of peace at any cost 
was broached. I am providing the content of some of the repartee in greater detail because it is so 
characteristic of the two mentalities of governance as well as the theatrical élan with which the 
changing of the guard is presented. 
[Ferdinand]- I have been and will remain a true friend and ally of the 
Central Powers. In my veins flows the blood of the nobleman. 
[Stamboliiski]- I do not doubt that, because I have tasted plenty of your 
nobility. 
-You have the coarseness of the peasant!... 
-But I do not have the wickedness of the nobleman. 
-You are unimaginably bold!... 
-But extraordinarily truthful. 
-Your tongue is intolerable!... 
-But my heart and soul are captivating. I have, as the Russians say, a nasty 






-You make use of the most boorish threats against me! 
-And still, not one hair from your head has fallen because of me. 
-You lack flexibility and perspicacity. You still have not reformed 
yourself... 
-It is too late, Your Highness, to show regret [pishmanluk] - I am out of 
prison. Besides, I find that your evaluation of me is incorrect. I feel that I 
am in the prime of my powers. I tested and tempered my will in the fires 
of the harshest suffering, and as to my intellectual prowess and political 
discernment, the events from 1912 up to now most eloquently attest to their 
scope and brilliance. During all those tumultuous and fateful times, that 
which I foretold, has happened. I also studied Your statesmen and 
councillors and I find, when I do an impartial comparison, way too many 
advantages in my favor. You will not find vacillation, uncertainty, or 
instability in my soul and character - something that acquires a most tragic 
shape in them. That you have reached the same conclusion is shown by the 
fact that the day before yesterday you sent a man to me with the offer to 
hand the government to me in these most fateful minutes for Bulgaria.36 
 
 When the conversation turned to what was to be done, it revolved around the issues of the 
reconstruction of the cabinet and the buttressing of the front until a ceasefire could be arranged. 
Stamboliiski positioned himself against the immediate forming of a new government, not because 
he was, as a matter of principle, "against the reconstruction of the present cabinet, but because I 
am convinced that it won't occur in the way that the needs of the times demand. In order for a real 
change in the cabinet to occur, a change that the whole nation wants, events have to somehow put 
greater pressure on you [Ferdinand]."37 The turning point of the meeting was the proposal to pacify 
the troops at the front. Ferdinand was ecstatic and could not wait to have Stamboliiski depart. Only 
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as a farewell courtesy did he ask what Stamboliiski intended to do after that. The response 
anticipated the rebirth of BANU after the war: "My first task after the signing of the peace is to 
revive, cure, and recreate the Agrarian Union, after which I will apply all my energy to the deep 
national [vsenarodno] revival of unfortunate Bulgaria that experienced such long and unfortunate 
wars."38 
 The very next day, Stamboliiski and Raiko Daskalov, who had been imprisoned with him, 
left for the front in the company of the Minister of War and a few other parliamentarians. They 
met the returning rebellious troops in the village of Radomir outside of Sofia. While Stamboliiski 
continued south in order to reach the Army Headquarters in Kiustendil, Daskalov remained in 
Radomir. By the next day, Daskalov had organized the soldiers into eight infantry battalions and 
two machine gun companies, had proclaimed a republic, declared a provisional government, and 
had sent an ultimatum for recognition to Sofia. The rebelling soldiers slowly marched on Sofia but 
were routed on September 30 by Macedonian brigades and German reinforcements. Even with this 
defeat, the transformation of Bulgarian politics was not halted, as Tsar Ferdinand's forced 
abdication on October 3, 1918 in favor of his son Boris III pacified the rebellious atmosphere 
among the soldiers. 
 The Radomir Rebellion or the Soldiers' Uprising, as this episode has entered the 
historiography, generated contentious historiographical debates almost from its conclusion.39 The 
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central issue of the debate was whether the Agrarians planned the proclamation of the republic or 
whether they were swept up in a popular uprising. Naturally, this was most important for 
communist analysis, and indeed, Daskalov added Stamboliiski's name to the declaration with 
neither his knowledge nor presence. Upon his return from Kiustendil, Stamboliiski did not join 
Daskalov, but rather returned to Sofia, where he had to contend with the refusal of the Agrarian 
Parliamentary Group, headed by Dimitur Dragiev, to recognize the rebellion.  
 Stamboliiski inflated his role in the rebellion for political purposes when he began speaking 
about it in 1919.40 Raiko Daskalov exaggerated the historical significance of the episode in a 
speech from 18 June, 1919 in which he talked about the "September Revolution" (not to be 
confused with the September Uprising of 1923).41 In a skewed attempt at comparative analysis, 
but which is indicative of the connections and inspirations that the interwar agrarian movements 
derived from each other, he announced, "The Czechs are also a Slavic people like us, they too led 
a war against the Central Powers, and not for three years like us, but for four. Today, however, 
they are incomparably better off than we are, chiefly because they managed to break with the 
politics of the Habsburgs after the rout and follow up on the consequences. We embarked on the 
same road that we had taken a month earlier. They succeeded, we didn't."42 Kosta Todorov also 
takes liberties with causality when he writes, "Daskalov's rebellion had failed, but its main purpose 
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was achieved. On the very day it was crushed, Malinov sent a delegation to Salonika to ask for an 
armistice, and persuaded King Ferdinand to abdicate."43 
 Much more important for the history of Bulgaria, however, were the tensions with Dimitur 
Blagoev's Bulgarska rabotnicheska sotsialdemokraticheska partiia (tesni sotsialisti) (Bulgarian 
Socal Democratic Workers' Party - Narrow Socialists, BRSDP, t.s.), which was to rename itself in 
1919 into the Bulgarska komunisticheska partiia (tesni sotsialisti) (Bulgarian Communist Party - 
Narrow Socialists, BKP, t.s.), that emerged from this episode. Stamboliiski sought Blagoev's help 
to create an internal uprising in the capital during the days of the Soldiers' Uprising. He was 
prepared to accept the program of the communists with the exception of the assault on private 
property, but Blagoev's calculations were that Stamboliiski would occupy the role of a Kerensky 
and refused support.44 This was the first step that turned the two parties which mobilized the 
revolutionary sentiment of the post-war years from potential allies into adversaries. 
 In terms of organizational transformation, the end of the First World War marked the 
resurrection of the BANU. During the war years, 1915-1919, the union had not collected 
membership dues. The Permanent Presence (Postoiannoto Prisustvie) of the party, its executive 
body, did not function and alongside Stamboliiski two of its other members, Stancho Momchev 
and Andrei Sharenkov, were incarcerated. Conscription, too, meant that the rank and file of the 
local agrarian organizations, the druzhbi (unions), spent the duration of the three wars at the fronts. 
It was in the aftermath of the armistice and demobilization, and the release of the BANU 
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leadership, that the organizational life of the party could resume. When the 77,298 members of 
BANU in 1919 elevated it to the rank of the most numerous party in the country, one needs to take 
stock of the furious organizational activity: the agrarian druzhbi numbered 1883 at the start of 
June, 1919, but nearly half of those, 920, had been formed after the war.45 The amnesty at the end 
of 1918, whose promulgation was sped up by BANU and communist grass roots agitation, also 
opened the gates to the electoral successes for the parties of change. 
 BANU participated in the short transitional coalition governments of Aleksandur Malinov 
and Teodor Teodorov, and Stamboliiski signed the Peace Treaty in Paris.46 At the National 
Assembly elections of 17 August, 1919, BANU received the largest percentage of votes and 36% 
of the elected deputies. With the communists in second place, and the Broad Socialists in third 
place, these three parties occupied 71% of the seats in the Narodno Subranie after having received 
a combined 59% of the vote. Stamboliiski had to create a coalition government and again he first 
approached Blagoev but was rejected as representative of the petite bourgeoisie. A coalition with 
the Broad Socialists was attempted next and in Paris Stamboliiski reached an agreement with Ianko 
Sakuzov to create a cabinet of six Agrarians, 3 Broad Socialists, and one Radical. On their return 
to Sofia, however, this agreement collapsed because of the demands of the Broad Socialists for 
four ministerial posts that would include the Ministries of Interior, War, and the Foreign Ministry. 
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Presented by the Broad Socialists ostensibly as a way to secure food deliveries and to combat 
speculation, this demand was taken as a thinly veiled preparation for a coup.47 In this way 
Stamboliiski was forced to work with the National and Progressive Liberal parties.  
 On the day that the new parliament was to begin work, 24 December, 1919, the Communist 
Party planned demonstrations to challenge the government. As a result of the imposition of martial 
law, few of the planned demonstrations occurred, but the next day the railroad workers went on an 
unplanned strike. This in turn expanded into a general strike on 28 December, 1919 and it received 
the support of the Broad Socialists. Whereas the strike grew from below and expressed genuine 
labor unrest, BANU and the rest of the political spectrum responded to it as a political challenge. 
Using the Orange Guard, which was the agrarian militia, and Allied support, Stamboliiski 
decisively and mercilessly crushed the strike on 5 January, 1920. The rupture between the two 
streams of the Bulgarian Left was complete and later found further expression in the communist 
refusal to defend the BANU regime against the June coup of 1923, despite the criticism from 
Moscow, something elaborated in greater detail in chapter 4. 
 After the communist challenge, Stamboliiski dissolved parliament and called for new 
elections on March 28, 1920. The results gave the BANU more than twice the deputies of the 
Communist Party and, in fact, BANU was only five seats short of an absolute majority. Using a 
technicality in the electoral law, thirteen seats were invalidated, and from 20 May, 1920, the 
BANU embarked on its project to transform Bulgaria.             
                                                 







 As a loser in the wars from 1912-1918, the Bulgarian case reveals the greatest 
radicalization and presents the traditional political structure at its weakest. Consequently, the 
transformative effects of the war almost enable a teleology that places the BANU at the head of 
the country in 1920. However, the cases of national triumph, rather than tragedy, like the ones in 
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, were also subjected to the transformative pressures brought about 
by the war, especially when the questions of state formation and reorganization are concerned. 
 
Agrarians in the service of the nation and the republic 
 
 Even though it was founded after the First World War, the Savez Zemljoradnika's 
appearance on the political stage becomes intelligible only in relation to its challenge to and 
encroachment on the base of the Narodna Radikalna Stranka of Nikola Pašić (National Radical 
Party, NRS). The Radical Party's roots in the Serbian village can be traced to the legacy of Peasant 
Radicals who formed in 1874 as an oppositional group in the Skupština. The uniting of agrarian 
delegates around Adam Bogosavljević was an expression of peasant discontent aimed at 
addressing peasant grievances and the dismantling of the bureaucratic state. The Radical Socialist 
movement under Svetozar Marković and Nikola Pašić was sympathetic to Bogosavljević and 
joined it in the Skupština even before it had formed the NRS. But with the death of Marković in 
1875 and Bogosavljević in 1880, Pašić was able to co-opt this foundation when he formed the 
NRS on January 8, 1881. Augusta Dimou summarizes this process, "By absorbing and 
appropriating the legacy of the Bogosavljević group, the Radicals managed to effectively stifle the 






of the Radicals met the discontent and the collectivist aspirations of the agrarian world halfway, 
adopting therefore several of their concrete social and political demands, and echoing to a large 
extent their worldview. Along with other factors, this goes far to explain the large-scale success of 
the Radical Party."48 Dimou is absolutely correct to characterize the Radical Party as a populist 
peasantist formation that presented itself as the mouthpiece of the peasantry and her analysis is 
that much stronger for recognizing that "both radicalism and agrarianism [here the comparison is 
to the BANU] shared and anti-capitalistic core credo and envisioned the retention of the small 
agrarian producer."49 This aspect of the NRS ensured its hegemony, especially as it could also 
draw on the victory in the First World War and the enormous territorial expansion of the state. 
 That the Savez Zemljoradnika could challenge and carve out its own electorate in the 
Serbian village against such an opponent is a testament to the resuscitation of agrarianist sentiment 
immediately after the First World War. Serbia had lost 25% of its population in the wars from 
1912-1918 and agricultural production fell by 70%.50 Foremost on the mind of demobilized 
peasants was the question of land reform. In Bosnia and Hercegovina, one of the few areas on the 
Balkans that were characterized by large landholdings and feudal relations, there were peasant 
revolts and seizures of land in November and December, 1918. In this context, one of the primary 
questions for the first government formed under the leadership of Stojan Protić on 20 December, 
1918 through a compromise between the National Council of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and the 
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Serbian government was land reform. Prince Regent Alexander issued a Manifesto on 6 January 
1919 that promised agrarian reform, the elimination of feudal relations and the parcelization of 
large estates and asked the populace for patience while the reform was achieved through legal 
means. The Preliminary Regulation from 25 February, 1919 began the land reform.  
 As in Bulgaria, the question among the radicalized and politicized peasantry was one of 
political representation and the lack of faith that lawyers and merchants could represent them in 
parliament. On 12 October, 1919, Mihailo Avramović, who had cut his teeth in the creation of the 
cooperative movement of the Raiffeisen51 type before the war, along with Milan Vlajinac and 
Mihailo Popović, found the Savez Zemljoradnika.52 Having settled on rules and a program, the 
Savez Zemljoradnika began publishing its newspaper, Selo in December 1919. In Bosnia and 
Hercegovina, the Težačka Organizacija (Peasant Organization) was founded on 25 August, 1919 
in Sarajevo at a gathering of 154 delegates which were delegated from peasant assemblies in 43 
districts. Its goal was radical land reform, but separated from the national and religious 
frameworks. At its meeting on 6 June, 1920 the Težačka Organizacija reorganized itself as a party 
under the name Savez Težaka u Bosni i Hercegovini (Union of Peasants in Bosnia and 
Hercegovina). However, at their congress in Sarajevo on 5 December, 1920, the decision was made 
to merge with the Savez Zemljoradnika. In fact, at the Constitutional Assembly elections of 1920, 
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the Savez Zemljoradnika incorporated not only the Bosnian party, but also the Težački Savez from 
Dalmatia, and the Seljački Savez from Croatia. Only the Slovenian Samostalna Kmetijska Stranka 
(Independent Agrarian Party) had its name next to the Savez Zemljoradnika but with the proviso 
that its delegates would work with the SZ in the skupština. After the electoral results, the Savez 
Zemljoradnika came in fifth place with 39 deputies out of 419. The boycott by the CPPP meant 
that in actuality it was the fourth largest block. 
 In Croatia, Radić's Croat People's Peasant Party, CPPP (Hrvatska Pučka Seljačka Stranka, 
HPSS) was the direct beneficiary of the radicalization of the peasantry during the war. This 
radicalization, which was the result of military casualties and military requisitioning in the village, 
meant that by 1918 the countryside was in revolt. Between October and December 1918, armed 
bands of peasants and returning soldiers, the Zeleni Kadar (Green Cadre) sacked estates and 
generally made the Croatian countryside ungovernable. This spontaneous action underscored the 
divide between traditional Croatian politics as advanced by the National Council and the taste of 
freedom from administration that the collapse of the Dual Monarchy produced. The National 
Council's policy to preserve order until the achievement of unification was thus at the center of the 
rural/urban divide.  The CPPP, with its anti-unitarist program and republicanism, became the only 
organized political force that could address these demands. In addition, because the elections for 
a Constitutional Assembly only took place at the end of 1920, for two years the Croatian lands 
were administered through the Serb bureaucratic system. The transferred resentments could then 
latch onto the unique ideological position of the CPPP and its organizational strength at the local 
level in order to resist the intrusion of the state. Biondich is correct to point out that, "The party's 
grassroots organizational work before 1914 paid dividends in the postwar era, but neither the 






should be exaggerated."53 For example, the party had not held its main assemblies at all during the 
war years. Still, a movement that Biondich estimates to have had 15,000 members in 1914, had 
2000 local party organizations and over a million members by 1921.54 
 Reflecting on this state of affairs, Radić wrote, "... this war created a completely new 
opinion and conviction in our peasant people; the opinion that the root of all evil and in particular 
of this war are the kings [vladari] and the conviction that the entire government and administration 
must be changed in their foundations according to peasant need and peasant right."55 The 
oppositional nature of the CPPP as the embodiment of peasant discontent is reflected also in the 
changing of its name in December, 1920 to the Hrvatska Republikanska Seljačka Stranka (Croat 
Republican Peasant Party, CRPP). Its antagonism to Serb centralism also resulted in repression. 
Radić was imprisoned from 25 March, 1919 to 27 February 1920 and then again from 23 March, 
1920 to 28 November, 1920. He was amnestied on 28 Novermber, 1920, the day of the elections 
to the Constituent Assembly, in time to witness the emergence of the CPPP as the only significant 
party of Croatia. In the elections the CPPP was third nationally in the amount of votes and fourth 
in the acquisition of deputy seats (14.3% of the vote and 50 seats). 
 
* 
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 In one sense, the role of the Republikánská srana československého venkova (Republican 
Party of the Czechoslovak Countryside, RSČV) in the early years of the Czechoslovak First 
Republic can be seen as anti-revolutionary. It was a guarantor of order in the revolutionary years 
between 1918 and 1920. It was the strongest party in the Revolutionary National Assembly, but 
that position was based on the proportional application of the 1911 Reichsrat election results. At 
the first corrective in the parliamentary elections of 18 April, 1920, the RSČV lost half its seats 
and was able to get only 9.7% of the vote. The merger with the Slovenská národná a rolnícka 
strana (Slovak National and Peasant Party) in 1922, when it changed its name to the Republikánská 
strana zemědělského a malorolnického lidu (Republican Party of Agriculturalists and Small 
Farmers), added 12 seats to its 28, but they were still overshadowed by the 74 seats of the Social 
Democrats. The Republican Party would only regain its primacy in the parliamentary elections of 
1925. Nonetheless, I argue that its central role in establishing and securing the stability of the 
political system was revolutionary in its own right.  
 The immediate postwar years were marked by civil unrest due to shortages and inflation, 
yet Antonín Švehla, the leader of the Republican Party, was able to use the party’s position to 
maintain moderate parliamentary coalitions. Within his own party he charted a middle course 
between wealthy landowners and poor peasants. To give an example, during the Karel Kramář 
government from 14 November, 1918 to 8 July, 1919 Švehla occupied the posts of vice-Premier 
and Minister of the Interior. As interior minister, he reduced urban unrest through the increase in 
the number of gendarmes and the formation of a "preventive service."56 Miller contrasts the 
political paralysis during the Habsburg Empire to the moderate policy that was maintained in the 
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difficult postwar years, "The catalyst for interparty cooperation and good relations among party 
leaders was Švehla. His political style had much to do with his success at negotiation. Even when 
he became de facto prime minister, he did not try to dictate policy but rather sought the support of 
other coalition parties in the form of a narrow ministerial committee, which brought together 
Agrarians, Social-Democrats, Czech Socialists, and State-Rights Democrats."57  
 Švehla's indispensability, and by extension that of the Republican Party, can be seen in his 
participation in the Red-Green coalition after the Kramář government fell. From July 8, 1919 to 
the elections of 18 April, 1919, the Republican Party was a coalition partner to Vlastimil Tusar's 
Social Democratic Party based on its postwar strength in the Assembly. But even after the dismal 
results, Tusar's new government insisted in keeping Švehla in the coalition. Finally when the 
growing communist wing in the Social Democratic party threatened the stability of the government 
in the summer of 1919, Masaryk, Švehla, and Tusar decided to resolve the crisis through the 
appointment of a government of experts headed by Jan Černý. To support the Černý government, 
and ensure stability, Švehla instituted the Pětka that Daniel Miller described above. Quoting 
Ferdinand Peroutka, Miller characterizes it as, "the Pětka governed and the cabinet of technicians 
administered."58 While the trajectory of the Republican Party did not capitalize on the social unrest 
following the war, its shift from reforming the monarchy and working through the Reichsrat to 
independence, and then to the maintenance of order, institution building, and the formation and 
defense of the political structure of the First Republic is at the heart of the extraordinary and unique 
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perseverance of the Czechoslovak parliamentary order in the interwar period. During that time, the 




 Another, perhaps more evocative, way to express the transformed position that the agrarian 
movements occupied after the First World War is through a juxtaposition with their origins prior 
to the conflict. With the exception of the Savez Zemljioradnika which was a new formation that 
could capitalize on the space opened by the war, the other movements had their beginnings in work 
that was quite limited in its political scope, and whose initial impetus was provided by socio-
economic grievances. While it would be a mistake to discount the significant gains and growth 
that these movements achieved in the first years of the 20th century, nonetheless the developmental 
trajectories of the agrarian movements after the First World War were so accelerated and 
transformed that one must treat them as changes in kind rather than degree. In other words, the 
catalytic effect of war becomes self-evident through the simple exercise of presenting the origins 
of the agrarian movements prior to it.   
 The BANU was founded on 28 December, 1899 from a collection of peasant professional 
and cultural associations. The lack of agricultural credit and the rampant usury in the countryside 
had provided the impetus for the creation of these non-political associations. Consequently, BANU 
was organized initially not as a political party. Its charter called for the enlightenment of the 
peasantry through education and the establishment of mutual savings banks and the provision of 






peasantry. Only at its Third Congress in 1901 did the party become political, but at the cost of the 
departure of some of the membership that was led by one of the founding fathers, Tsanko 
Tserkovksi. From the time the party's first program was adopted in 1905 (prepared by 
Stamboliiski), the BANU began to establish itself in political life, especially through its anti-
monarchist stance and socio-economic program. Nonetheless, at the parliamentary elections of 25 
May 1905, it could muster only 11% of the vote, and even though after the Second Balkan War its 
parliamentary gains had doubled in the 24 November, 1913 election, it still could only claim 21% 
of the vote. 
 The Republican Party, known then as the Českoslovanská strana agrární (Czech-Slavic 
Agrarian Party) was founded in 1905 from the fusion of the Česká strana agrární (Czech Agrarian 
Party) and the Česká strana agrární pro Moravu a Slezsko (Czech Agrarian Party for Moravia and 
Silesia). It worked to improve the condition of smallholders and one of its first successes, one that 
propelled Švehla to the forefront, was in the support it afforded to sugar beet farmers. The refining 
industry was dominated by wealthy estate owners, while the raw material was grown by 
smallholders. The refiners ran virtual monopolies that generated usurious abuse. Švehla worked 
within the Central Union of Sugar Beet Growers and in 1905 caused the deliberation of the problem 
in the Reichsrat. In the first years of the twentieth century, the Českoslovanská strana agrární 
created economic interest groups amongst other sectors of agriculture and that activity generated 
a popularity and base in the countryside. Although the electoral system expanded to universal 
manhood suffrage in 1907 in the Dual Monarchy, and that in turn began transforming the Agrarians 
into a mass party, its economic activity was still central. The expansion of party membership from 






1914, shows a party that was in a position to capitalize on the transformative political potentials 
that the consequences of the First World War brought.59 
 The Hrvatska Pučka Seljačka Stranka was founded on March 10, 1904 by the Radić 
brothers because they were convinced that the peasantry needed its own expression, against the 
politics of the intelligentsia, to advance the cause of the Croatian nation. This was the reason that 
unlike the other Croatian parties before the war, its base was organized in the village. From the 
adoption of its party program in 1905, the party sought to advance the social and political level of 
the peasantry while seeking a solution to the national question. The latter meant resistance to the 
unitarist projects with Serbia, and this position kept it on the political margins until after World 
War One. For instance, its positions in the Sabor which had 88 seats was zero in 1906, 2 in 1908, 
9 in 1910, 8 in 1911, and 3 in 1913.60  
 By June 28, 1921 when the Vidovdan constitution was approved in the Triunine Kingdom, 
the principal agrarian players in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and the Triunine Kingdom had already 
forged or recast themselves into the political movements that would occupy center stage in the 
interwar period. Already from May 21, 1920, the BANU had been able to establish majoritarian 
rule and embark on the ambitious reform programs that allowed Stamboliiski to sum up the 
significance of his politics for European history in the following way, “Today there are only two 
interesting social experiments: the experiment of Lenin and my own.”61 Similarly, Antonín Švehla 
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had placed his stamp on the politics of the First Republic with the creation of the institution of the 
Pětka in September, 1920. 
 Out of the ashes of the First World War, therefore, four autonomous mass movements had 
emerged that in a syncretic way would present the three faces of the alternative modernity 
imbedded within the Golden Age of the European Peasantry. The Bulgarian case was the clearest 
expression of agrarian radicalism. The case of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was 
dominated by the national question, the unifying efforts of the Savez Zemljoradnika 
notwithstanding. The Czechoslovak case, on the other hand, presents a moderate and centrist 
agrarianism that was the key guarantor of parliamentary stability. That is not to say that nationalism 
was not a factor in Czechoslovakia, and indeed the Republican Party could not properly address 
the Sudeten German problem in the way that it incorporated the Slovak agrarians. The key 
difference in the development of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, which otherwise shared a 
similar task of nation-building, lies in the fact that Serbia had had the experience and history as an 
independent state from the nineteenth century. In Serbia, the Radical Party had already challenged 
liberal politics before the First World War and to a degree had mobilized the peasantry. The victory 
in the conflicts from 1912-1918 thus provided it with sufficient prestige to hold out against the 
internal challenge of the Savez Zemljoradnika and the external challenge of the Hrvatska 
Republikanska Seljačka Stranka and this set the tone for the conflictual politics in interwar 
Yugoslavia. Conversely, Czechoslovakia was constituted after the First World War and despite 
the greater development in the lands of Bohemia and Moravia, Slovakia was not subjected to the 
center-periphery politics that were in play in Yugoslavia. The unification of Czechs and Slovaks 
is metaphorically reflected in the renaming of the Republikánská strana československého venkova 






Party of Agriculturalists and Small Farmers) when it merged with the Slovenská národná a 
rolnická strana (Slovak National and Peasant Party). The completely new formation of the 
Czechoslovak state gave the space to the Republican Party to become the major keystone of the 
interwar system.  
 This chapter has located the formation of powerful agrarian political organizations within 
the context of the First World War and the disruptions it caused. It has argued that this context 
allowed the agrarian parties to project themselves onto the national stage, often as the most 
powerful political entities, and that this newfound significance quantitatively and qualitatively 
transformed these organizations. The next chapter extends this argument to the international stage 
and looks at the competing interests and initiatives behind the projection of the peasant on the 
















Projecting the Peasant on the World Stage 
 
 On April 10, 1921, The New York Times ran an article entitled "The Little Anti-Red 
Entente." The subtitle, “Protective Alliance Engineered by Jonescu and Benes --- ‘Green 
Internationale’ Plan," adds another layer to the hodge-podge coverage of developments in Central 
and Southeastern Europe as they appeared from New York. As a result, this article is memorable 
not only because it is one of the first treatments of the idea of a Peasant Green International in the 
press, but also for the way it rather clumsily tries to link it to the Little Entente through the idea of 
an ascendant anti-Bolshevik front. The article eschews the representation of the Little Entente, 
which was signed on August 14, 1920, as the defensive alliance between Czechoslovakia and the 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes that Beneš envisioned against a revanchist Hungary and 
the possibility of a restoration of Austria-Hungary. Nor does it spill any ink on the refusal of 
Romania to join the alliance on August 17, 1920. Romania in fact became a signatory only on 
April 23, 1921, almost two weeks after the article appeared. While France supported the Little 
Entente, its role is promoted to being decisive by the article’s author, Walter Littlefield: 
 
The "Little Entente" is only one of several more or less binding or moral agreements 
between the emancipated States of the old Dual Monarchy and the neighboring 
States which have chiefly profited by its partition.... Often working at cross-
purposes but generally with identical objects in view, these agreements have been 
mainly directed by France and Italy, who have more or less shaped the initial 
programs of Take Jonescu, the Rumanian statesman, and Dr. Edouard Benès, the 
Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia, and the interesting scheme of Alexander 
Stambulisky, the peasant Premier of Bulgaria, for a "Green Internationale" - a 






on the one hand, and the "Red Internationale" of anarchy and Bolshevism, on the 
other [italics mine].62 
 
A consequence of the thesis that the West was constructing and directing an anti-Bolshevik 
front was that the interests and agencies of the states of Central and Southeastern Europe are being 
written out. Furthermore, the imperative of imagining a bulwark against the Soviet state dictated 
the streamlining of convenient facts and the subsumption of contradictions. While the Little 
Entente falls prey to this constricting logic, some redemption can be found in the context of Bela 
Kun's Soviet republic in Hungary. The liberties taken with the insertion of Alexander 
Stamboliiski's regime and the Green International are a different matter altogether. 
 Before I perform the critique of this representation, I would like to present in a little more 
detail the specific "contextualization" that the article offers vis-à-vis Bulgaria. It is a useful 
departure point because the conventions of reporting in the press are the condition for the creation 
of a text that imbeds within it the keys to its deconstruction. 
 In line with the stereotype of Bulgaria as the bête noire of the Balkans, the article reaffirms 
the image even as it suggests that the scheme for the Green International is a sign that finally the 
country is moving in the right direction. "The position of Bulgaria - her correct attitude in trying 
to carry out the terms of the Treaty of Neuilly and her subsequent hope of more territory under the 
readjustment of the Treaty of Sèvres, her supposed leanings toward a sort of rural Bolshevism - 
has, meanwhile, been measurably elucidated by the recent visit of M. Stambulisky to Prague, 
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Warsaw and Bucharest, and the formulating of his scheme for a great "Green Internationale," 
support to which was pledged him in those capitals."  
The description of the theory of the international as the article presents it, based on a speech 
by Stamboliiski at the "Congress of the Agricultural League" on 15 February, 1921, which reads 
as follows: "[T]his was to be an international union of the peasants of Central and Southeastern 
Europe, to offset and overcome the work of the White Internationale of the reactionaries, who 
wanted to restore the dethroned monarchs, and also of the Bolsheviki (the Red Internationale), 
who were attempting to destroy all government and with it industry and individual initiative in 
industry as well as in the arts."  
The quotation from Stamboliiski that is provided is decontextualized and offered in a way 
to suggest that the Green International is a direct response to the threats of the 'reactionaries' and 
'Bolsheviki' in the passage above: "I have no doubt that our 'Green Internationale' will ultimately 
free Russia from the Soviets. At least, it is destined to free farmers elsewhere from the unjust 
restrictions placed upon them by the manufacturers and capitalists, who know nothing about 
farming, and make both realize that the farmer is just as necessary to the life of a country as the 
workers on the roads, in the factories, or employed in transportation." 
 It is fascinating how what originated as a direct critique of liberal capitalism is deflected 
towards the monarchists of the ancien régime. Even more incongruous is the manipulated 
'meaning' of freeing Russia from the Soviets. A western reader might not be aware that 
Stamboliiski had begun an article entitled, "The Russian Revolution" in Zemledelsko Zname in 
1918 with a glowing assessment, "The most glorious event of these times remains the Russian 






the most terrible tsarism, which endangered the progress of all humankind, on the other, it made 
the question of peace the order of the day."63 These words cannot be reduced to temporary and 
misguided revolutionary euphoria carelessly tossed from a prison cell in 1918; one only needs to 
look at his speech on Bulgaria's foreign policy that he read to parliament on 26 October, 1921 for 
a refutation of the anti-Bolshevism claims. "And I have said that we have absolutely nothing 
against Russia, because we do not want to meddle in its internal affairs - let her rule herself as she 
sees fit: whether it is Bolshevik rule or something else, let us only hope it is not tsarist rule.... 
Because this tsarism ruined it, and not Bolshevism - tsarism ruined it." Responding to his critics, 
Stamboliiski continued, 
 
You accuse us of Bolshevism and these accusation go into the mouth of foreigners. 
Supposedly we have been pushing Bulgaria towards Bolshevism. This accusation, 
this suspicion still exists. Why? Because we chase away the Wrangelisti [these are 
the White Russian remnants of General Pyotr Wrangel's army that sought refuge in 
Bulgaria after its defeat in the Russian Civil War], because we chase those generals 
which want to conspire in Bulgaria, which try to impose on us another mentality, 
another constitution, other laws. What do you want? You want us to pass a law with 
which to forbid the existence of these people. We cannot impair the freedom of the 
Bulgarian people. We want there to be a proper Switzerland on the Balkan 
peninsula. You strove to make it a Prussia, a Japan, we will strive to make it a 
Switzerland.64 
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 As an anti-Bolshevik initiative grotesquely married to the Little Entente, the representation 
of the Green International in the New York Times is an artifact of wishful thinking and the need to 
make the complex and radical developments in the Balkans conform to the mental frameworks of 
a Western readership. However, I do not intend to single out a "Western" misrepresentation that is 
implicated in imagining the Balkans and then facilely overturn it through recourse to a Rankean 
positivism that draws its claims of authenticity from being rooted in the region. Substantive 
references to the Green International are minimal prior to 1923. I would like to illustrate that 
condition of flux and indeterminacy with three examples from three of the most prominent 
architects of that institution, Antonin Švehla, Milan Hodža, and Alexander Stamboliiski. The 
provision of this caveat will go a long way to explain how the space for outside appropriations 
such as that of The New York Times became possible. It also makes the 'imagination' of The New 
York Times just one among several imaginaries that were sparked by the agrarian potential.65 
 The lack of clarity about the International, but also the interest it sparked, is evidenced by 
a letter sent by the Bulgarian Legation in Paris to Sofia on August 11, 1921. The letter informs 
Stamboliiski, who was also holding at that time the portfolio of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
that the French government has begun to be interested in the agrarian movement in Europe and is 
seeking to determine if it represents a danger to the current social order. Not only does the letter 
report that the French agrarian parties had been investigated for possible links to the Green 
International, but also that a French commissar from the Interior Ministry had questioned the 
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secretary of the Bulgarian Legation about the goals of the international and the means with which 
it intended to pursue them.66  
 Until the Mezinarodni Agrarni Bureau (The International Agrarian Bureau, MAB) started 
its work seriously in Prague in 1923, the idea of the Green International was nebulous, fuzzy, and 
in the service of competing interests. Yet even that crystallization of the institution was 
problematized in the internal self-assessment that the MAB produced in 1927.  At the end of 1927, 
Karel Mečíř, the specially appointed Secretary General of the MAB by Antonin Švehla to overhaul 
the institution, wrote an official letter to Jovan Jovanović, the president of the Savez 
Zemljoradnika, to inform him of changes in the statutes of the organization. The task of 
reorganization and enlargement of the activities of the MAB that Mečíř undertook were justified 
in that letter through a rather ungenerous summation of the first few years of work, "You know, 
dear Minister, that the hopes we had placed on the activity of this international organization were 
not realized at its inception. It is true that even the Bulletin appeared rather irregularly. In these 
conditions, one should not be surprised to see that the links between the Bureau and the member 
parties have weakened more and more, until they have become a pure formality."67  
The fear of Mečíř was that without an international organization to bind the peasant 
political parties, not only would the political influence of peasants be diminished, but also that 
without it any other agrarian organization would be condemned to stagnation. Mečíř's letter 
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specifically names Švehla as the founder of the MAB and there is no mention of Stamboliiski. 
Further, Mečíř refers to Jovan Jovanović's predecessor, Avramović, only as a signatory to Švehla's 
institution. 
 In a letter dated ten days earlier, 15 October, 1927, this time signed both by Mečíř and 
Švehla, the elision of Stamboliiski's contribution to the Green International is even more glaring. 
While making the case for the necessity of an international agrarian organization, both authors use 
the bloody coup against Stamboliiski and the even more violent white terror in its aftermath to 
engage in some counterfactual speculation. "And let us also remember that in Bulgaria, under a 
past regime, thousands of peasants were killed without due process, that a war of extermination 
was declared on the peasant political organization, the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, a war 
which took the lives of 20 thousand peasants. Who learned of it, who protested? How many 
thousands of these wretches could have been saved if the peasant parties had been informed, united 
internationally and had decided to act?"68 
 As an appeal to international peasant unity, these words are compelling. However, Švehla 
was fully aware of the extent and consequences of the coup against Stamboliiski, that 
Czechoslovakia limited its assistance to the acceptance of a few political refugees, and that it 
promptly recognized the new regime of Alexander Tsankov. I will go into greater detail about the 
response of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia to the coup in chapter 4, but the decision to adopt a 
passive response that would not shake up the post-war order requires a mention here to 
contextualize Švehla's and Mečíř's next sentence: "All these circumstances and considerations 
convinced us to create the International Agrarian Bureau. The International Agrarian Bureau in 
                                                 






Prague exists since 1923 and is responsible for the appearance of the Bulletin of the International 
Agrarian Bureau which is to date the only international organ of the peasant political movement 
(italics mine)."69 
 As an imaginary that frames the function of the MAB, this one is no less problematic than 
the earlier production by The New York Times. But let us now complete the picture with an even 
more evocative iteration that was generated in Bulgaria by Stamboliiski himself a few short months 
before his death. Mihail Genovski was an eminent cadre of BANU in the second half of the 
twentieth century. He served as the Minister of Agriculture and State Property in the second cabinet 
of Kimon Georgiev after the Second World War and was an MP from 1945-1949 and 1981-1990. 
In 1923 he was 20 years old and as a founder of the Bulgarian Youth Agrarian Union, he was 
invited to attend a meeting with Stamboliiski on April 2nd, 1923.70 The purpose of the meeting 
was to coordinate with the youth movement planned changes in the makeup of the leadership of 
BANU, to begin preparation for changes in the political and economic program of the party, and 
to prepare the ground for the elimination of the monarchy and a new constitution. Alongside these 
topics, however, the question of the Green International arose in a context in which the leading 
cadres of the youth movement were asking Stamboliiski for clarification for the otherwise 
nebulous pronouncements that had accumulated concerning the Green International in 
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proclamations in the press and in political speeches. This source is a unique interior view into the 
expectations and strategies concerning that initiative from the Bulgarian side. 
 The discussion began from an examination of the differences between the various agrarian 
parties in Europe and the absence of a common ideology to link them. When the difference 
between the Bulgarian and Czech parties over the membership of large landowners was discussed, 
Dimitur Iliev asked, "Why are we then uniting with them and creating a peasant international, the 
Green International?" Stamboliiski's tripartite answer lays bare the imaginary of Bulgarian 
agrarian interests, 
 
 For us, for now, the Green International has a threefold significance: first, we have 
to secure the support of the political currents in other countries, and especially in 
those countries which are in the system of the victors, for example those that have 
entered into the Little Entente; second, when we interact with them, we 
propagandize our ideas and we can influence the social composition and the ideas 
of these peasant parties; third, the Green International is necessary for us a means 
to differentiate ourselves from the communists.71 
 
 
Each of these points is pregnant with signification. First is the projection of agrarianism on 
the international stage as a means to modify the postwar Versailles divisions between victors and 
vanquished and to supplant them with a cooperative, agrarian structure. Second is the expanding 
horizon of possibility of the radical reorganization of social structures and the implementation of 
a peasant alternative modernity. Third is the carving out of space at the same level of prestige as 
the competing developmental paths, in this case namely the Communist alternative because it was 
                                                 






the closest competitor in recasting the role of the peasant citizen. Further, while key terms such as 
the "Little Entente" and "communists" reappear between the different imaginaries of the Green 
International, the differences in the approaches to them is staggering. At its extreme, rather than 
an anti-Bolshevik front, the Green International is conceived here as a parallel developmental 
front. Earlier in the meeting Stamboliiski categorically repeated his position concerning the 
Communist Party, "We would be no genuine representatives of the sovereign people 
[narodovlastnitsi], we the agrarians, if we forbid the legal life of a political organization, which, 
according to our tenets about the estate organization of society, has the historical right to exist and 
has deep roots among the working masses."72 
 The history of the crystallization of the Green International as an institution in the fall of 
1923 is explained by multiple currents in the development and implementation of agrarianism in 
the first decades after the First World War and the responses of various peripheral forces. Two 
frames are useful for contextualizing that history: the federalist idea itself and the competition from 
its rival, the Moscow based, International Peasant Council (Krestintern). Both of these frames 
operated on the international stage where the agrarian parties, via the Green International, sought 
to project themselves. But that international stage, despite the hopes and efforts by the agrarian 
parties to recast it (foremost among which were the efforts of Bulgaria) was severely constrained 
by the Versailles system. 
 At the Paris Peace Conference, Stamboliiski appealed to the Great Powers for a just peace, 
which would not produce a truncated Bulgaria burdened with impossible reparations. On 22 
                                                 







November, 1919, Stamboliiski, who was present in Paris to sign the treaty, sent out several letters 
with that goal in mind. The letter to Georges Clemenceau was an assurance of the good faith of 
the Bulgarian regime particularly since Stamboliiski could mobilize his own and the BANU's 
opposition to the policies of Ferdinand. It was also an appeal for clemency in these circumstances, 
since, as Stamboliiski, argued, a just peace would eliminate the points of contention between the 
Balkan nations: "The League of Nations could establish more equitable borders on the Balkan 
Peninsula, acceptable to all nations, and in this way it could contribute to a final understanding 
and political rapprochement between the Balkan states. The victors could also solve the Thracian 
question by leaving Bulgaria a free and sufficient territorial outlet to the Aegean, which is 
necessary for our trade relations with them."73 
 In order to strengthen his appeal, Stamboliiski also wrote to his Balkan colleagues, Nikola 
Pašić (Serbia), Constantin Coandă (Romania, stand-in for Ion Brătianu), and Eleftherios Venizelos 
(Greece). The letter to Pašić deserves a closer look because its tone is pregnant with heartfelt 
affection for Serbia and presumes that that feeling was mutual. The other letters are measured and 
depend on careful arguments. This one however, begins with, "I believe that a voice will not be 
raised in Serbia to challenge my sincere desire for a tight rapprochement between the two Slavic 
nations - the Serbian and Bulgarian. My whole past as a political figure is an unbroken chain of 
deeds towards the realization of this idea. I fought against this fatal war in Parliament, in the press, 
among the people and I have always preached not only rapprochement, but a union between our 
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two nations (italics mine)."74 For Stamboliiski, the post-war elevation of the Bulgarian Agrarian 
National Union to a position of power meant not only a recasting of the domestic structures in 
Bulgaria, but also the chance to shape the Balkans and Europe. With this in mind, he concludes 
his letter to Pašić, "Give us your hand. I will do in my fatherland everything possible to achieve 
this ideal and to put forever an end to the bloody struggles between our brotherly nations. Give me 
your valuable cooperation. Nothing is impossible! As long as there is good will, the basis for a 
lasting agreement will be found. In it is the salvation of the Balkan nations."75 
 Pašić did not even dignify this gesture of cordiality with a reply. The less ebullient letter to 
Venizelos, however, at least was answered. Writing on 25 November, 1919, Venizelos politely, 
but firmly rebuffed the suggestion of concessions from the Greek side and stood by the 
consequences of employing the principle of "War Guilt."  
 
If some sacrifice is necessary, Bulgaria cannot ask this sacrifice from its neighbors 
in accordance with its friendship. On the contrary, she is expected to give 
guarantees so that the doubts of her neighbors can disappear, doubts which are 
justified by the fact that everyone suffered from her perfidy. ...that, which Bulgaria 
can hope for, is that with the exact execution of the conditions of the Peace Treaty 
and with the possible reparation of the damages caused by her fault, and also 
through the passage of time, the bitter memory of the misfortunes she caused to her 
neighbors [will] be forgotten. This is the way the relations of Bulgaria with her 
neighbors will breathe a contagious confidence, which will gradually grow [sic!].76 
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 The failure of Stamboliiski to secure support for a new post-war order in the Balkans, let 
alone advance the further step of a Balkan Federation had two consequences. He returned from 
Paris isolated and burdened with the suspicions of his neighbors and the Great Powers that Bulgaria 
would try to evade its treaty obligations. On the domestic front his failure was exploited by the 
forces arrayed against him, and in addition, it made the outlook for economic recovery of the 
country dismal given the its isolation and heavy reparations burden.77 The need to postpone or 
renegotiate the reparations payments was one of the greatest challenges that faced the BANU 
regime. At the same time, after numerous failures, for example at the Genoa Conference, this issue 
produced one of the regime's greatest foreign policy successes. On 21 March, 1923 the Bulgarian 
government succeed in signing a protocol with the Reparations Commission that divided 
Bulgaria's obligations in two parts. The first part, composed of 550 million gold francs, was to be 
paid by Bulgaria at 5% interest for 60 years starting on 1 October, 1923. The second part, 
consisting of the remaining 1.7 billion francs was to be frozen until 1983.78 
 By agreeing to immediately start paying off Bulgaria's pre-war debts, Stamboliiski had 
been able to delay the start of the reparations payments until June 1922. With his characteristic 
sympathy and wit, John Bell relates Stamboliiski's efforts at that time: 
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Having encountered a total lack of sympathy from "his" Reparations Commission, 
Stamboliski was astonished when the commission in Austria ruled that that country 
was unable to pay. Seeking to fathom the mystery of Austria's good fortune, he sent 
Kosta Todorov and Alexander Obbov to Vienna to investigate. They found that the 
Austrians had provided the members of their commissions with large cash bribes, 
valuable art works, and other amenities. Somewhat surprised that this part of his 
"schooling in diplomacy" consisted of a lesson long familiar to Balkan politicians, 
Stamboliski decided to test it at home. The commission looked in favor on these 
new arrangements and submitted a report that led to Bulgaria's receiving a further 
postponement to the spring of 1923.79 
 
Kosta Todorov tells that in the scramble to delay the start of reparations payments that were 
to begin in June, 1922 of the amount of 105 million gold francs (the budget for 1921 had been 150 
million), he delivered a letter from Stamboliiski to Poincaré on May11, 1922. The offer in the 
letter, which Poincaré rejected, was for Bulgaria to pay 10 million gold francs a year for three 
years, to be followed by a reassessment based on Bulgaria's economic condition. This alternative 
means of “influencing” the Reparations Commission cost the Bulgarian Government 25 million 
leva, one tenth of the amount offered to Poincaré.80 Stamboliiski's "corruption" will receive special 
attention in Chapter 5. 
 The solution to the reparations question in 1923 is tied to the limited successes Stamboliiski 
made on the international front to break Bulgaria's isolation. In March 1923, Bulgaria announced 
that it could not pay despite the threat by France and Italy that in such a circumstance they would 
impose sanctions that would topple the BANU government. When Bulgaria's neighbors were 
authorized to collect these sanctions through the occupation of the coal mines in Pernik and the 
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seizure of customs as per the articles of the Treaty of Neuilly, Yugoslavia declined in order not to 
ruin her improving relations with Bulgaria, and so did Greece and Romania.81 The roots of the 
détente which made this possible lay in Stamboliiski's famous foreign relations blitz, the 100 day 
tour of Europe, during which the arrangements which began the Green International also occurred. 
 Starting on October 1, 1920, Stamboliiski departed on a diplomatic tour which would take 
him from London, to Paris, Brussels, Prague, Warsaw, and Bucharest,. In England he met with 
Lord Curzon, Churchill, and Lloyd-George. In his report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
Prague from 1 November, 1920, the chargé d'affaires in Sofia, Künzl-Jizerský assessed the 
difficulties facing Stamboliiski, "In any case the tenacity of Stamboliiski has to be recognized, 
with which he strives to lead Bulgaria out of today's political isolation, and that despite the fact 
that his zeal is met with big hurdles. For now, the international position of Bulgaria remains quite 
unfavorable..."82 Before he reached Prague on 12 December, 1920, Stamboliiski passed through 
Paris and Brussels. On October 29, 1920, Mečíř, who was serving as Czechoslovak ambassador in 
Bruxelles (before he would head the Green International-MAB starting from 1926) wrote to Beneš 
about his conversation with the Yugoslav ambassador there, Marković. Marković expressed 
concern about a possible breakthrough in Bulgarian - Czechoslovak relations, "... in my opinion 
this is coming too early. I will tell you that it is not enough to wait years; my assessment is that a 
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new generation needs to come, a new Serbian and a new Bulgarian generation, which could have 
faith in one another. We have suffered too much, to have faith."83 
 Given the relations and obligations towards Yugoslavia as its Little Entente partner, the 
Czechoslovak position necessitated assurances. On 30 October, 1920, a circular telegram was sent 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague to the Czechoslovak embassies in London, 
Copenhagen, Washington, Paris, Rome, Bern, the Hague, Bucharest, Budapest, and Belgrade. it 
read, "...We want to support an agreement between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, however in a manner 
that is completely correct and loyal with respect to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, 
and the Rumanians. We stand by our views concerning the excessively harsh peace terms for 
Bulgaria. However if we were forced to choose concerning the Bulgarian-Yugoslav question, we 
would walk with the Yugoslavs as our closest allies. This, by the way, is a tactical directive and 
changes nothing in our opinion. This opinion, however, must not be manifested in such a way that 
it could be used to agitate or provoke."84 Indeed, on 21 December, 1920 Stamboliiski telegraphed 
from Prague that he had been told that the previous day the Yugoslav representative in Prague had 
protested in front of the ministry that not only the Czechoslovak people, but also the government 
had received him most hospitably.85 
 During his eight days in Prague Stamboliiski met with Masaryk, the prime minister Jan 
Černý, Švehla, and numerous members of the Republican Party. While the documentation 
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regarding the 100 day trip is one of the comparatively richest periods of Stamboliiski's foreign 
policy initiatives, it is nonetheless scant. His telegram from 16 December, 1920 speaks of a two 
and a half hour conversation with Karel Kramář, the head of the National Democratic Party, and 
only adds "...he is won for the cause."86 Even the detailed and exhaustive report of J. Šrom who 
was attached to Stamboliiski by the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry, and from the details of his 
account appears to have attended all the major meetings of the Bulgarian premier, only states that 
in his meeting with Masaryk, Stamboliiski mentioned that even in these difficult circumstances, 
he still has no second thoughts about his willingness to enter into a Yugoslav-Bulgarian 
federation.87 Šrom concludes his report with a characteristic of Stamboliiski: 
 
By and large, the prime minister Stamboliiski can be characterized as a person with 
strong will, who does not stop even before violence, so long as it leads according 
to him to the goal. A person with extremely practical purposes, clearly with the 
qualities of an economist, without particular interest about questions that do not 
have exclusively economic character. His philosophy is natural, consistent, and at 
the same time ruthless, [he] serves his idea with his whole being and therefore is 
ready to sacrifice everything for its realization, even his popularity and his life. As 
an orator he is sharp, temperamental, [and] with considerable confidence and 
preparedness.88 
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 Despite the difficulties he faced, Stamboliiski did much to soften Bulgaria's isolation 
through his tour. It is important to note that at that time, when Bulgaria's isolation and Yugoslavia's 
suspicion made the pursuit of federation impossible, the advancement of the Green International 
picked up that idea on a different front. The Green International could thus serve as a way to unite 
the agrarian Slav nations and serve a springboard to overcome the immediate post-WWI hurdles 
to the federal project. Had Stamboliiski survived past 1923, the history of the federative idea could 




Since the early modern period, ideas have floated about the creation of a cooperative 
political system in Europe.89 In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the period of nationalism’s 
high tide, there were several attempts to implement these ideas in practice.  Most of them were 
attempts to foster cooperation between rising national movements against what was seen as the 
cooperation of the repressive empires in which they were subsumed, especially in Central and 
Southeastern Europe Kossuth’s Danubian Federation movement in the decade after the 1848-1849 
revolutions, explicitly spoke of federation, but was, in fact, doomed by the fact that Magyars, 
Romanians, and South Slavs were interested in the movement only insofar as it satisfied their 
national aspirations.90 While the Habsburg Empire opted finally for dualism with the Ausgleich of 
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1867, and not for federalism, the federalist project remained alive in the ideas of the 
Austromarxists. The idea of cooperation without the federative component was revived, although 
on a modest scale and with a predominantly anti-revanchist goal (preventing Hungary, Austria and 
Germany from territorial revision), by the Little Entente between Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and 
Romania in the 1920s and 1930s. 
In Southeast Europe, the federative idea began with the attempts of the Balkan 
revolutionary movements to coordinate their efforts against Ottoman rule. The idea for mutual 
military help was closely linked to the establishments of future political unions, and eventually of 
a Balkan federation.  Inspired by the French revolution, the plan of Rhigas Velestinlis for a restored 
Hellenic Republic was arguably the first roadmap of these ideas. Throughout the nineteenth 
century these belonged predominantly to the democratic wing of the revolutionary movements 
with their ideal of a constitutional republican democracy and had Switzerland and the United States 
as their model.91 
As in Central Europe, there were several attempts to forge regional cooperation short of a 
federation, such as the First Balkans Alliance system in the 1860s and 1870s, and the Second 
Balkan Alliance system, which prepared the Balkan wars. By the end of the nineteenth century, a 
Balkan federation was championed seriously only by the socialists, who were members of the 
Second International. Aside from the agrarians of Stamboliiski, they were also the only consistent 
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force opposed to war. At the height of the Balkan war in 1912, Yanko Sakuzov, a socialist deputy 
in the Bulgarian Parliament stated: “We do not want a Balkan Confederation created as a result of 
the war. What we want, what we are preparing is a Confederation uniting in fact all of the Balkan 
nations, including Turkey, for a work of peace, of labor, of production and exchange, a work of 
liberty and of progress … Will you who are allied today, not turn against each other tomorrow as 
is already foretold in the press and diplomatic circles?”92 
Both the First Balkan Socialist Conference in Belgrade in October 1911 and the Second 
Balkan Socialist Conference in Bucharest in July 1915 passed manifestos calling for a Balkan 
Federation. After the end of the First World War, the split within the socialist movement was 
institutionalized, and while the socialists spoke vaguely of a “rapprochement among the Balkan 
peoples and their union in a federation of independent States,” the communists advocated for a 
“Balkan Socialist Republic” established through a proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of 
the proletariat.93 
The only other consistent anti-war and pro-federalist force was the agrarian alternative. In 
the face of snubs from his neighbors and the international community, Stamboliiski persisted in 
working for Balkan cooperation and unity. He specifically aimed to achieve improved relations 
with Yugoslavia and, if possible, even a federation.94 He had allies in the shape of the Croatian 
Peasant Party, adamantly opposed to the centralism of Belgrade. In 1921, Noel Buxton, the British 
                                                 
92 Cited in Leften S. Stavrianos. “The Balkan Federation Movement: A Neglected Aspect,” The 
American Historical Review, vol.48, N.1, Oct. 1942, 32-33. 
93 Ibid., 37. 






Labor politician, reported that “The party led by Radich - republican, Croatian and federalist - is 
rapidly growing in influence. Radich has proclaimed his desire to unite all the peasants of the 
Balkans in one state, and he especially invites the kindred branch of the Southern Slavs - ‘our 
Bulgarian brothers’.”95 
A curious episode of the interwar period is the alliance of a branch of the Macedonian 
IMRO with the Communist International (Comintern). The IMRO was instrumental in the 
overthrow of Stamboliiski over the Treaty of Niš and his acceptance of the status quo in 
Macedonia. Soon however part of the leadership realized that IMRO’s aims of an autonomous 
Macedonia ran contrary to the stated goals of the Bulgarian government for annexation. The result 
was the negotiations with the Comintern that likewise supported Macedonian autonomy in the 
spring of 1924, and which to this day are the subject of a bitter dispute. As of 15 July 1924, 
however, a bi-monthly publication -- La fédération balkanique -- started appearing in Vienna in 
all Balkan languages, in addition to French and German. The program of the publication was 
defined in its editorial: 
The liberty and peace of the Balkans, through the Balkan federation, will only be 
attained by movements for national liberation which will break, as soon as possible, 
the bonds which attach them to the European and Balkan governments; which will 
hasten to unite, under their flag, the working masses of their nation into a united 
national front; which will have aided and drawn upon their power for the social 
struggles of these same masses in neighboring countries; which, finally, will be 
eager to unite its forces into a single Balkan front directed against chauvinism and 
conquering imperialism from whatever quarter it may come.96 
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It was in the same publication a few months later, that Stjepan Radić shared his vision on 
the Balkan federation: “The Balkan federation can be only peasant and republican. It cannot have 
any trace of Rumanian or Hungarian feudalism any more than it can be a copy of Russian 
bolshevism. At the outset and probably for a long time it will not include Rumania or Greece 
because it is really and formally limited to the four principal Yugoslav peoples, the Slovenes, the 
Croats, the Serbs, and the Bulgarians, and to Macedonia and Montenegro, and finally to Albania, 
all this, naturally, with their complete consent.”97 
This vision proved to be short-lived. By the spring of 1925, fearing the destruction of his 
party over the smear campaign following his trip to Moscow, Radić committed a volte face and 
recognized the monarchy, the dynasty, the Vidovdan constitution, and the unitary state.98 That 
these ideas were not realized is beyond the point. As Stavrianos perceptively shows, “for the first 
time the Balkan federation movement had secured a mass basis, at least in Bulgaria and 
Yugoslavia. Hitherto Balkan co-operation and federation had been the dream of isolated idealists 
and of powerless revolutionists, or the slogan of diplomats and statesmen who almost invariably 
were interested primarily in national aggrandizement. For the communists and socialists and 
agrarians, however, federation constituted a fundamental and integral part of their program and 
philosophy.”99 
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 With the suppression of the genuine federalists – communists, socialists, and agrarians -- 
the movement for cooperation lost its radical edge and assumed what several authors have called 
a liberal alternative.100 The Third Balkan Alliance System started in 1930 with a series of several 
conferences aimed at furthering social, economic, and cultural cooperation between the Balkan 
states. Despite their success, there was practically no federalism in the conferences. But the attempt 
to conclude a Balkan Pact (the Balkan Entente) in 1934 turned the effort into an anti-revisionist 
bloc against Bulgaria. With the Great Depression, the economic penetration of Germany, and the 
coming war, these last attempts came to a halt. 
 I have argued that Stamboliiski's idea of a South-Slav federation contextualizes the birth 
of the MAB through the hope that that idea could be pursued by other means. The postwar isolation 
of Bulgaria put an end to Yugoslav federative idea of Stamboliiski as a realizeable option in the 
near term. With the coup d'etat in 1923, and the reversal of the Treaty of Niš, that option was gone. 
It survived only as an utopian vision, an alternative, even as a means for the BANU to differentiate 
itself from the policies of the Bulgarian monarchy as late as 1937.101 The fall of the BANU regime 
                                                 
 
100 The most detailed account of the Balkan conferences remains Theodore Geshkoff. The Balkan 
Union: A Road to Peace in Southeastern Europe. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940. 
See also Robert Joseph Kerner and Harry Nocholas Howard. The Balkan Conferences and the 
Balkan Entente 1930-1935: A Study in Recent History of the Balkans and the Near Eastern 
Peoples. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1936 and Stavrianos, L.S. Balkan Federation, 224-
258. Pavlos Hatzopoulos. The Balkans Beyond Nationalism and Identity: International Relations 
and Ideology. London: Tauris, 2008 identifies three challenges to nationalist ideology in the 
interwar years: the communist, the agrarian, and the liberal internationalist. 
101 Tsentralen Durzhaven Arhiv (Bulgarian Central State Arhives, TsDA) Fond 361K, op. 1, a.e. 







removed this component from the imaginary of the Green International and over the course of its 
development under the leadership of the Republican Party, it never exceeded a level of cooperation 
that might either endanger Czechoslovakia's foreign policy, or compromise the unitary state 
structure of the country. Thus it is ironic that dissolution of the MAB in 1938 (see chapter 6) would 
also be marked by the renaissance of the federal idea by none other than one of the highest 
functionaries and ideologues of the MAB, Milan Hodža. Thus one can see how the achievement of 
foreign policy interests shifts from federation to international and back to federation over the 
course of two dozen years. 
 Milan Hodža published his Federation in Central Europe: Reflections and Reminiscences 
in 1942.102 The first part of his book is a history of international cooperative efforts that begins 
with the efforts to reform Austria-Hungary in the early years of the Twentieth Century and then 
covers the interwar period through Czechoslovakia's domestic and international policies as a basis 
for cooperation. The second part of the book is an elaboration of the structures of his Federation 
in Central Europe that would unite Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Yugoslavia. Hodža's proposal is structured around the tenets of agrarianism as it 
developed in Czechoslovakia- economic cooperation, the strengthening of the middle class 
through rural democracy, etc. His section 'From struggle to tolerance and compromise to co-
operation,' is a direct extension of Švehla's politics of compromise in the First Republic.103 
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 Aware as Hodža was of how the crucible of World War One remade Europe at the same 
time as it made agrarianism relevant, he reflects on the failures of the system that failed in 1938: 
 
After lasting for twenty years, from 1918 to 1938, the Central European order as set 
up by Versailles is partly destroyed, partly altered in its foundations and partly 
living under the threat of being overthrown as well. Does it mean another failure? 
This appearance of a double failure, the one in building up a first primitive stage in 
the period 1904-1914, and then that in preserving the Versailles solution does not 
seem actually to have the meaning of failure. We simply have to face the fact which 
no statesman and no historian and no sociologist should deny. This fact is that a 
definite shape of Central Europe, comprising a federation of its free nations, has to 
share all the pains of a new Europe which could not succeed in being created in a 
pacific way by diplomatic channels, and which has to emerge out of blood and toil 
and suffering like all great achievements and political settlements.104 
 
The first time around, the agrarians did emerge like a phoenix from the ashes of the war. 
That feat, unfortunately, was impossible from the ruins of the second. 
The other useful frame to contextualize the formation and activities of the Green 
International is the history of its rival, the International Peasant Council (Krestintern). The 
activization of the peasantry and the growing role of the agrarian parties in the wake of the First 
World War drew the attention of the leaders of the Communist International, created in 1919. After 
all, there was one agrarian party in power (Bulgaria) and in three other post-war states peasant 
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parties participated in coalition governments (Czechoslovakia, Poland, Latvia and Estonia). As the 
communists looked at the agrarian movement as a catalyst to accelerate the coming of the 
revolution, they raised the slogan of a “worker’s and peasants’ government,” a theory developed 
by Lenin after the experience of the Russian revolutions of 1905-1907 and 1917.105  
The “worker’s and peasants government” was meant to be a provisional one, formed on 
the basis of a united front between the communist party and the reformist peasant, petty bourgeois, 
and even bourgeois parties in order to effectuate the peaceful transition toward the dictatorship of 
the proletariat. It is within this vision that the leaders of the Comintern decided to create an 
international peasant organization, which would base its activities on the platform of a united front 
with the working class and its communist party. All of this became possible after the end of war 
communism and the adoption of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1921. 
The decision to create a Peasant International (Krestintern) was taken at the Third Plenum 
of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI), which held its sessions on 
12-23 June, 1923.106 The immediate stimulus for this decision came from the events in Bulgaria. 
The coup of 9 June, 1923 had toppled the Stamboliiski government and the Communist party had 
taken a wait-and-see stand prompted by the realization of its weakness in the face of a successful 
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military coup. However, officially, its position was formulated as neutrality in the face of an 
internal bourgeois contest in which BANU was considered to be a petty-bourgeois formation. The 
plenum of the Comintern criticized the position of the BCP and adopted a resolution compelling 
all communist parties to strenghten their work in the villages in the name of a “worker’s and 
peasants’ government.” The Comintern created the Peasant International in view of the theory that 
1923 saw the beginnings a second revolutionary wave in Europe.107 
The formal announcement about the formation of the Krestintern came during the 
International Agrarian Exhibit in Moscow, 10-16 October, 1923. While representatives of agrarian 
cooperatives and agrarian periodicals were invited, the core of the conference was made up of 
communists, and the (de facto appointed) members of the leading body of the Krestintern (the 
International Peasant Council, IPC) were all representatives of 52 communist parties. The 
Krestintern was modelled closely on the Comintern. Its leading organ was the International 
Peasant Conference, to be held every two years. It published the journal “Krestianskii 
internatsional” in four languages (Russian, English, French and German), in additon to the popular 
series “International Peasant Library.” Each country was supposed to have at least one section, 
under the control of the communist party. Mirroring the structure of the ECCI, larger sections were 
created for Western Europe, the Balkans, the East, Latin America, and the colonies, as well as a 
section coordinating the activities of cooperative organizations.  Officially the Krestintern was to 
be a non-party organization, whose main task was to dispel the mistrust of the peasants toward the 
                                                 







communists, to penetrate their ranks and establish contacts with their existing political or economic 
organizations, and to create communist factions in the peasant parties. 108  
In fact, since the Krestintern did not have concrete local structures, it was the communist 
parties that were charged with the implemenation of the decisions of the IPC and the ECCI. The 
propaganda work was delegated to peasant-communists and the question of creating seperate 
Krestintern cadres was never put on the agenda. The instructions about the work of the Peasant 
International were that the communist parties should isolate the right wings of these organizations, 
strengthen or create a left alternative, and introduce the notion of a workers-peasant union, 
essentially pursuing the tactics of division and schism within the agrarian parties.109 
Understandably, not a single agrarian party adopted the idea of a united front and the leading role 
of the working class. The Permanent Presence (PP) of BANU was categorically against contacts 
with the communists and argued that the united front was detrimenal to the agrarian movement, 
leading solely to the accomplishment of communist goals. 
The greatest achievement of the IPC was the creation of a left wing in BANU, which was 
able to lead an independent life between 1924 and 1931 in close cooperation with the BCP. The 
main reason for this was that after the 9 June coup, some members of BANU saw in the Communist 
Party the only organization ready to help them in their attempt to overthrow the government of 
Tsankov. They accordingly sought the cooperation of the BCP through the Vienna Center of the 
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Comintern.110 The participation of BANU members in the September 1923 uprising cemented this 
cooperation, and it seemed that the Peasant International had achieved in Bulgaria one of its goals: 
the formation of a united front between communists and left agrarians. Even after the crushing of 
the uprising, the communist and agrarian representatives abroad cooperated in helping out the 
political emigrants, mostly in Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.111 
Even as they were preparing for another armed uprising in the summer and fall of 1924, 
the cooperation between communists and left agrarians was fragile, and each group was distrustful 
of the future plans of the other. The misconceived terrorist assualt on the “Sveta Nedelia” Cathedral 
on 16 April, 1925 brought about not only the rout of the communist party; it provoked a wide 
reaching White Terror that decimated the communist leadership and the leadership of the left and 
centrist wings of BANU. 
 After 1925 there were two centers in the Representation Abroad of BANU, as the executive 
organ of the party outside Bulgaria was called in contrast to the domestic Permanent Presence of 
BANU. The first, led by Obbov and Kosta Todorov, was against the united front with the 
communists; the second, under the leadeship of Nedialko Atanasov and Hristo Stoianov, while 
critical of the dicatorial attitude of the Krestintern, did not renounce the links to the communists 
and continued to receive financial help from the IPC until the end of the 1920s.112  
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The relations were further damaged by the official adoption of the theory of social fascism, 
which was transferred also onto the agrarians, by the Tenth Penum of the ECCI in July 1929. All 
agrarian parties that refused cooperation with the communists were defined as agrar-fascists. After 
the faction of BANU “Vrabcha 1” entered the People’s Bloc and became one of the governing 
parties in 1930, BANU’s independent left wing ended its existence. A few of its members joined 
the Worker’s Party, the legal face of the CP, but most merged with the centrist BANU “Vrabcha 
1.” 
The agrarian parties in Yugoslavia were equally skeptical toward the Moscow-based 
Peasant International. Most characteristic is the attitude of Stjepan Radić. His rapprochement with 
the Krestintern and the ensuing reaction in Yugoslavia is followed in detail in chapter 5, but here 
I would like to see it from the point of view of the Comintern. Representatives of the Comintern 
got in touch with Radić after his failed attempt to secure help for Croatian autonomy from London. 
On his way back, in Vienna, Radić was visited by E. S. Goldstein, a secretary at the Soviet 
Embassy and agent of the Viennese Bureau of the Comintern, who offered Moscow’s help in his 
struggle.113 
In June 1924 Radić arrived in Moscow, and on 1 July 1924 the CRPP became a member 
of the Peasant International, citing the closeness of the aims of both organizations on all major 
issues, like the land question, the rights of workers to nationalize factories, the liberation of 
national minorities, the organization of the Yugoslav federation, the formation of a Balkan 
                                                 








Federation.114 Nevertheless, when on his way back from Moscow, Radić was met by Maček in 
Vienna, the latter asked him what he had achieved. “Nothing,” was Radić’s response, “the 
communists don’t expect allies, only servants.”115 According to Biondich, “his trip to Moscow was 
designed simply as a means of attaining a measure of international legitimacy, which might in turn 
strengthen his bargaining position vis-à-vis Belgrade.”116 
All subsequent efforts of the IPC to press Radić to send his representative to Moscow and 
to initiate a Balkan peasant conference remained unanswered. By December 1924, the leadership 
of both the Comintern and the Krestintern realized that the relations with the CRPP were hopeless, 
and that for Radić the link with Moscow was a liability.117 By mid-1925 when it became clear that 
Radić was a lost cause, the IMC started a campaign to split the CRPP with the help of the YCP. 
The results were negligent.118 
The small Serbian agrarian party (Zemljoradnička Stranka) of Radosav Đokić, on the other 
hand, hoped that the links with Moscow would strengthen its positions both internationally and 
financially. Arriving in Moscow in May 1925, Đokić participated in several meetings with the IPC 
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but after his departure, the relationship with the Krestintern waned, mostly over the refusal to give 
him a solid financial subvention.119 
The interaction of the Krestintern with the MAB, and thus by extension with the Republican 
Party of Czechoslovakia was one of failure and hostility, despite some initial efforts of the MAB 
to reach out to Moscow. The unwillingness of the Krestintern to participate outside of a leading 
role meant that from the late 1920s, the ideological animosity between the two organizations 
intensified, with the MAB being dismissed as a kulak formation. It was in this context that the anti-
Bolshevik imaginary found its real elaboration. 
In the meantime, the Krestintern entered a period of decline, fostered by the competition 
with the rising Green International. On 12 January, 1931, a special commission decided to dissolve 
the Peasant International with the pretext that it had not managed to become the international center 
of the peasant movements, and that these movements in the capitalist counties and their colonies 
were weak and with little prospects for growth. 
In the meantime, the Krestintern entered a period of decline, fostered by the competition 
with the rising Green International. On 12 January, 1931, a special commission decided to wind 
up the activity the Peasant International with the pretext that it had not managed to become the 
international center of the peasant movements, and that these movements in the capitalist counties 
and their colonies were weak and with little prospects for growth. That same commission shifted 
the task of mobilizing the peasantry to the communist European Peasant Committee in Berlin, but 
that bureau conducted its last congress in 1932. While the Krestintern was not formally dissolved 
                                                 







until 1939, the priorities and realities of Stalin’s collectivization scuttled it. 
            The ideas from Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia about the function of the Green International 
differed even initially. After the possibility for decisive Bulgarian input was truncated with the 
overthrow of the BANU government, the Green International developed to a large extent according 
to the directives and interests of the Czechoslovak Republican Party. Yet even as this institution 
continued to be recast throughout the 1920s and 1930s, as at its inception, this occurred in relation 
to the two decisive frames I treated above: the international situation and the competition with the 
communism. For the sake of completeness, the Green International also differentiated itself from 
what it saw as the non-political, professional organizations of the capitalist system such as the 
International Institute of Agriculture in Rome or the proposal for an international confederation of 
agricultural organizations championed by Ernst Lauer, but the challenge coming from this 
direction was minute in comparison to the threat from the Krestintern. 
 This chapter has mined the competing visions of agrarian cooperation that complicated the 
formation of the Green International in the 1920s in order to situate this agrarian internationalist 
initiative within the geopolitical context following the First World War. The influence of rival 
organizations and ideas demonstrates the multiple points of contact which linked agrarian 
initiatives to major trends in European history. Rather than a peripheral and ineffectual institution 
as it has heretofore been portrayed, the Green International emerges as a focal point that can serve 
as a foundation for the reexamination of the post-World War One international order. The next 
chapter takes the idea that a recasting of agrarian history can better elucidate the agrarian past and 
at the same time can contribute to and inform broader theoretical and empirical subjects, and 
applies it to the study of nationalism. Through a close reading of the orthographic debate in the 






dominant framework for the description of nationalism in East European studies, and interrogates 























Reimagining the Nation 
 
 
Nationalism in the Context of Agrarianism 
 
The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics by Ivo Banac continues to 
enjoy the status of the definitive monograph on the subject At the time of its publication, almost 
thirty years ago, the dissolution of Yugoslavia was not on the horizon, and the subsequent bloody 
break-up of the state bolstered the positivistic approach to the national identity of each component 
nation. Especially for political science or policy purposes, Banac's serious scholarship provides a 
stable foundation. The position that this monograph occupies is deserved, yet its framework is no 
longer satisfactory. This statement does not mean that its scholarship is faulty; in Yugoslavia, and 
in particular with the Croatian case, the language of nationalism does predominate. However, 
Banac's genetic approach overstates the case and obscures other factors and inputs. In the preface 
to The National Question in Yugoslavia, he succinctly characterizes his project, "This is, in short, 
a genetic study, which traces and analyzes the history and characteristics of the South Slavic 
national ideologies, connects these trends with Yugoslavia's flawed unification in 1918, and ends 
with the adoption of the centralist constitution of 1921. It will not take readers through the 
labyrinthine byways of the two interwar decades, nor will it guide them through the dramatic 






its own way connected with the new twists in the national question, can be understood without the 
prelude that contained all the seeds of future disorders."120 
This ingenuous characterization is a testament of the times in which it was made and fits 
squarely within the schematic and typological tradition in which nationalism was an artefact to be 
isolated, dissected, and classified.121   Three decades later, however, that statement sounds 
predeterrministic, an essentialization of the nature and mechanisms of nationalism which is related 
to the static reductionism imbedded within the civic/ethnic antinomy. The purpose of the second 
part of this chapter is provide an alternative reading of the relation and function of nationalism to 
the agrarian movements in the interwar period. 
I would like to begin with a disclaimer: nationalism is not derivative of the ideology and 
politics of the agrarian parties. Just as these parties were a product of modernity and strove to 
articulate and institute a more equitable modernity for the peasant masses, so was the concept of 
the national community integral to the actualization of that project, at the bare minimum through 
the institutions of the nation state (though not necessarily the unitary one). That said, and thus 
providing a common denominator, the expression of nationalism varied depending on the tactical 
choices and strategic considerations that had to be taken to advance the agrarian project. What I 
mean by this is that in a conjuncture in which an agrarian project could be compromised by the 
expression of a revanchist nationalism, as was the case of Bulgaria, claims in the name of the 
                                                 
120 Ivo Banac. The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1984. 
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nation against an external "other" were muted. Conversely, in a centralizing structure such as that 
of interwar Yugoslavia, discursively, the national question was amplified because of its political 
utility in creating the space which was perceived to be necessary to institute the agrarian program 
in the well known Croatian case. However, the contingency of this expression is underscored by 
the diametrically opposed relation to nationalism that was expressed by the Savez Zemljoradnika, 
which perceived its inclusive program of peasant emancipation to be threatened by fractioning 
along national lines. 
 I want to make clear that if we overemphasize nationalism as a political movement, in the 
terminology of subaltern studies, much of the complexity of the socio-political function of 
nationalism is occluded. This doesn't mean that a parallel category such as the 'subjective realm' 
in the parlance of Chatterjee is necessary in the case of Interwar Agrarian Europe. All that is needed 
is to pay attention to the contingency of national expression that occurs on the surface of the deeper 
and more stable agrarian ideology and praxis. It is precisely this conditionality that frees the 
analysis of nationalism in Eastern Europe from essentialist genetic reductions and historicist 
determinism. 
After the Second Balkan War and during the First World War, the virulence of Bulgarian 
nationalist rhetoric against its Balkan neighbors was at its height. That a politician of Stamboliiski's 
stature could oppose this rhetoric in these circumstances of nationalist hysteria is in itself 
noteworthy. That he could go even further and invert the discourse is symptomatic of the 
alternative articulation of nationalism that is the topic of this chapter. Two quotations reflect 
Stamboliiski's complex relationship to nationalism. The first was pronounced on the floor of 
Parliament when discussion turned to Austria-Hungary's invasion of Serbia in August, 1914. 






was a surboman122 and traitor. To this Stamboliiski famously retorted, "At a moment, such as the 
present one, when our South Slav brothers are threatened, I am neither a Serb nor a Bulgarian, I 
am a South Slav."123 To this day, this pronouncement cannot be forgiven by Bulgarian nationalists 
and regularly resurfaces as proof that Stamboliiski was a national traitor in these circles. 
In a similar vein Stamboliiski resisted the expression of xenophobic nationalism when he 
argued for the release of fellow political prisoners in 1918 with King Boris. Nikola Genadiev from 
the National-Liberal party was incarcerated during the war for his resistance to Bulgaria's entry 
into the war on the side of the Central Powers; he was found to have been involved in the 
DesClosières Affair in which the Entente had tried to draw Bulgaria to its side through substantial 
grain purchases above market value. When his name came up, King Boris indignantly asked, "But 
do you know what kind of man is Genadiev?" Stamboliiski's unsatisfactory answer that Dr. 
Genadiev was one of the foremost Bulgarian politicians pushed the King to qualify, "He is not a 
Bulgarian, but he was made by a Greek." This time too, Stamboliiski's answer sidesteps national 
othering: 
 
I do not know this, but even if I did, that would completely not prevent an unbiased 
assessment. There is a mass of Bulgarian politicians with pure Bulgarian blood, of 
course if we can even speak of purity in this blood, which absolutely are not suited 
for their position and purpose. They are simply a superfluous and harmful ballast 
with their sheepishness, cowardice, and servility in the political life. It appears to 
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me, that this terrible vice is absent from Genadiev and therefore he deserves a 
different consideration.124 
 
Too much attention to anecdotal examples, such as the ones above that I included to 
establish a tone, has been combined with an excessive emphasis on Stamboliiski's rejection of 
irredentist goals and foreign policy initiatives by his detractors in order to advance the argument 
of national betrayal. Even moderate and sympathetic treatments such as those of John Bell refer to 
an "anti-national" foreign policy that is decoupled from the transformative domestic reforms.125 
This limited view of nationalism obscures the intimate relationship between these two projects.  
It is insufficient to characterize this relationship as a sacrifice of Bulgaria's interests on the 
international stage in order to secure the space for the implementation of domestic reforms, 
although there certainly is an element of this. Rather, the consistent policy to erase the 
confrontational relations with Bulgaria's neighbors was an effort to recast and reimagine Bulgaria's 
interests and thus to transform the nation in synchronicity to the internal national transformation. 
I would like to recall two initiatives here in order to clarify the recasting of nationalism. The two 
proverbial institutions that accomplish the socialization into the nation are the army and education. 
Stamboliiski's two initiatives, the Labor Service (trudova povinnost) and the education reform are 
crucial to an understanding of what type of nationalism was being formulated in the first years of 
the 1920s. 
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The Compulsory Labor Service replaced compulsory military service with the requirement 
that male and female youths work for the public good. Its ambitions had to be diluted because in 
the eyes of the Allied Control Commission, it looked as an attempt to avoid the disarmament 
provisions of the Treaty of Neuilly. However, even in its more diluted form, the socializing and 
educational component remained on par with its economic value. In propagandizing for the 
service, Stamboliiski emphasized both the increase of productivity and well-being that would 
result, and the development in the Bulgarian citizen of a sense of responsibility and care for public 
property.126 The formation of the new Bulgarian subject was continued in the educational sphere. 
The BANU expanded school construction, made secondary education compulsory, and revised the 
curriculum. If one adds to this the formative impact of the cooperative movement and its intention 
of economic liberation, then one can see very clearly a muli-pronged attempt to engineer a new 
Bulgarian citizen. 
Stamboliiski's non-confrontational foreign policy with Bulgaria's neighbors is even more 
critical as an illustration of the subordination and transformation of nationalism with regards to the 
domestic program. In other words, the recasting of nationalism operates through a relational 
principle in which the domestic reworking of the nation produces a particular, non-irredentist 
expression of Bulgaria's national interests that through a feedback loop reinforces the primacy of 
the principle of social equity and cooperation within the nation and among nations. The coup 
against BANU in 1923 truncated this experiment and restored the irredentist pattern of Bulgarian 
national expression and the mentality of encirclement in which foreign policy was the vehicle for 
                                                 







fixing Bulgarian nationalism against the external "other." To a certain degree then, the potentiality 
of Stamboliiski's efforts to recast Bulgarian nationalism remains in the realm of the hypothetical 
or counterfactual because the agrarian experiment was not accorded enough time to mature and 
come to fruition. However, the very fact that such an alternative was elaborated is important as a 
precedent because as this thesis argues time and time again, the agrarian alternative was so 
important that all the other political currents in the Interwar period had to respond to and position 
themselves against it even in its rejection. This in other words is the manifestation of the principle 
that the "failure" of the agrarian experiment cannot belong to the dustbin of history but is 
indispensable for the proper comprehension of the interwar period. 
 
The Case Study 
 
 The significance of language and literature as formative to national identity is a major trope 
within studies of nationalism. The act of imagining and realizing a nation and a nation-state along 
these lines has been tackled from multiple angles including folklore, linguistics, historical studies 
of educational institutions and their curricula, with a prominent place reserved for textbook 
analysis. Even though historical studies for the most part have underscored the rapidity and novelty 
of these processes, a temporal claim that is part and parcel of the larger and fundamental assertion 
that nationalism is a modern phenomenon, these processes are negotiated over a period of decades. 
In Braudelian terms, the standardization of a national language would fall somewhere between 






 Political life is rarely sensitive to long-term developments in the structure, yet within the 
other two tiers it resolves to power relations, social or individual, respectively. It is this idea of 
power and the related concept of legitimacy that constitute the other critical pillar of nationalism 
studies. Constructivist and modernist conceptions of nationalism illuminate the changing power 
relationships between individuals, collectivities and the state within the national imagined 
community, as well as the institutional developments that make these relationships possible. In the 
intermediate plan, literary-linguistic developments and national-political projects are linked in a 
knowledge-power relationship. By looking at nationalism through the intermediate lens of the 
conjuncture, its reification into a static structure and the over-emphasis on the rapid vacillations 
characterizing politics can be avoided.   
 In the modern period, nationalism has spanned the gamut from an emancipatory, 
revolutionary, oppositional and even internationalist ideology, to an exclusionary, official and 
dominant one. Explanations for this variation, however, have too frequently been static. The 
tendency to equate nationalism only with its extreme manifestations not only produced the 
problematic binary of nationalism versus patriotism but also seriously retarded the development 
of nationalism studies by treating the two as separate phenomena, only one deserving explanation 
and censure. The subsequent classification of nationalism into a civic and ethnic type resuscitated 
identity politics involved in privileging the North-West European and American cases. In its most 
extreme, it cemented this difference by imputing the operation of deterministic logics to each type. 
In both cases the dynamics between language and politics on an intermediate scale are lost and the 
problem is compounded by the accretion of normative and essentialist notions about one type of 






 In its treatment of the conflict over the BANU orthographic reform, this chapter begins by 
tracing the correspondence between the conjunctural chronology of changes in Bulgarian 
orthography and the mutable nature of Bulgarian nationalism while opposing this inquiry to the 
continuing influence of the civic/ethnic antinomy on the scholarly literature of Eastern Europe. 
Showing that orthographic reform was an important element of the discourse of ethnic as well as 
civic nationalism not only fractures notions of structural continuity predetermined by the path to a 
nation-state, but is exemplary of the fluidity of national identity as it interacts with parallel 
discourses of modernity. 
 The orthographic reform re-imagined the national community and in a significant, 
structural way paralleled a shift in the organization of the nation. Simply put, it was intended to 
and eventually succeeded in recasting the role of the Bulgarian citizen. The content of political 
integration and the emphasis on a literate citizenry backed by a democratic spelling system could 
be represented as a drastic shift from an ethnic to a civic conception of the nation.127 More 
importantly, however, the debate undermines this very duality within the workings of Bulgarian 
nationalism. More appropriate is a vision of nationalism that accommodates progressive and 
traditionalist inputs; the balance of the two tendencies shifts according to various socio-political 
pressures. Most importantly, it is this dialectic, rather than a predetermined path, that predominates 
and provides the theoretical basis for more rigorous analyses of nationalism in Eastern Europe. 
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 The agrarian movements of Bulgaria and Croatia in the interwar period receive a very 
different treatment in the literature with regards to nationalism. Whereas the Bulgarian case has 
been described as anti-national, the Croatian, on the other hand is represented as the embodiment 
of a national movement. The utility of this polarity, however, is rather circumscribed as it ossifies 
and essentializes the complex relationship of the agrarian movements to nationalism and the 
imagined community at a moment when the character of that community was being transformed 
through the introduction of the peasant subject. Thus, the second part of this chapter will illustrate 
how the different outward expressions of nationalism in the Bulgarian and Croatian agrarian 
movements are in fact based on very similar conceptions of the peasant right and the peasant state. 
Theoretically, while the first half of the chapter is a critique and response to the distortions of the 
civic/ethnic binary, the second part elaborates an opening in the treatment of East-European 
nationalism that draws inspiration from the work of the Subaltern Studies Group. While a strict 
transposition of concepts is counterproductive given the contextual differences, the critical 
juxtaposition of East-European agrarian nationalism to the emancipatory project of Subaltern 
Studies facilitates the extraction of the former from the stale narratives that obscure and suppress 
the radical agrarian merger of the nation, the peasant state, and the peasant subject. Again, as in 
the first part of the chapter, a dialectic is present that produces polar 'national' expressions based 
on the perceived hurdles to the establishment and defense of the peasant state. 
 







The beginnings of a systematic exploration of nationalism that transcended the available 
ethical and philosophical inquiries or the triumphalist histories of national historians, can be traced 
back to the period between the two world wars in the early work of scholars like Louis Snyder, 
Carleton Hayes, and Hans Kohn. The methodological imperative to classify or categorize 
nationalism before a general definition or theory was generated, coupled with the need to account 
for its destructive potential, generated several taxonomies in the years immediately following the 
Second World War. While some works, such as Snyder’s typology in The Meaning of Nationalism 
adopted a diachronic categorization that relegated the period of ‘aggressive nationalism’ to 1900-
1945, others advanced frameworks that placed extreme manifestations of nationalism alongside 
more innocuous ones.128 In the work of Hayes, ‘integral nationalism’ is the extreme, centralized, 
(fascist) kind listed alongside the ‘humanitarian,’ ‘liberal,’ and ‘economic’ types.129 The most 
enduring of the early typologies, however, divided nationalism into two kinds, a Western and an 
Eastern. In Prophets and Peoples, Kohn normalized and contrasted a positive Western type arising 
out of the Enlightenment and stressing individual liberty to a reactive, authoritarian Eastern type.130 
According to Kohn, the differences between these nationalisms were serious enough to produce 
two divergent forms of the nation. The Western nation was a voluntary union of citizens whereas 
the Eastern nation was centered on an irrational and exclusivist conception of the Volk. 
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The persistent attractiveness of Kohn’s model cannot be explained only in recourse to its 
political utility in describing first the German Sonderweg and then in buttressing the divisions of 
the Cold War. Its Manichean division taps into notions of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ nationalism arranged 
along the axis of inclusion/exclusion. Of course, the experience of decolonialization shifted the 
theoretical focus of the literature on nationalism. Not only did the burgeoning nationalist 
movements demand more sophisticated theorization, but the linkage of nationalism to modernity 
first via modernization theory and then through its critique prioritized functional analyses over 
normative typologies. Through the focus on nation-building, scholars such as Tom Nairn, Ernest 
Gellner, and Benedict Anderson explored economic, political, and cultural transformations within 
a grand-theoretical framework that implicitly avoided a positionality vis a vis Kohn’s binary.131 
The explicit theoretical dismantling of Kohn began from the late 1980’s when the theoretical 
literature on nationalism itself underwent a reevaluation. The deconstructions that accompanied 
the epistemological crisis in the social sciences and coalesced in the post-modern critique 
problematized the grand narratives from a multiplicity of angles such as gender, the subaltern, or 
the production and reproduction of national identity. Currently the most interesting work examines 
nationalism as a discursive field or practice. One would be hard pressed to find a place for Kohn’s 
antinomy in Étiene Balibar’s treatment of nationalism as a “construction whose unity remains 
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problematic, a configuration of antagonistic social classes that is not entirely autonomous, only 
becoming relatively specific in its opposition to others.”132 
One would, thus, suppose that Rogers Brubaker’s famous pronouncement in relation to the 
primordialist/modernist debate that, “no serious scholar today holds the view that… nations or 
ethnic groups are primordial, unchanging entities” could be extended to cover essentialist divisions 
of nationalism into two mutually exclusive types.133 The few exceptions such as Leah Greenfeld’s 
Nationalism, which will be analyzed in greater detail below, do indeed prove the rule.134 However, 
if the civic/ethnic antinomy has by and large been superseded in the theoretical literature on 
nationalism, it is still firmly entrenched within East European studies.135 Even if we leave aside 
the excesses of the largely journalistic employment of the ‘ancient hatreds’ thesis, it is fair to say 
that the dominant paradigm is one of exclusive vs. inclusive nationalism. There are two readers on 
nationalism in Eastern Europe, both edited by Peter Sugar.136 The first (1969) distinguished 
between aristocratic, bourgeois, popular, and bureaucratic nationalisms. In the second (1995) 
Sugar had ‘updated’ his framework by employing Kohn’s division.  
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Criticism of nationalism in East European studies is in its infancy. It is telling that Jeremy 
King declared war on ‘ethnicism,’ the bleeding through of primordialism in East European 
historiography, in 2001.137 Innovative approaches to nation and state-building begin to make 
important strides. Irina Livezeanu’s Cultural Politics in Greater Romania and Timothy Snyder’s 
The Reconstruction of Nations are worth examining for their successes and shortcomings.138 
Livezeanu’s treatment of cultural politics in the unification of Romania is extremely useful and 
follows the shift towards cultural analyses of identity formation. On the other hand, her work 
attempts to explain the radicalization of Romanian nationalism before WWII and its exclusivist 
ideology, a problematic that implicitly perpetuates the inclusive/exclusive binary. Snyder also 
adopts an innovative position with respect to the standard periodization of Polish history. While 
his historicization of nationalism parallels the ethno-symbolism of Anthony Smith, he too adopts 
the inclusive/exclusive dichotomy and focuses on the gradual elimination of the former. Attention 
to the variable construction and interweaving of identities remains strongest but somewhat isolated 
within the anthropological literature of Eastern Europe.139 
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What explains the disconnect between the advances in theoretical works on nationalism 
and the persistence of the civic/ethnic antinomy in East European historiography? For one, at the 
heart of the translation of civic and ethnic categories from contextual specificities to ontological 
truths is the embedding of the antinomy within the larger power discourses that divide Eastern 
Europe from the rest of the continent. The layering of the binaries modern/backward, 
individual/collective, democratic/autocratic, developed/undeveloped continue to allow the 
civic/ethnic antinomy to creep back into analyses so long as essentialist approaches to the 
treatment of variation (East/West) remain firmly entrenched within East European studies. The 
other contributing factor derives from some of the thematic tropes of Eastern European 
historiography. The traditional attention to wars, irredentas, minorities predisposes toward this 
distinction. More innovative topics such as the focus on alterity, borders, collaboration and 
retribution are welcome developments and the best examples consciously try to bridge the 
East/West divide.140 However they too tend to focus disproportionately on moments/ cases of 
extreme tension. The recent trend in rehabilitations of the multi-ethnic empires is itself predicated 
on a contrast with the exclusivist East European nation state model.141 
Clearly, the effectiveness of theoretical objections to the civic/ethnic antinomy is limited. 
It is so entrenched within East European historiography that it is worth scrutinizing it on its own 
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terms. In order to illustrate the problems with the dichotomy, it is worth focusing on Greenfeld’s 
Nationalism, its most sophisticated, recent version. The success of the book, based to no small 
degree on its scope and the author’s erudition, is also firmly rooted in the neat modeling that it 
proposes.142 However, two disturbing propositions lie at the heart of her inquiry and radically 
contradict her measured assurances. The first can be described as an engine of alteration that 
corrupts nationalism at the time of its spread, often under the pressure of Nietzschean ressentiment. 
The result is an inverted or negative telos redeemed only by the emergence of the American 
national polity.  
The second proposition encapsulates the essential flaw of Greenfeld’s argument because it 
establishes the internal logic that generates this hierarchy. It is the equivalent of a statement of 
Original Sin, in privileging the initial formation of national identity and disregarding its subsequent 
spread: “The character of every national identity was defined during its early phase…Its effects, 
in the political, social, and cultural constitution of the respective nations, as well as their historical 
record, are attributable to this original definition which set the goals for mobilization, not to the 
nationalization of the masses.”143 The deficiency of such approach is obvious: it leads to 
essentialism and ahistorical modeling. The conceptual rigidity also robs nationalism of its most 
significant characteristic, namely the ability to reinvent itself and remobilize the population as a 
                                                 
142 To be fair, Greenfeld, Nationalism, 17, 25-26, is very careful to qualify and moderate her 
claims. 







response to specific historical situations. In the end, nationalism resembles a desiccated 
archeological artifact instead of the living social construct that it really is.  
On the surface, Bulgarian nationalism seems to fit easily within ethnicist categorizations. 
The nationalization of Bulgaria was elite driven, heavily grounded in cultural initiatives of which 
language was one of the central pillars of national identity, and was intimately entwined with ideas 
of historical continuity. It is a case of a nationalism imagined along the lines of ethno-linguistic 
continuity. It was also formed against the Greek and Turkish other.144 If we follow Greenfeld’s 
logic this means that ressentiment is the deep structure of Bulgarian nationalism. 
In order to transcend such a static portrait, it would be useful to insert a distinction between 
notion and concept. The crucial difference is that notion does not clearly mark the contours of the 
object it describes and thus its utility lies in its function as rough synthetic and intuitive knowledge. 
While Greenfeld identifies obvious variations in the ways nationalisms have developed, in my 
opinion she is culpable of extending her notional insights into conceptual categories. If all 
developmental paths to the modern nation-state can be conceived of as being united within the 
larger context of modernity, then the civic/ethnic antinomy’s tendency towards conceptual 
essentialism would be shown to be groundless and the category of ressentiment irrelevant. 
 
The Centrality of the Language Question 
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When the Bulgarian revivalists confronted the issue of the formation and standardization 
of the literary language in the 19th century, their initiatives were marked by the burden of history. 
The perception, content, and meaning of the historical burden changed during the course of the 
Bulgarian Revival, and it exerted a profound influence on the choices of grammatical or 
orthographic structure of the language. That crucial link had been forged in 1762, when the monk 
Paisii Khilendarski advanced the idea of language as the expression of national consciousness. The 
famous exhortation of his Istoriia slavenobolgarskaiia for the Bulgarian to remember his glorious 
past and not be ashamed of his language set the tone for the interrelatedness of nation and language. 
Given the absence of a powerful center that could impose a particular dialect, it was natural 
for the language of the Middle Ages to exert tremendous influence. Indeed, in contrast to his radical 
national ideas, the linguistic choice of Father Paisii fell on the conservative side as he based his 
work on Church Slavonic. The other literary tradition, that of the damascenes, emerging from the 
16th century, covered texts in the vernacular of religious edifying content. Whereas Church 
Slavonic continued to use a case structure, the vernacular had switched to a synthetic (analytical) 
grammar already before the Ottoman conquest.145 Not only were the damascenes more accessible 
to the population, but they offered the possibility of solving the language question with greater 
radical potential for the advancement of national and literary aims in tandem. 
In the 1830’s and 1840’s these traditions crystallized into two competing approaches to the 
problem of codifying and standardizing the language. The New Bulgarian School insisted on the 
                                                 







vernacular, while the Church Slavonic School elevated the language of the Orthodox Church, the 
institution that, as the argument went, had preserved the ‘nation’ through the centuries of ‘Ottoman 
yoke.’ A third school that emerged a few years after the others, the Slavo-Bulgarian, occupied the 
space between the two and sought a compromise position by suggesting an analytical language 
based on the common elements of the Bulgarian dialects with Church Slavonic.146 
Scholars frequently refer to the triumph of the New Bulgarian school by the middle of the 
19th century, when its prescriptions are seen as having set the direction for the future development 
in morphology, phonetics, and the lexicon.147 This interpretation largely holds from the perspective 
of hindsight, but it also obscures the rather murky reality of that ‘victory.’ For one, the New 
Bulgarian school was less able than its competitors to produce a concrete program manifested in a 
cogent translation of the vernacular into its literary counterpart. Second, the argument that it 
accommodated inputs from the Slavo-Bulgarian and Church Slavonic literary traditions in order 
to flesh out and enrich the language in the latter part of the 19th century begs the question. It 
definitely invites the query of whether, at least structurally, it would be more appropriate to talk of 
negotiated compromises more akin to the program of Neofit Rilski, the chief proponent of the 
Slavo-Bulgarian platform. 
An egress from this morass is offered by Stoian Zherev when he characterizes the position 
of the New Bulgarian school not as a concrete victory, but one of principle, “It is more precise to 
accept that the view [original italics] of a literary language with a vernacular basis triumphs. It 
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establishes itself more categorically and more concretely during the movement of the Bulgarian 
literary language (after the ‘Riben bukvar’) from diatopia to sintopia.”148 Zherev’s argument 
hinges on the simple reality that the linguistic controversies were decided on the stage of the 
budding Bulgarian press. There were numerous proposals for the Bulgarian language that were 
only loosely united under the flag of a vernacular basis for the modern literary language. In this 
context, Zherev provides another clue with his reference to the Riben bukvar. Petîr Beron’s work 
was the first Bulgarian primer, used extensively in elementary schools. Beron was also one of the 
chief proponents of the New Bulgarian school. He and Vasil Aprilov, the founder of the first 
Bulgarian secondary school, were able to utilize their fame to provide an invaluable nimbus of 
legitimacy to the New Bulgarian argument. In other words, the triumph in principle of the New 
Bulgarian school was pushed through due to the exceptional cultural and social capital that its 
proponents were able to muster around its cause. 
 This is an example of the interconnectedness of the national and literary projects, where 
the very form that the Bulgarian language was to take was negotiated in reference to the historical 
legacy of the nation. Clearly the nexus between the glories, past and future, of a Bulgarian state 
and its language figured in the minds of the revivalists. But they were not only men of letters. 
Major revolutionary figures combined the literary and the political into a joint program for 
Bulgaria’s independence. Georgi Sava Rakovski was one of the fathers of the revolutionary 
movement, the founder of the Bulgarian Legion in Belgrade. He had participated in a revolt in 
1841, passed through France, fought in the Crimean War, and lobbied for support for the Bulgarian 
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revolutionary movement in Belgrade and Athens. Rakovski maintained that language was the most 
important marker of ethnicity and the nation, and that the native language was the chief weapon in 
the struggle for national progress. His views are reflected in his poetry, but he advanced his literary 
agenda more directly as editor of Dunavski lebed, where he agitated against the normalization of 
a single dialect as the basis of a literary language.149  
Khristo Botev, a prominent member of the next generation of revolutionaries, also trod the 
dual cultural and political path towards the nation state. He is as much remembered for his 
organizational activities in Bucharest in the 1870’s as for his talented and frenetic editorial activity 
and versification. Before he fell in the April Uprising of 1876 at age 27, he had edited three 
newspapers: Duma na bîlgarskite emigranti (1871), Zname (1874-1875), Nova Bîlgariia (1876). 
Zname had a section “Literary News,’ where Botev reviewed the Bulgarian press, and analyzed 
and critiqued its language.150 
The preceding survey of the genesis of the modern Bulgarian literary language makes 
intelligible the debate over the orthography during the second half of the 19th century. However, it 
also allows an important refinement, or at least a qualification, of the Hrochian periodization of 
the national revival in Bulgaria. In the case of the codification of the grammatical structure of the 
literary language, it is no longer appropriate to apply a model of unproblematic transmission of the 
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work of the national enlighteners from Stage A to the succeeding stages along a vector whose only 
reaction to change involves the size of the groups involved. As the complex reality of 19th c. literary 
practice shows, the activity of the academic grammarians was quickly sidelined after its initial 
explosive influence by the larger group of Stage B activists and the preferences of a reading public 
in Stage C. The choices of publishers, editors, writers and especially the various groupings of these 
agents in the periodical press determined the selection of a radical New Bulgarian rather than a 
conservative and etymological basis for the literary language, a reality that was confirmed by the 
codification of this choice when it was implemented as the language of state following 
independence in 1878. Gyllin writes, “[n]ot only during the Renaissance, but also for a long time 
afterwards grammars lagged behind existing written realities…. Thus, in practice, the modern 
Bulgarian literary language as it existed in the decades after the liberation had been formed not by 
grammarians but by those actually using it.151  
The importance of cracking a teleological account of the national revival is that it permits 
the entry of politics into the analysis. Rather than a passive public, we are confronted with agents 
that take over the process at certain moments. The debates over the democratic or traditional basis 
of the language did not occur in an ivory tower, but were contested in the body politic.152 Especially 
after the formation of the Bulgarian kingdom and during the early course of its development, there 
was a growing tendency towards greater social involvement.  
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By the middle of the nineteenth century, interest in the Bulgarian past had produced a 
considerable body of literature and the appropriate specialists. The expansion in knowledge 
changed the balance of forces between traditionalists and modernizers in favor of the former 
because it became increasingly difficult to ignore the ‘cultural heritage’ of the medieval Bulgarian 
kingdom. This shift is well represented by Aprilov’s publication “Thoughts on the Contemporary 
Bulgarian Studies” (1847).153 According to Gyllin, this paper established “certain fundamental 
historical linguistic facts, which strongly favored traditionalistic views: the difference between Old 
Bulgarian and Russian Church Slavonic, the direct link between Old Bulgarian and New 
Bulgarian, and not least that Old Bulgarian was the oldest Slavonic literary language, that it had 
spread outside the Bulgarian borders and had been of importance for the formation of other 
Slavonic literary languages.”154 Thus, even though Aprilov continued to reject an Old Bulgarian 
basis for the language (the historical continuity between Old and New Bulgarian was yet another 
argument for accepting the vernacular position), his research helped bolster the traditional, or 
etymological schools.  
While grammatical disputes were raging between the 1820s to the 1840s, the orthographic 
question had remained on the back burner. Writers not only were free to choose their spelling, but 
they frequently employed different alphabets, a variation that had 24 to 38 letters at either 
spectrum. But with the grammatical basis of the language settled, the morphological and 
phonological streamlining that remained to be done was picked up within a broader debate over 
the orthography. Characteristically, two schools emerged that defined the battle lines in their 
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relationship to the historical legacy. The Plovdiv School of Naiden Gerov and Ioakim Gruev 
favored a strongly etymological orthography. The Tîrnovo School of Ivan Momchilov and Nikola 
Mikhailovski retained traditional elements, but a juxtaposition with its competitor clearly reveals 
its proximity to the phonetic principle.155 By the end of 1870, two other schools had joined the 
fray. Liuben Karavelov was able to advance an orthography that was even closer to speech through 
the weighty examples of his novels and journals. 
The most influential intervention, however, was made by Marin Drinov, the prominent 
Bulgarian linguist and historian at the University of Kharkiv. A mixture of the phonetic and 
etymological principles, although leaning more towards the latter, Drinov’s position was published 
in 1870 in the organ of the Bulgarian Literary Society. The Literary Society, founded in Braila, 
Romania, during the previous year, sought to “spread general enlightenment among the Bulgarian 
people and to show it the way to its material progress.”156 Eventually this national emancipatory 
institution would be transformed into the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (1911), but even in the 
decade prior to 1878 it was the most prestigious Bulgarian cultural center. Drinov’s proposal 
exerted tremendous influence. Drinov considered that “the most correct path to the achievement 
of a consensus on the orthography…[would be], first, to fully use the ‘living’ Bulgarian speech in 
all the varieties found in all the various regions of Bulgaria, and, second, to not neglect the Old 
Bulgarian in its oldest and most orthographically [correct] monuments.”157 The precise content of 
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his orthographic proposal is not relevant to this chapter, aside from mentioning that he got rid of 
the Greek letters , , , etc., but kept several traditional letters from Old Bulgarian.158 The result 
was that Drinov’s conciliatory orthography enjoyed an informal dominance from the early 1870’s 
and especially in the first decades of Bulgarian ‘independence’ (1878-1890’s).159  
The 1890’s were marked by an increased interest in the orthographic question. The 
normalization of political life under the administration of Stefan Stambolov provided a large 
impetus towards cultural projects. A commission of experts convened in 1892 with the aim of 
producing a standardized spelling. The members of this commission that were to play a significant 
role in the astoundingly vituperative quarrels over orthography in the 1920’s, Liubomir Miletich, 
Alexander Teodorov-Balan, Benio Tsonev, first cut their political teeth here.160 Although 
grounded in philology, their proposal paralleled Stambolov’s anti-Russian politics and brought the 
Bulgarian spelling closer to the Serbian. Strong public reaction against the proposal doomed its 
implementation, especially after the fall of the Stambolov regime in 1895.161 Two more official 
proposals failed to establish themselves in the following years. All the while, Drinov’s almost two-
decades-old system continued to attract the most adherents. It is not surprising then that Bulgaria’s 
first official orthography of 1899 affirmed what was de facto already the case. Todor Ivanchev, 
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the Minister of Education at the time, based the official orthography on the proposals of Drinov, 
Momchilov, and Karavelov, producing a moderate program. Even though it contained a firm 
phonetic basis, it retained some traditional elements that caused it to be difficult to learn and 
master. Known as the Drinovsko-Ivanchevski orthography, it remained firmly entrenched until 
after the First World War. 
A seeming paradox emerges from this brief narrative of the standardization of modern 
Bulgarian. The grammatical structure of the literary language that triumphed was radical and New 
Bulgarian, whereas the orthography was based on a conservative, Old Bulgarian etymological 
principle. As we have seen, the reasons for this divergence are historical and related to changes in 
the vision of how the Bulgarian nation should relate to its history. The language question was an 
integral component of national sentiment. It was debated, changed, and codified in a process that 
paralleled the political and social development of the country. As the essence of the nation, 
language was also its marker. Conflict over the orthography was political and related to questions 
about nationalism as well as popular participation and popular sovereignty. For language had to 
foster inclusion into the state and the national community, and at the same time had to serve as the 
protector of the Bulgarian heritage. At the heart of the language debates are the related antinomies 
of the vernacular/etymological and the modern/traditional. These antinomies lent themselves 
easily to reconfiguration as democracy/oligarchy in the crucible of the crisis in authority following 
the First World War when the radical ideas of self-determination and popular sovereignty gained 
ground. Omarchevski’s spelling reform of June 1921 that further simplified the alphabet was the 








The Orthography Debate of the 1920s 
 
 
On December 20, 1921, Stoian Omarchevski, the Minister of Education in the cabinet of 
the agrarian government of Alexander Stamboliiski (1919-1923), decided he had had enough of 
the obstructionism of the University of Sofia over the implementation of his orthographic reform. 
Twelve days earlier the cracks in the relationship between the minister and the academic council 
of the university were evident, as Omarchevski refused to attend the annual holiday of the 
university that was held in the national theater.162 December 20, then, marked the official 
commencement of hostilities when Omarchevski issued a fine to the rector of the university, 
Liubomir Miletich, amounting to a twelfth of his salary and ordered that the university coffers be 
sealed. The immediate cause for the intervention was that Miletich had made use of the old 
orthography to publish the official university obituary for his colleague, Prof. Medvedev. There 
were other, more serious issues that could have precipitated an impasse like student tuitions, the 
holding of positions of public office by faculty members, and even the thorny question of 
university autonomy. In what chroniclers of the university aptly call the second university crisis, 
these and other issues definitely found their place.163 But it was an argument over spelling that 
began and lay at the heart of the conflict. More precisely, the university’s refusal to fully implement 
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the new orthography passed by Omarchevski in the summer of 1921 and its unwillingness to atone 
for its errant publications crystallized the already developing animosity between the two parties 
into an outright refusal to work with each other. 
In the first phase of the conflict, the frenzied correspondence between the Ministry of 
Education and the university established the battle lines and the arguments that would be used. 
The response of the academic council of December 22 firmly rebuffed the intervention of the 
minister by arguing that the sealing of the coffers was an unlawful act and that only the council 
had the right to discipline members of the faculty. On his part, Omarchevski countered on 
December 23 with an explanation that it was not only the obituary that offended, but also a number 
of other publications including the yearly report of the university for the academic year 1920-1921. 
Furthermore, Omarchevski sought to convene a meeting of the whole faculty that was to determine 
if the rector had acted alone or as a representative of the university’s interest in flaunting the 
orthographic directive of the Ministry of Education. The indignant reply of the council (December 
26, 1921) contained a refusal to convene the university faculty and punish the rector.164 It added 
the barb that Omarchevski should be more concerned with his own actions because he himself had 
made exceptions to the orthography directives.165  
In January 1922 the university sought a higher arbiter and appealed to the Supreme 
Administrative Council to remove the fine on Miletich, again by using the argument of university 
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autonomy. Omarchevski, too, sought measures to weaken his opposition by applying legislation 
that the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU) had passed prohibiting politicians from 
holding lectureships at the university.166 In fact, quite a number of MP’s and leaders of the 
bourgeois opposition parties were holding appointments at the university. The leadership of the 
National–Progressive Party -- Stoian Danev, Stefan Bobchev, Petîr Abrashev; of the Democratic 
Party -- Georgi Danailov, Vladimir Mollov; of the Radical Party -- Iosif Fadenkhekht, Petko 
Stoianov, Venelin Ganev, and of the National Alliance -- Alexander Tsankov, Dimitîr Mishaikov, 
comprised almost exclusively the faculty of law. The importance of these figures and their political 
connections are all the more visible if one remembers that the economics professor Tsankov 
headed the coup against the agrarian government in 1923 and subsequently became prime minister 
in the new regime. Thus, when Omarchevski demanded the resignation of eight figures from the 
faculty of law on February 18, 1922, he was attempting a coup against nothing less than members 
of parliament.  
 Omarchevski additionally put financial pressure on the university via the new budget for 
the upcoming academic year. The budget proposed to cut the professorial posts of a number of the 
most vocal opponents, inclusive of the rector and the pro-rector, and placed a moratorium on new 
appointments. The response of the academic council was a warning that this crass unconstitutional 
encroachment on the internal workings of the university would make future cooperation with the 
ministry impossible and would force it to cease instruction.167 This position was affirmed on 
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several occasions in March, when the conflict spilled into the press and took on a more ominous 
tone with professional societies announcing their solidarity with the university and organizing 
protests. The unwillingness of either side to back down is illustrated by the cessation of classes on 
March 11 and the government’s answer in its chief organ, Zemedelsko Zname, on March 16 that 
this was to be a “battle to the end.”168 Thus, the decision taken by the general meeting of the entire 
professorial body on April 1, to completely shut down the university was the only possible 
outcome in light of how serious the situation had become. The university remained closed until 
August 19, 1922.  
 The reopening was the result of a series of negotiations that began at the end of June. Still, 
the resolution of the university crisis occurred only after Stamboliiski sent Omarchevski on a 
diplomatic mission to Brazil at the beginning of August. The concessions by the government 
included rescinding the rector’s fine, restoration of the university credits in the budget, and certain 
changes to the university rulebook following the recommendations of the administrative council. 
On its part, the university agreed to immediately open and follow the existing law. Although the 
wording of this resolution was not specific, presumably to save face for the university, it implied 
that it would diligently apply the new orthography. For, in the course of the university crisis, on 
March 25, 1922, parliament had passed a “Law for a Unitary Bulgarian Orthography” that included 
specific punitive measures for transgressions.169 Furthermore, the university undertook to hold 
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elections for a new rector, deans, and members of the academic council, which it duly fulfilled on 
September 11, and agreed to replace the private lecturers (politicians) with regular employees. The 
agreement held until the coup against the agrarian government in June, 1923, and the university 
remained open. Although a few issues remained to be resolved, chief among them student taxes, 
the resolution of the orthographic battle removed the major bone of contention between the two 
parties. 
The battle between the Ministry of Education and the University of Sofia was much more 
than a peripheral conflict. Over its course it involved all major political players and mobilized 
significant sectors of society, particularly in the capital. The language question, which had uneasily 
mediated between the etymological and the phonetic principles, was eminently well suited to take 
on the symbolic role of a litmus test dividing the radical populist conceptions of the national polity 
that emerged in the aftermath of the First World War, from the paternalistic elitism of the étatist 
apparatus that had developed in the first decades of independent statehood. In other words, the 
violent sentiments that the spelling reform aroused in its supporters and detractors were a major 
component of the struggle for the nation’s soul in the turbulent 1920’s. The extension of the 
democratic principle and the location of unmediated popular sovereignty in the masses became 
even more legible in the democratization of an orthography that would erase the distinction 
between literate and ‘illiterate’ citizens, and the privileges that hinged upon it. It is my contention 
that while the forces on the Bulgarian right found it difficult to overtly contain the democratic 
revolution in their political rhetoric, they found a surrogate for their program in the defense of 
traditions that preserved social exclusions. Since the language question had been so intimately tied 






parallel change in the nature of nationalism. As seen in detail below, even rhetorically, the bottom 
line of the impassioned responses to the new spelling always concerned Bulgarian nationalism. 
 A focus on the localized struggle between the ministry and the university has the advantage 
of revealing the technical process of escalation in which recalcitrance over the implementation of 
the spelling reform turned into a battle for the university’s survival. A broader, socio-historical 
perspective, however, can represent the university’s unwillingness to censor its rector as an effort 
to retain at its core the role of autonomous defender of culture and the national patrimony against 
the peasants’ meddling. It is this second perspective that better puts in focus the symbolic 
significance of the orthographic issue and exposes it as an integral part of the socio-political 
struggle for ascendancy that was the legacy of the First World War. 
The immediate cause of the agrarian regime’s decision to examine the orthography in 1921 
was agitation by the primary school teachers. In several conferences the educators expressed their 
dissatisfaction with the difficulties they encountered in teaching the Drinovsko-Ivanchevski 
spelling. The biggest cause of concern was that it was so difficult to learn, with all its etymological 
exceptions, that it invariably ended taking up the majority of the instructional time. In an appeal 
to the ministry, a teachers’ delegation demanded a simplified orthography so that literary and 
stylistic exercises could be reinserted into the curriculum.170 The teacher’s position was buttressed 
by the intervention of the prominent linguists Tsonev and Teodorov-Balan, who had presented a 
proposal for an orthographic reform at the conference. 
                                                 






Omarchevski’s response was to issue Order No. 1941, whereby he charged a commission 
with the task of “reexamining the orthography of the contemporary Bulgarian language and giving 
its opinion on whether it can be simplified so that it would become accessible and easily 
assimilable.”171 The concluding report presented on June 17, 1921 was eminently sensible. Its chief 
points concerned abandoning the several letters with dual value or denoting sounds that in the 
course of the linguistic development had become mute. The organizing principle behind these 
suggestions was that every letter should correspond to a single unique sound.  
 The work of the commission was closely observed and discussed in Sofia. Even as it began 
its work, a lively debate took place on the pages of the periodic press. Teodorov-Balan and Tsonev 
as well as the literary critic and historian Alexander Balabanov agitated in favor of reforms. Others 
advanced the case that a small clique was imposing its agenda contrary to any real linguistic need. 
The fact that Tsonev received death threats and Teodorov-Balan was publicly defamed attests to 
the pervading rancor.172 In this tense context, the commission displayed sensitivity to the 
developing nationalistic tinge of the debate and attempted to dismantle one of the key objections 
of the detractors. Its final report reads, “…these reforms in the orthography do not damage the 
Bulgarian national unity because national unity is expressed specifically through a literary 
language and orthography, which are properly established and universal.”173  
The report was supposed to be provisional, to generate recommendations to be examined 
by the relevant competent authorities, chief among them the Historico-Philological Branch of the 
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Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (BAS). By no means was it to serve as the independent basis for 
reform. Still, immediately after its completion and publication, Omarchevski presented it to the 
cabinet for scrutiny and implementation. In a little over a week the “Directive for a Common 
Orthography of the Bulgarian Literary Language” made the spelling reform official. It 
implemented the commission’s recommendations with one notable exception: the reduced vowel 
would be denoted by the Church Slavonic Ѫ rather than by the suggested hard sign. In light of the 
way in which the opposition to the reform developed, historians have focused on the arbitrary and 
authoritarian side of Stamboliiski’s personality when providing an explanation for why he 
overruled the recommendations of Omarchevski and the commission, and preserved the Ѫ. 
Alexander Velev shows another side to the debate, when he examines the minutes of the Council 
of ministers and tracks the arguments of both sides:174   
 
G. Damianov [MP] insisted on the preservation of the letter Ѫ because it was an 
Old Bulgarian letter and it distinguished our language from others. Apparently his 
chief concern was the differentiation of the Bulgarian from the Serbian language. 
This view doubtlessly expressed the intimate considerations of the initiators of the 
orthographic reform, who, with the conservation of this letter, intended to disarm 
the opposition parties whose claim it was that the reform was pandering to the 
interests of Belgrade.175 
 
Velev’s analysis is a useful corrective showing that even the highest circles of the agrarian 
government were not insulated from concessions to nationalist positions. There were good grounds 
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for the agrarians’ concern because the resistance to the orthographic reform was serious. It came 
via objections over the content of the reform and its improper implementation. It occurred at rallies 
and demonstrations, through the formation and activities of coalition blocks, and in the treatment 
of a hostile press.. At the first level of commonality, the opposition was united in its political 
struggle against the agrarian regime. Beneath it one can isolate a second level of commonality, 
which is the language of nationalism. The two are almost completely isomorphic with the 
exception of the Communist and Social Democratic Parties. Both of these recognized the need for 
reform but criticized it over the irregular and authoritarian methods of its implementation. These 
parties of the left did not play the popular nationalist card; rather, their critique of the bourgeois 
parties hinged on the exposure of the dangerous demagogic and reactionary pandering to 
nationalist sentiments.  
On July 12, 1921, a rally against the orthographic reform was convened in Sofia by the 
Union of Bulgarian Scientists, Writers and Artists, the Association of Journalists, and the 
Association of Writers. Alongside its more technical objections, the adopted resolution is quite 
illustrative of the nationalistic overtones, particularly with regards to the Bulgarian irredenta, that 
opponents to the reforms found useful to employ, “The reform, so abruptly imposed, having paid 
no attention to the literary traditions that are so precious to our co-nationals outside the boundaries 
of the Kingdom of Bulgaria, is extremely damaging to the common Bulgarian national 
interests.”176 
 The Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine compounded the irredentist obsessions in Bulgaria after 
the Balkan wars. BANU infuriated revanchist circles both because of its history of opposition to 
                                                 






the First World War and its policy of rapprochement with the Triune Kingdom. The neglect of the 
army, the replacement of the compulsory military service with a civil counterpart, and the 
rhetorical abandonment of any territorial claims, were now aggravated by concessions on the 
cultural front. As we see here and in the discussions of the ministerial cabinet, the reception of the 
orthographic reform was tainted by the preoccupation with Macedonia and how to preserve, in the 
worst case scenario, at least the cultural links with the ‘fellow Bulgarians.’ In this rhetorical 
context, the representation of BANU policy as national treason was only a short step away. 
The voice of the opposition in the press became ever more insistent through 1921, 
especially with the university crisis. At first the critique of Omarchevski’s cultural politics focused 
on the spelling. Liubomir Andreichin refers to the significant negative reaction that held the 
abandoned traditional letters and spellings to be “symbols of Bulgarianness” and rose in defence 
of the national patrimony.177 An example is Stoian Romanski’s article “Orthographic Crisis” of 
1922. He too maintained that the Ѫ, Ѣ, Ъ, and Ь were ‘distinguished signs of Bulgarian writing,’ 
and concluded that “[The Drinovsko-Ivanchevski spelling] is a reasonable combination of the ten-
centuries-old tradition of Bulgarian writing with the demands of the New Bulgarian language. 
Because of these qualities it should not be replaced by a new spelling system even if it contains a 
few obvious advantages.”178 His is a significant example of the implacable yet measured 
opposition. Romanski was no extremist, yet the eminent philologist and ethnographer would play 
a central role in the restoration of the Drinovsko-Ivanchevski spelling after Tsankov’s coup. 
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Once the university crisis developed, the oppositional newspapers began to print in defense 
of university autonomy as well. These were the newspapers Radikal of the Radical-Democratic 
party, Priaporets of the Democratic Party, and Nezavisimost  of the National-Liberal Party. Only 
Zemedelsko Zname, BANU’s chief publication, defended the policy of the Ministry of Education. 
The newspapers Zora and Priaporets were even closed down for a while at the end of 1922 because 
they demonstratively continued to use the old orthography.179 
 On February 26, thousands of people protested Omarchevski’s proposed firing of the staff 
of the Law Department. This action was called by the Union of Bulgarian Lawyers. Students 
marched as well that day and were dispersed by the police. In March, shortly before the university 
went on strike, twenty-one societies, institutes, and organizations united to form the Cultural-
Professional Committee of Citizens in defense of the university. Aside from professional 
organizations, it included BAS, Naroden Sgovor, and the Union of Reserve Officers. Dimitrina 
Petrova correctly analyzes the politics of this formation as a committee for struggle against the 
government, “The university crisis, and especially its conclusion, reveals the isolation of BANU 
from academic and some other cultural circles as well as the failures in its efforts to integrate them 
to the regime.”180 The bigger failure, however, was the alienation of the nationalist circles. In fact, 
it was even unable to properly represent and then defend its cultural policy against those that 
deemed it anti-national. 
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 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to treat all of the sites of contestation that developed 
around the orthographic debate. The proposal of BAS in 1921, which to a great extent replayed 
the drama of the university crisis as the ‘Crisis of the Academy of Sciences,”181 and the 
parliamentary debates over the spelling legislation proved to be significant for two reasons: first, 
they indicate the breadth of the phenomenon and the commitment it elicited from a vast array of 
agents; secondly, the discursive positions adopted at these two sites are perfect illustrations of the 
politicization of linguistics in the context of nationalism. The parliamentary debates, in particular, 
revealed the invariably nationalist arguments advanced by all bourgeois parties alongside the more 
serious objections to the orthographic reform and its encoding into legislation. Even the 
communists and the social democrats treated nationalism in their critique since it was the only 
differentiating mark that separated their stance from that of the bourgeois position.182 It is worth 
stressing that agrarians, communists, and social democrats were appealing to a different 
conception of nationalism when they made the claim that a orthographic reform was necessary in 
the name of the common citizen. It is a nationalism connected to popular sovereignty and the 
interests of the people. By exposing the narrow, demagogic interests of the bourgeois parties in 
appealing to a defensive nationalism, they were claiming space for an alternative, populist 
‘Bulgarianness’ both conceptually and politically. Of course, the coincidence of interests did not 
prevent the Commmunist Party in particular from joining the opposition, just as it stood by on the 
sidelines in June of 1923 during the coup against the BANU regime. 
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 For all of their criticism and denunciation of the methods employed by the agrarians in 
their cultural policy, the conspirators led by Tsankov availed themselves of the same tactics. Ten 
days after the bloody coup against the agrarian government of Stamboliiski on June 9, 1923, 
Miletich, the former rector of the university and chief protagonist of the university crisis as well 
as the man who bears the chief responsibility for the scuttling of the orthographic project of BAS, 
was at the head of a new orthographic commission. Its reactionary conclusion to restore virtually 
verbatim the Drinovsko-Ivanchevski spelling of 1899 was hardly a surprise.183 One cannot refrain 
from reveling in the irony that Tsankov’s guide to the orthography of August 1923 entitled, 
“Upîtvane za pravopis na bîlgarskiia ezik,” both syntactically mimicked Omarchevski’s effort of 
1921, “Upîtvane za obsht pravopis,” and was promulgated in exactly the same way by ministerial 
decree. The 1920’s witnessed a farcical iteration of the tremors centered on Omarchevski. The left 
leaning press continued to employ the 1921 orthography.184 Linguists continued to agitate in favor 
of reforms, be they of the Omarchevski or the BAS variety.185 The climax in 1928 involved nothing 
other than the employment of the legislature, in the same way that Omarchevski had done, to make 
the old spelling mandatory. The only difference was the conciliatory gesture allowing authors of a 
limited number of scientific and literary works to choose their spelling. 
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While the old Drinovsko-Ivanchevski orthography continued to be used in the interwar 
period, the radicalism of 1944-1945 brought a change. A large commission of writers and linguists 
began work shortly after the communist dominated Fatherland Front took power on September 9, 
1944. The February 1945 decree that derived from its work was an affirmation of the phonetic 
principle. The orthography legislated in 1945 was basically identical to the agrarian one. While it 
is more precise to say that its immediate model was the proposal of the Historico-Philological 





What explains the observer’s initial awe at the tumult that was caused by a seemingly 
technical issue, the orthographic change in the 1920’s? The answer this chapter proposes is that 
the spelling reform was much more than a matter of linguistics. It marked a fundamental change 
in the Bulgarian polity and was associated with a moment of restructuring, democratization, and 
reshuffling of elites, the rearrangement of norms that favored different social and cultural 
constellations. It is only appropriate that something so momentous would have been debated in the 
dominant discourse of the time – nationalism. This discourse incorporated all of the 
anxieties/peculiarities of the historically contingent face of Bulgarian nationalism. There is a direct 
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link between the debate over orthography and the debate over the face of Bulgarian nationalism. 
But there is also something more involved here. This was not simply the couching of an external 
debate in the trappings of nationalism. The centrality of a linguistic base for the nation (the ethno-
linguistic community) in Eastern Europe make this a contest for the soul of the nation. 
The cultural/political importance of orthographic reform was its attempt to open up the 
polity to the masses by erasing a marker that generated difference. That was the mechanism 
through which the reforms in 1921 and later in 1945 favored “civic” nationalism. But we should 
reflect for a moment here on the limitations of using the categories civic and ethnic. The separation 
that they presume is about two ways of engaging with the national polity. But there are no clean 
cases and tidy distinctions. A careful analysis of any polity reveals mixtures, or better yet, different 
goals and agendas of nationalist agitation/politics that are variably inclusive and exclusionary 
depending on the historical context. As there are no predetermined paths, the analysis of 
nationalism responds better to historical inquiries than to sociological modeling. 
The orthographic question, when scrutinized beyond the evènement allows one to glimpse 
its dynamic within the conjoncture. The fact that it parallels the political history of the modern 
Bulgarian state from 1878, permits the linkage of nationalism to the long term political 
development of the country.  In other words, the picture of nationalism that it elicits is one that 
intimately grapples with one of the most central political processes of the modern Bulgarian state 
– the question of democracy and popular sovereignty. As stated above, there is good reason to link 
the three revolutionary re-conceptualizations of the Bulgarian polity -- Independence, the First and 
Second World Wars -- to the simultaneously occurring crucial and radical interventions into the 
ethno-linguistic nature of the nation via orthographic reform. That Stamboliiski’s agrarian regime 






of these social experiments, that of popularization and democratization within the nation. Rhetoric 
aside, especially that of the outwardly non-national communist ideology, the orthographic reform 
re-imagined the national community in Bulgaria. While the critique of the civic/ethnic antinomy 
from within necessitated the demonstration of shifts using the problematic binaries of the model, 
the contextual approach that this chapter advocates could further deconstruct the ‘re-imagination 
of the national community.’ Even as the ‘civic’ base of the nation is broadened with the 
orthographic reform, the consolidation of the national language contributes to a new set of 
exclusions. Attention to the changing hierarchies within the nation can reveal the constellation of 
contradictions it tries to cover.  
The contest for the soul of the nation and the different potentialities and outcomes could 
be very succinctly summed up in a question that owes its terminology to Benedict Anderson: 
Whose imagined community? This question plumbs to the depths of what is at stake in imagining 
the nation as a socio-cultural project. This question, however, is not mine, and has been raised with 
slightly different connotations by Partha Chatterjee's homonymous article from 1991 that became 
the first chapter of his The Nation and Its Fragments in 1993.187 Despite the differences which will 
become apparent below, the two projects, mine as developed in this chapter, and his, converge in 
their implications. In order to situate this relationship and also to establish the limits to the points 
of contact, a few words are necessary about the work of the Subaltern Studies Collective and the 
vast intellectual impact it has made in the past decades. 
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Subaltern Studies, beginning with the publication of its volumes from the early 1980s, 
began as a project to problematize Indian and South-East Asian history in its particular relation to 
the colonial and post-colonial condition. The impact of this reevaluation from the multi-
disciplinary scholarship of the collective was profound precisely because the frameworks within 
which the particular studies were situated had implications for European and World History as 
well. For example, the critique of the liberal historicist mythology and the exposure of the gap 
between its promise and realization that Dipesh Chakrabarty performs in Provincializing Europe 
reverberates in Marxist theoretical frameworks about the function and condition of modernity, 
particularly when these conceptions are forced to account for difference.188 Such relational 
critiques, when connected internally to the subaltern position of groups within society, such as the 
peasantry, opened new avenues for deconstructing the hegemonic practices imbedded within 
discourses of the 'universal' from the previously subsumed and marginalized particular. 
The Subaltern Studies project is not static and has undergone changes in its thematic focus 
and editorial leadership. The widening of its claims from its humble Marxist origins under Ranajit 
Guha is mirrored in the critiques of it that strive to keep up with the widening of its influence. 
Thus, while Sumit Sarkar could draw attention to the relative marginalization of the micro-
historical work on the subaltern subject in "The Decline of the Subaltern in Subaltern Studies" in 
1997, the most recent salvo from Vivek Chibber's Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital 
is revelatory of the status that Subaltern Studies has achieved when it is used by him as a 
                                                 






theoretically cohesive proxy for the variability of postcolonial theory.189 The debate between 
Chibber and Partha Chatterjee at the Historical Materialism Conference in New York on April 28, 
2013, entitled "Marxism & the Legacy of Subaltern Studies," turned out to be far from the swan 
song for a spent movement as was forecast. Although the parameters of the debate restricted the 
discussion to only a few topics, nonetheless the central divergence over the treatment of difference 
is emblematic. Below is a transcription of the conclusion of Partha Chatterjee intervention; it 
functions as an iteration of a manifesto that stakes out claims, defends choices taken, and through 
praxis links theory to politics: 
 
One can only acknowledge that the debate between universalism and its critics 
continues and will not be resolved in a hurry. The choice between the two sides at 
this time is indeed political. The greatest strength of the universalist position is the 
assurance it provides of predictability and control over uncertain outcomes. It is the 
assurance that past history is a reliable guide to the future, which leads Chibber to 
insist that capitalism or the struggles of subaltern classes must be the same 
everywhere. .... The critics of universalism argue that the outcomes are unknown, 
indeterminate, and hence unpredictable. They accept the challenge of risky political 
choices based on provisional, contingent, and corrigible historical knowledge. Since 
its early work, which Chibber has dissected in his book, Subaltern Studies went in 
several new directions, especially after the important interventions by Gayatri 
Spivak and Gyan Prakash. Their historical practice does not rule out the rise of new 
universalist principles, but these, they insist, must be forged anew. What is certain 
is that the working classes of Europe and North America  and their ideologues can 
no longer act as the designated avant-guarde in the struggles of subaltern classes in 
other parts of the world. Historians of Subaltern Studies have only attempted to 
interpret a small part of these struggles, and changing the world, needless to say, is 
a job that cannot be entrusted to historians.190 
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What is left unsaid in this quotation, but which is implicit, is the function of the subaltern to the 
project. It is through paying attention to the presumably powerless, malleable, or marginalized that 
a counter-example to the hegemonic narrative can be produced, the site of its failure or 
contradiction can be pinpointed, and a new conceptualization can be produced.  
This critical thrust of Subaltern Studies is what makes it such a useful theoretical frame in 
relation to this dissertation in general and to its treatment of nationalism in particular. This relation 
is much more than a simple parallelism through the attention to the peasantry as a subaltern subject. 
Actually, the deeper claim is that through the study of the subaltern subject, in this particular case 
the peasant, certain important critiques can be made that otherwise are obscured. In the case of 
Subaltern Studies as it started in the 1980's, the central issue was how to continue to apply Marxist 
theory in empirical situations that did not conform to expectations and challenged orthodoxies. In 
effect it was an internal critique that argued that the exceptional case from the 'periphery' is of 
paramount importance to the nuancing and clarifying of capitalist practice. Of course, the 
reverberations of this critical analysis were imbedded within the particular colonial and post-
colonial history of India and South East Asia, and so the divergences from the liberal promises of 
the nation-state produced a similar shake-up in the other pillar of modernity: nationalism. 
When Partha Chatterjee wrote Whose Imagined Community, he performed a series of such 
critical moves with regard to nationalism in India. He challenged Euro-centrism by arguing that 
the Indian case neither conforms quantitatively to modular forms imported from Europe, nor 
qualitatively, because the implication is that the non-European imagination "must remain forever 







colonized."191 Further, he profited from the insight that the circularity of standard nationalist 
history, which could also be considered as an elite narrative, or one that overemphasizes 
nationalism as a political movement, is bound to reproduce itself. "In fact, since it seeks to replicate 
in its own history the history of the modern state in Europe, nationalism's self-representation will 
inevitably corroborate Anderson's decoding of the nationalist myth."192 Based on this, Chatterjee 
locates and describes a prior location of sovereignty for nationalism in the inner spiritual domain 
of the social imagination that is confronted by Western material superiority. While the particular 
case of Bengal that he fleshes out is not transferable either in its particulars or in its more 
generalized structure to the rest of the world, the very fact that he locates it opens up the possibility 
of alternative readings in other arenas. This, in my view, is the inspirational function of the 
Subaltern Studies critique. 
 More particular applications are problematic, and I would like to flesh out this point a bit 
as an explanation of the distance I maintain from Subaltern Studies, even as I continue to 
demonstrate how it informs this work. Said differently, I would like to tackle here the temptation 
in East-European historiography to tie itself to broader theoretical movements in order to escape 
the parochialism of area studies, but often at the cost of problematic transplantation. This situation 
is not unique to East-European studies. Daniel Clayton's conclusion to his review of Chakrabarty's 
Habitations of Modernity: Essays in the wake of Subaltern Studies grapples with the temptation of 
transferability, "Chakrabarty gives us some important insights into how and why modern Indian 
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history has become the locus classicus for so much theoretical production in the sprawling field of 
postcolonial studies. By the same token, he causes us (or at least this reader) to ask: how might we 
think and write about forms or habitations of postcoloniality that deviate from canonical Indian 
intellectual conceptions of this term and condition."193 
One of the best engagements with this problem that emerged from within East-European 
studies was the provocative article by Katherine Verdery and Sharad Chari, "Thinking between 
the Posts: Postcolonialism, Postsocialism, and Ethnography after the Cold War."194 The article's 
goal is to suggest points of contact between postcolonial and postsocialist studies. The three 
concrete areas where the authors think that this can best occur are in work on imperialism, the 
jettisoning of the Cold War division of the world into Second and Third Worlds, and attention to 
the biopolitics of 'state racisms,' in their terms, but which actually devolves to the treatment of the 
'other' in categories such as "internal enemies." Although stimulating to consider, the actual content 
at these sites is debatable. Maria Todorova, for example, problematizes the characterization of 
state relations in the Soviet Bloc as colonial, even as she herself considers the limits of the 
applicability of postcolonialism, partly in relation to her earlier distinctions between Balkanism 
and Orientalism in her "Balkanism and Postcolonialism, or On the Beauty of the Airplane 
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View."195 I would argue that the content of this debate is as unimportant as the determination of 
sites of contact so long as critical inquiry does not contravene the production of meticulous thick 
description. To this reader, the most fruitful contribution of Verdery's and Chari's piece is 
contained in the critical possibilities imbedded in the rescuing of the term "postsocialism" from 
the anti-communism of the transition.196 "Over time, "postsocialism" too came to signify a critical 
standpoint, in several senses: critical of the socialist past and of possible socialist futures; critical 
of the present as neoliberal verities about transition, markets, and democracy were being imposed 
upon former socialist spaces; and critical of the possibilities for knowledge as shaped by Cold War 
institutions."197 I hope that this present work serves as a fruitful illustration of how the use of the 
subaltern project as inspiration can produce a nuanced conversation between East European 
Studies and postcolonial theory. 
If the legacy of Subaltern Studies is this spirit of critical inquiry that opens up space for 
reevaluation, then it is especially important to avoid tendencies toward ossification. In Whose 
Imagined Community?, Chatterjee provides a genealogy of the impetus toward reevaluation by 
referring to the ""area specialists," the historians of the colonial world, working their way 
cheerlessly through musty files of administrative reports and official correspondence," out of 
whose ranks a figure like Benedict Anderson emerged.198 The humility of painstaking work that 
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can identify inconsistencies and difference is in fact the method by which Subaltern Studies has 
been able to supersede 'elitist' historiography or to provincialize Europe.  
However, there is a troubling tendency to reify Europe even as the universalist claims of 
Europe are undone. It is surprising that Chatterjee reiterated a point in his debate with Chibber in 
2013 that he had codified back in 2001 in his synthesis, "Subaltern History" for the International 
Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences:199 
 
The historical problem confronted by Subaltern Studies is not intrinsically a 
difference between West and East, as Chibber repeatedly insists. The geographical 
distinction is merely the spatial label for a historical difference. The difference is 
indicated, let me insist emphatically, by the disappearance of the peasantry in 
Capitalist Europe and the continued reproduction to this day of a peasantry under 
the rule of Capital in the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. .... That is 
also why, despite the apparent similarity, Subaltern Studies could never have been 
carried out in the same way as history from below in Europe. The recounting in the 
latter body of work of the struggles of peasants and artisans in the period of the 
ascendancy of capitalism in Europe was inevitably written as tragedy since the 
ultimate dissolution of these classes was already scripted into their history. Should 
we assume the same trajectory for agrarian societies in other parts of the world? 
Does a different sequencing of capitalist modernity there not mean that the 
historical outcomes in terms of economic formations, political institutions of 
cultural practices might be quite different from those we see in the West?200 
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The contradiction in this claim is that while it justifies the provincialization of Europe from 
without, it denies its possibility from within (in this particular case through a Thompsonian history 
from below). Subaltern Studies opens up space for the other - in general India and Southeast Asia 
- in parallel to Europe. That is done by demonstrating that there is neither a simple transplantation 
and accompamying imposition of ideas or institutions, nor are all other nationalisms or modernities 
derivative. Because of the West versus the Rest duality, the argument for difference, multiple 
modernities, unfortunately is not brought back to Europe. Europe remains in some important 
respects homogeneous. I would claim that that critical logic has to be and can be brought back to 
Europe to perform the rupture with elite historiography. Otherwise it would be an intolerable irony 
for Subaltern Studies to be the expression of European elite historiography. 
An example would more clearly illustrate my point here. In the chapter, "The Nation and 
its Peasants," Chatterjee begins his analysis with a portrayal of the fate of the European peasantry. 
Two claims cover the range of European experience. "In Western Europe, the institutionalization 
of a modern regime of power coincides with or follows a process of the extinction of the peasantry. 
Even in France, where it survived as a sufficiently large mass of the population in the second half 
of the nineteenth century, the peasantry was associated with such supposedly aberrant political 
phenomena as Bonapartism and had to be systematically disciplined and transformed into 
"Frenchmen."201 The other half of the continent is covered by, "Further east, the peasantry figured 
for more than half a century as a hub of a fierce debate between populists and Marxists over its 
role in a revolutionary Russia.... In the end, the matter was settled in Russia by the elimination of 
                                                 






the peasantry under the collectivization program of the 1930s."202 Nowhere is the European 
peasantry accorded any agency; Hegel speaks about it. The problem of the veracity of the truth-
claim about Europe disappears in the logical structure of Chatterjee's deduction: Europe and its 
relationship to its peasantry is A, the colonial East and its relationship to the peasantry is the 
opposite of A (extinction vs. survival), and hence the conclusion about the implication of historical 
difference, and the necessity for autonomous analysis. The logical deduction is valid irrespective 
of the truth value of the premises, but it cannot be sound, if either premise is invalid.  
Even as I argue that this representation of Europe by Chatterjee is in an unsatisfactory 
reduction that is false as far as interwar agrarian Europe203 is concerned, I want to stress that 
essentializing Europe is not necessary for provincializing it. The Subaltern critique is consistent 
with a similar project that achieves that provincialization from within. Therefore, enriching the 
European experience with the complex history of the alternative that the agrarian movements of 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia elaborated in no way invalidates the enrichment 
brought about by the accommodation of the colonial east. Tongue in cheek, I cannot help but 
remind the reader that the peasant alternative was not eliminated in interwar Europe by capitalism. 
Nor is the very complex path of the peasantry's disappearance in the socialist period reducible to 
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the typology of violent Stalinist war against the peasantry.204 Some points of departure for how the 
agrarian alternative was brought to an end in the years following World War Two will be the topic 
of the last chapter, but suffice it to say here that this is why its history in this work cannot be and 
is not written as tragedy. 
The Subaltern inspiration can be turned against its own essentializations through the insight 
that understandings of Europe's interwar period have been impoverished by the absence of the 
peasantry as a subject, a condition which is doubly ironic since it treats a moment when the 
peasantry sought to shrug off its subaltern condition and projected itself as a transformative 
modern political subject. And while this thread runs through the entire study of the Golden Age of 
the European Peasantry, in this particular chapter the inspiration of subaltern studies is activated 
at the level of representations of East-European nationalism, where I argue that close attention to 
the relationship between agrarian politics, nationalism, and the reconfiguration of the nation 
reveals processes that are otherwise missed and through their inclusion can do nothing but force 
an enrichment of the static models which unfortunately dominate scholarship even to date. 
This chapter has been a demonstrative experiment in two directions. The first pertains to 
agrarianism itself and has sought to demonstrate the horizon of possibility that motivated the 
golden age of agrarianism: in relation to nationalism it showed the political ethics beneath a topic 
that has attracted little attention but which, as I have demonstrated, is pregnant with significance. 
The second pertains to the significance of agrarianism for European history and the social sciences 
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and has sought to demonstrate that a neglected topic can offer a unique point of reference from 
which to interrogate the theoretical and impirical foundations of other subfields and disciplines. 
Both of these directions celebrate the exciting potential still available to research into agrarianism 
and in a small way mimic the excitement that agrarians could harness to their cause in the interwar 
period as they sought to imagine a more equitable modernity. The next chapter’s purpose is to 
qualify this potential along the line of Marx’ dictum that men make their own history but do not 
make it as they please. The chapter illustrates the tension between aspirations and limitations that 























Between Aspirations and Limitations 
 
 Raiko Daskalov, Stamboliiski's partner in the Radomir Rebellion, had been sent to Prague 
in May, 1923 as the minister plenipotentiary to Czechoslovakia. On June 9, 1923 he was in Prague 
and there he began to organize the response to the coup in Sofia. He founded the Representation 
of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union Abroad. On 26 August, 1923, an agent of IMRO, Iordan 
Tsitsonkov, carried out the death sentence that had been passed by IMRO against him and that had 
failed once before in December of 1922. Todor Alexandrov, one of the leading figures in IMRO, 
sent out a circular to the IMRO vojvodas on 27 August, 1923: "On the 26 of August three 
revolutionary bullets brought down in Prague the former Minister in the Cabinet of Stamboliiski, 
Raiko Daskalov. Having covered his tracks for a long time, having almost gone completely 
underground for about three months, the killed could not hide from the watchful eye of IMRO: she 
found him and for his crimes against Macedonia and her holy cause, she punished him with 
death."205 Even though Tsitsonkov was captured at the site of the assassination, he was exonerated 
at his trial. Outrage from the BANU émigrés, the Czechoslovak public, and even diplomatic 
pressure from the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (not because there was an especial 
affection for Daskalov, but out of its struggle against IMRO) forced a second trial at which 
Tsitsonkov was sentenced to 20 years in prison. 
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 After the assassination of Daskalov, the Representation of the Bulgarian Agrarian National 
Union Abroad was headed by Aleksandur Obbov, the deposed Minister of Agriculture and State 
Property. Under Obbov, the official purpose of the Representation Abroad was: 1) to organize 
European public opinion against the regime in Bulgaria, 2) to save the comrades in danger inside 
Bulgaria, 3) to inform the public about events in Bulgaria by publishing Zemledelsko Zname and 
contribute to the Bulletin of the MAB, 4) to organize the (Bulgarian) youth abroad.206  
 It is tempting to concede the point to critics that present the Representation Abroad as an 
information center. The initial efforts to from a United Front with the communists in 1924 failed 
and thereafter Obbov and Kosta Todorov engaged in propaganda to defend themselves from their 
representations as communist agents by the Tsankov and then Liapchev governments, but also the 
ones that emerged from within the BANU as the organization started to fracture. The anti-
communist component grew also in proportion to the threat of communist infiltration as well as 
advances in the countryside due to BANU's weakness. 
 The Representation Abroad survived until the partial Amnesty Laws of 1932 and 1933 on 
a meager initial sum of 2 million leva, funds it could collect from the gardener associations, 
members of the BANU, and crucially, financial and logistical aid from the Czechoslovak 
Republican Party. In some ways, the support in Czechoslovakia was decisive to the survival of this 
organization, but in others, it kept it barely above the subsistence level. For example, the 
Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry rejected the demand by its Bulgarian counterpart on 8 August, 
                                                 






1923 to extradite Obbov over specious accusations that he had stolen BANU property.207 This 
defense extended to the rest of the Bulgarian agrarian cadres, even though the links with Kosta 
Todorov in Belgrade to explore the possibility of armed resistance brought complaints from 
Bulgaria that Czechoslovakia's continued succor of these 'criminals' was compromising the 
relations between the two countries.  
 From the Republican Party the Representation Abroad received office space, the use of 
their printing facilities for Zemledelsko Zname, which began to reappear on 15 September, 1923 
after it had been closed in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian émigrés for a while received stipends and some 
had subventions to study at the Cooperative Institute. While this assistance was crucial, 
Czechoslovak policy was measured. Leftist revolutionary tremors had the potential for 
embarrassment, and so Obbov was progressively marginalized. This was aided by the fact that as 
the BANU splintered, the émigré leadership too engaged in personal attacks and infighting among 
itself. At the start of the Republican Party Congress on 5 September, 1925, neither Nedialko 
Atanasov, the former Minister of Rails, Posts, and Telegraphs who had spent almost a year in 
prison after the coup but had emigrated after his release, nor Obbov were allowed to make a 
statement. Obbov had called Atanasov a bolshevik spy and the latter was planning to complain 
and turn the tables at the congress.208 
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 This factionalism made the Czechoslovak position which favored legal activity and a more 
centrist approach easier when it came to promoting or lending support. Officially, the position was 
to unite BANU. Yet in 1932, a year after the Democratic Alliance lost the elections in Bulgaria to 
the People's Bloc that included BANU Vabcha 1 of Dimitur Gichev, Milan Hodža summoned the 
Bulgarian minister plenipotentiary in Prague, Pancho Dorev to protest his portrayal as the financial 
minister of the Bulgarian émigrés in Liapchev's paper, Demokraticheski Sgovor.  Hodža stated, 
"To Obbov, Atanasov, and others we gave a few thousand crowns monthly, but on the condition 
to not engage in any active politics. As soon as Obbov transgressed that condition, we stopped 
being interested in him and he left for Paris with not one sou.... I am not with Obbov and his 
"Pladne"... I and the party are for the active and positive politics of all agrarian parties, for cross-
party cooperation in support of democracy and the constitution."209  
 As stated above, the constraints on the Representation Abroad make it an easy target for 
dismissal as an information center. On the contrary, however, I would argue that these limitations 
notwithstanding, the Representation Abroad's greatest significance was that it could preserve the 
critical and to some degree independent position of Bulgarian agrarianism. It was spared the initial 
terror and the subsequent harassment that plagued the BANU in Bulgaria and resulted in its 
fractioning. Its biggest achievement was that at a time of seeming hopelessness that anything could 
be done to restore political normalcy and a semblance of democracy in Bulgaria, its members 
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tenaciously kept the spark alive for themselves, the beleaguered BANU, their agrarian partners in 
the MAB, and in front of European public opinion. 
 This would not amount to that much, if it only concerned a few dozen already politicized 
grizzled veterans that could not accept defeat even in the context of exile. The difference between 
these men and those colleagues of theirs that formed the International Peasant Union after the 
Second World War (see chapter 6) is that agrarianism was still alive as an idea and still carried a 
potential that could inspire its base. To illustrate this, I would like to stop on an extremely rare 
instance in which the documentary record reflects a radical intervention from the base, an instance 
that allows a momentary engagement with history from below. 
 On 27 May, 1927, responding to meetings of Bulgarian émigrés in Paris, Belgrade, and 
Prague, Obbov and Kosta Todorov attempted to exert some control over the discussion by 
channeling it in an "Appeal to the Bulgarian United (zdruzheni)210 Agrarians Abroad." In the 
appeal, they summarize the content of these meetings as revolving around the following two 
questions, "Do we not lose too much ideologically, situated as we are abroad, as we live 
ideologically divided far from our motherland, and without following and participating in the 
ideological development of our organization?" and "What do we give [now], divided as we are, 
and what could we contribute to the cause of the Bulgarian peasant, if we could live 
organizationally united?"211 The Representation Abroad packaged the concerns from the émigré 
meetings in these questions in such a way so as to be able to maintain its leadership and assert 
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some control over the way dissatisfaction was being expressed. Thus, to recapture the leading role, 
their appeal called for the creation of a Cultural-Educational Union of the Members of BANU 
Abroad. 
 From the documentary evidence regarding this organizational effort that departed from the 
center, the Representation Abroad, everything appeared under control. On 20 June, Stancho 
Trifonov, writing in the name of Obbov, wrote to the comrades in Vienna, Brno, Munich, and 
Stuttgart to inform them that the center was in agreement with their arguments to postpone the 
founding congress of the new organization until after the end of the summer holidays, so that the 
students who were to spend the summer break in Bulgaria, could return.212 What the letter did not 
mention, however, was the hard to contain excitement and mobilization that was bubbling from 
below.  
 I transcribe below a significant portion of one such letter. Even though it forms a part of 
the story of the organization that was to eventually culminate in the creation of the Union of the 
Bulgarian United (zdruzheni) Agrarians Abroad, for me its greatest significance is as a testament 
to the stake individuals had in Agrarianism. Its expression is made all the more poignant by the 
context of 1927, when Andrei Liapchev, who had taken over from Tsankov as the head of the 
Democratic Alliance, was consolidating its rule which was to last until 1931.  
                                                 






 On 5 June, 1927, Peicho Pop-Petrov wrote a letter addressed to the temporary committee 
of the Cultural-Educational Union.213 
 I received the appeal and the draft statutes and I thank you very much. The 
initiative is extremely timely and worthy of praise. Up to now I have always seen 
an emptiness in the life of the BANU, namely the lack of a journal which could 
serve as the ideological platform of the organization. Much more fundamental is 
the need of those who are scattered abroad and thus are denied the possibility to 
participate firsthand in the life of the Union. It is gratifying that today, the cream of 
the emigration is undertaking a task, which although difficult, will produce good 
results. The four-year-long road that the first two members of the temporary 
committee have behind them and which not only they, but also their ideological 
comrades can regard with pride, is sufficient guarantee for success. These four 
difficult years for BANU and [four years] of difficult hardship for the emigration 
testify to the constancy, energy, and fighting spirit of the leaders, of which we, the 
rank and file, can only be proud..... 
 I am, and will remain a partisan of the ideas for which the Union is crucified 
and I am ready to give my support for its triumph. I have not been a member of 
BANU because then I was still young and this is the fifth year since I left Bulgaria. 
I was a member of the Youth Agrarian Union in Bulgaria and I hope that I will be 
accepted without reservations in the village druzhba even though my future 
profession is foreign to agriculture. A person must have love for it [the village] and 
must work for the cultural advancement of the estate from which he comes, to be a 
member of BANU. 
 In Stuttgart I am alone of our [people, agrarians]. I would be glad to join the 
group in Munich, Karlsruhe, or another. If the journal appears, please send an issue 
to me as well. 
 With many wishes for success I send you my brotherly greetings.214 
 
 Peicho Pop-Petrov was to some extent an exception. His peers in Brno were more 
cautious, "Given the extraordinary circumstances in Bulgaria the founding of this Union should 
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not be rushed; students are still afraid to enter into such a Union in order not to be suspected of 
having links to émigrés, and upon their return in Bulgaria [because of this] to be mistreated by the 
government and irresponsible forces there."215 Nonetheless peers with his convictions gathered at 
the founding congress of this Union in Paris on 11-13 April, 1928 and began a revolt from below. 
In meetings on 11 and 12 November, 1928 the Parisian section of the Union of the Bulgarian 
United (zdruzheni) Agrarians Abroad forcefully articulated its dissatisfaction with the course of 
the BANU and the factionalism among its leadership. Its resolution on the state of affairs in BANU 
is a forceful indictment that puts to rest the thesis of a disconnect between a manipulative 
leadership and a passive peasantry: 
RESOLUTION               
about the situation of BANU 
  
The unified student agrarians in Paris, at their meetings on 11 and 12 
November, discussed the debates and struggles within BANU caused by the 
latest embroilments, and found: 
1)                  that the internal struggles within the Union are only 
among the leaders of the Union, whereas the peasant masses are united in 
solidarity and true to the main principles of the agrarian movement, such as 
they had been pronounced by our late teacher and leader Al.Stamboliiski. 
2)                  that these struggles among the leaders, however, create 
despair and disgust in the midst of the peasant masses, and are considered the 
result of personal ambitions, without any ideological or tactical reasons. 
3)                  that in fact until today the main representatives of these 
groups have not communicated either their programmatic, nor their principal 
or even tactical differences, so as to justify this excessive hostility among 
themselves. 
                                                 






4)                  that, on the contrary, the heavy accusations are based 
solely on the errors of separate individuals and not on the ideas that these 
individuals promote and defend. 
5)                  that this situation causes a decline in the powers of the 
Union, and hinders it in playing the role that it should have, because if its size 
and the significance of its great principles, in the political development of the 
country. 
6)                  that the government and the reactionary forces want to 
use this situation in the Union, by nourishing these struggles with all available 
means, either through promises that make some of the leaders believe in the 
possibility of political combinations, which secure them ministerial posts, or 
through threats of persecution and terror. 
All these dark forces have gathered to support these struggles in the 
Union and to corrupt their participants, to kill the morality and the faith in 
victory of the peasant masses, and to diminish the power of their opposition to 
the present regime in power. 
7)                  that the communists, on the other hand, having lost all 
hope to restore their party, are looking for revenge, attempting to influence 
and take over the leadership of the Union, using the same methods and means 
to influence separate individuals, advocating a “unified front.” 
DECIDED: 
1.                   It rebukes these struggles as ones that paralyze the 
forces of the Union and hamper it from taking its proper place in our political 
life. 
2.                   It invites the fighting parties to clearly state the 
ideological or tactical differences that divide them. 
3.                   It appeals to all unified agrarians, who are not divided 
because their shared interests order them to move together, not to succumb to 
the passions that feed these struggles and lead to cleavages in the Union. 
4.                   It finds that the only exit out of this situation are the 
congresses, in which the Statute if the Union will be respected, the will of the 
Bulgarian unified agrarians will be correctly represented, and the elected 






For the meeting: 
Chairman: DIMIROV 
Paris, 12 November 1928216 
          
The creation of the Union of the Bulgarian United (zdruzheni) Agrarians Abroad was by 
no means a momentary blip. It began the publication of the journal Zemledelets from May 1928 
and issued it for two years until the publication had to cease due to lack of funding. The first issue 
of 1929 reported on the Union’s attendance of the founding congress in Paris of the Parti Agraire 
et Paysan Français, on 26-27 January, 1929. Its creator, the former teacher, peasant organizer, and 
founder of the sugar beet grower’s association, Gabriel Fleurant “Agricola” had maintained contact 
with the International Agrarian Bureau in Prague from the early 1920s (see the text around footnote 
272 below). Indeed, Karel Mečíř, the Secretary General of the MAB attended the congress 
alongside Ferdinand Klindera, the president of the Prague Centrokooperativ. The Bulgarian 
student émigrés had the following to say of this event and the significance of BANU’s agrarianism: 
 
The founding of an agrarian party in France is a slap to those Bulgarian 
politicians [politikani], which even in clearly agrarian Bulgaria deny the right 
of life to BANU. The Bulgarian agrarians cannot but rejoice at this significant 
event and see that the road that they chose 30 years ago was the most correct 
and that the theories of agrarian organization [zdruzhavane- based on the 
druzhbi- – the organizational units of the BANU at the local level] and ‘estate’ 
struggle [BANU corporatism] are not “vulgar,” as our “learned” Bulgarian 
opponents call them every day, but are [of] such [quality] that today, one after 
the other, the cultured peasants of Western Europe copy them word for 
                                                 








             
The letter of Pop-Petrov, the 1928 resolution, and the perspective on French agrarianism 
quoted above signify for me the integral part of agrarianism that made it an inalienable part of the 
Interwar period. Above all else, in my eyes, Agrarianism is the expression but also constitution of 
a moral economy in the peasant that altered his relation to modernity from a transitory object into 
an agent with a stake in its constitution. For reasons which will be explained below, this core has 
been entirely neglected by scholarship that has sought to synthesize agrarianism above the level of 
national politics. That in itself is a question of interest because even if there are significant 
differences in the degree to which the national histories of the agrarian parties have been 
elaborated, they nevertheless have succeeded in producing a nuanced reading that reflects the 
significance of the agrarian moment. The failure to properly situate agrarianism in regional surveys 
is easier to overlook because that can be remedied more easily. The more serious matter concerns 
the shortcomings of the more theoretically minded scholarship that has tackled the problem of 
agrarianism. 
 To begin, a fundamental problem is caused by an excessive focus on a limited interpretation 
of ideology. A quotation from G. M. Dimitrov's chapter on Agrarianism in Feliks Gross' European 
Ideologies: A Survey of 20th Century Political Ideas appears ubiquitously without either its 
introductory clause, or the sentence that follows, or without context whatsoever. It reads, 
                                                 







"Naturally, being recent, Agrarianism does not yet possess a systematic doctrine of fundamental 
principles or a coherent philosophical structure of values. Nevertheless, as may be seen even from 
this brief account, [which opens with the first sentence: "In its fundamental principles, Agrarianism 
tends to be an ideology of political and economic democracy based on the idea of cooperative 
syndicalism."] its ideological and theoretical argumentation tends to rely on the dynamic scientific 
attainments of the age taken as a whole [italics mine]."218 The italicized passage is taken as 
evidence that even for one of the agrarian leaders, agrarianism was nebulous. The latest example 
appears on page 17 of the 2013 Agrarismus und Agrareliten in Ostmitteleuropa, a work which will 
shortly be analyzed below.219 
 The obsession with ideology is the bane of efforts to theoretically grapple with agrarianism. 
The struggle by scholarship to come up with a cohesive representation circularly also produces 
one of the major reason that are given for agrarianism's historic failure, i.e. the absence or lack of 
a cohesive ideology.  
 This denigration comes not only from the competing ideological currents - from the 
communist left or from liberal center, or from right.  It also intimately tied to the overly ideologized 
mode of scholarship that characterized the study of communism, the Soviet Union, and after the 
Second World War, Eastern Europe. What can be seen in the reductive logic of the totalitarian 
thesis can be extended to this case.  It is the obsession with ideology as the defining characteristic, 
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the determining thread that runs through history, through analysis, and permits moral judgment.  It 
is a simple equation: characterize, classify ,critique, overcome. 
 The focus on ideology misses the part of agrarianism as radical politics, that is not about 
administration, but a contest over the distribution of power, or in the words of Francisco Panizza, 
"Politics is about challenging the institutional order with the radical language of the excluded, but 
it is also a dimension of the practices that make institutions operative, and contribute to both their 
existence and erosion over time. As such, it operates in the spaces between the political logic of 
the permanent revolution and the technocratic logic of the end of history."220 
 As such politics, par excellence, for which people dedicated and sacrificed their lives, 
agrarianism occupied and elaborated the tertiary space between the two other dominant modes of 
modernity, while holding onto the platforms that were elaborated around WWI all throughout the 
interwar period: in the Bulgarian case written by Stamboliiski in prison, for the Croat Peasant Party 
in 1921 with an addendum in 1922, for the Republican Party, 1922. Agrarianism in action was 
thus not a logical elaboration of some fundamental principles, but contextual praxis that responded 
and adjusted to its national, contextual specificities as well as to the brutal environment of the 
interwar decades.  
 It is not surprising therefore that there was a multiplicity of maneuvers and directions that 
agrarianism took. This work has strategically examined the different manifestations in three 
countries in order to show three vertices of the elaboration of agrarianism, the radical moment in 
Bulgaria, the national direction in Yugoslavia, and the centrist position in Czechoslovakia. That 
                                                 







which is worthy of analysis and which heretofore had not been satisfactorily attempted, is to 
explain what held these differing movements together in a matrix and network of information and 
cooperation. The answer this work proposes is imbedded within its definition of agrarianism as a 
third road between capitalism and communism. It was the awareness of the agrarians that they had 
found their place on the world stage, not in one country, or two, but regionally, and in their hopes, 
in Europe and the world, that produced initiatives such as the Green International. 
 To map the scholarly terrain that I have been mentioning I would like to give two examples 
of approaches to agrarianism. The first is the approach to agrarianism that adopted the lens of 
populism.  In Ernest Gellner's and Ghita Ionesco's Populism: Its Meaning and National 
Characteristics, this was accomplished in the classificatory mode.221 Even though the work begins 
with a riff from Marx to establish its serious ambitions, "A spectre is haunting the world - 
populism," it is a product of modernization theory, and implicit in it is a model to explain 
backwardness. Ionescu, who wrote the chapter on Eastern Europe asks, "This of course leads to a 
much vaster question, whether the peasantry as a dominant class is historically able effect the 
revolution of modernization."222 Instead of answering himself, Ionescu quotes Barrington Moore 
from the Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, "The peasants have provided the 
dynamite to bring down the old building. To the subsequent work of reconstruction they have 
brought nothing; instead they have been its first victims."223 Peter Wiles then provides the 
operating schema for the volume. In the chapter entitled "A Syndrome, not a Doctrine: Some 
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Elementary Theses on Populism," the author lists twenty four points which, à la Brzezinski and 
Friedrich's characteristics of totalitarianism (they only had 6), map out the phenomenon. Points 
four through six are gems: "4) Populism is in each case loosely organized and ill-disciplined: a 
movement rather than a party, 5) Its ideology is loose, and attempts to define it exactly arose 
derision and hostility, 6) Populism is anti-intellectual. Even its intellectuals try to be anti-
intellectual."224 
 The Agrarismus in Ostmitteleuropa project at the European University Viadrina brought 
together a remarkable collection of scholars from the region in a series of conferences from 2007 
to 2010. I attended the one in 2009 and even though the individual contributions have merit as 
particular scholarship, the laudable effort to reexamine agrarianism was hampered by an insistence 
on a structural synthesis. For example, I was particularly troubled by the splitting of the region 
into Central Europe and the Balkans through the rubrics of 'aristocratic agrarianism' and 'peasant 
agrarianism.' When the final report was published in 2010, its summary began with, "As initial 
hypothesis, East Central European societies entered the modernity not only with the burden of 
peripheral structure, and the heritage of long lasting foreign rule, but as incomplete societies 
too."225 The latest product from this project is Agrarismus und Agrareliten in Ostmitteleuropa 
which was mentioned above. This time it brought in different sociological theories of elite 
formation, from the earlier classifications between positional - and reputation elites to the more 
contemporary ones, based on the notion of "elite connection" with the public, thus giving the latter 
more agency. While it transcends the structural rigidity of the prior attempt and explicitly notes 
                                                 







that the history of Agrarianism cannot be restricted to a history of parties or ideas, (here the 
organizational component of agrarian elites!), it still cannot escape the structuralist frame in which 
it was conceived.  
 The fate of Agrarianism was very context specific. Hence, the three polarities in 
Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia are so significant. Internal pressures and contexts 
determined the expression. As stated above, the most common reason given for failure is weak 
ideology and weak organization, on the national and international plan. The problem with this 
lumping together, even granted certain problems and weaknesses, is that most of the time these 
movements were not given the time and space to mature. The golden age of the European peasantry 
happened during the most turbulent decades in these countries' modern history. Between 
repression and the Great Depression, the agrarian parties were prevented from accomplishing the 
transformations they sought. Even in the exceptional case of Czechoslovakia, there was no 
insulation from the destruction of the state from without. Johand Eellend quotes from Mary Samal's 
dissertation on the topic of failure, "All the Peasant parties of eastern Europe were cheated of their 
legitimate claim to power by the alliance of the crown, army, Socialist parties, and the bulk of the 
urban population."226 
 Having said this, three universal initiatives underwrite the agrarian project: 1) 
Parliamentarism 2) Land reform 3) the Cooperative movement. To see agrarianism in praxis and 
in relation to these components, the examination of the reform activity of the independent BANU 
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rule in Bulgaria is instructive. All agrarian movements had in common the desire to elevate the 
peasant and make him the maker of his own history, in a word, to imbue him with agency. While 
the literature varies in its evaluation of the modernization aspirations of the agrarian movements, 
my argument here is that there is little doubt about their modernizing potential. Still, it is one thing 
to gauge this from ideological platforms and another from praxis. Luckily, we have in the short-
lived rule of Stambiliiski’s BANU (1919-1923) the perfect example of ideas put into practice. 
 Already before coming to power, BANU had an elaborate ideology (“agrarianism”) and a 
reform program, whose most important statement was Stamboliiski’s book Politicheski partii ili 
suslovni organizatsii (“Political Parties or Estate Organizations”).227 The centerpiece of the 
agrarian doctrine was the estate theory and the idea of people’s rule (narodovlastie), as well as the 
philosophy of “labor democracy.” According to the estate theory, society consisted not of classes, 
but of estate grouping people of similar professions, often with diverse interests.228  At present, 
there were the following estates that made up the social body: the agrarian estate, the estate of the 
craftsmen, the estate of hired workers, the industrial estate, the merchant estate, and the 
bureaucratic estate.229 The peasant estate was the one that was crucial to the well-being of society 
with its labor, but was held in abysmal conditions because of the exploitation by money-lenders, 
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merchant, lawyers, doctors and, in general, by the city. Political parties had played a positive role 
after the passing of monarchical regimes, but today they are enfeebled by partisan struggles and 
are becoming redundant.230 
 BANU as the estate organization of the peasants was waging a legal struggle in their 
interests. The notion of people’s rule (narodovlastie) was left for the future, except that the form 
of government would be republican, and the ultimate goal was to empower politically the majority 
of the population (which, implicitly, was the peasantry).231 The economic basis of people’s rule 
was “labor democracy.” State power was the means to implement deep-reaching reforms for the 
benefit of the small and middling peasants, based on the idea of small property that was managed 
by individual or family labor, without the exploitation of hired labor. This would bring about “labor 
democracy” and social justice, achieved through a basic transformation of capitalism, but short of 
the abolition of all private property. Quite to the contrary, small private property was to be 
affirmed, but large properties were to be nationalized, and capitalism should be regulated. Finally, 
all of this would be accompanied by a broad social program making education, medical care, and 
the judicial system affordable for the broad masses of the population. This was the essence of the 
vision of a “third way” between capitalism and socialism. 
 The implementation of this vision began immediately after BANU came to power. 
Throughout its brief rule, it passed more than one hundred laws, not counting a number of purely 
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administrative measures.232 Bell summarizes BANU’s activities thus: “Labor property, 
Compulsory Labor Service, cooperation, new forms of education and administration – these were 
the tools the Agrarians employed in their struggle to transform Bulgaria.”233  
Labor property (trudova sobstvenost) was the cornestone of the land reform. The principle 
had been elaborated by Raiko Daskalov while in prison in 1916-1917. He had been contemplating 
the decline of the Roman Empire, and came to the conclusion that this came about because of the 
excessive concentration of property in the hands of the rich. To avoid the sad fate of Roman, 
Daskalov proposed the principle: “The land belongs to those who till it.”234  Accordingly, no one 
should possess more land than he and his family could cultivate. But everyone should possess 
enough land to secure self-support. 
While Bulgaria, without a landed aristocracy, was the Balkan country with the most 
equitable land distribution, the growth of the population and the influx of 450,000 refugees after 
the wars necessitate the introduction of land redistribution. At first, in 1920, a state land fund was 
established for the distribution of land to landless peasants or ones whose holdings were too small 
to support them. Maximum amounts were established of 30 hectares of arable land per household, 
and for absentee landlords this was 4 hectares. Compensations for confiscated lands were paid on 
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a sliding scale by the government. Crown and monastic lands were also affected, and a “Directorate 
of Labor Property in Land” was set up.235 
 When BANU was overthrown, the files of the Directorate “contained appeals from 28,325 
landless peasants, 74,420 dwarfholders, and 7,500 rural laborers. Of those, the Directorate had 
dealt with the requests of 17,127 landless peasants, 54,471 dwarfholders, and 4,407 rural laborers. 
In addition, 18,000 peasant families had been settled on state lands through direct administrative 
processes.”236 The most remarkable thing about the land reform is that it was kept in place and 
further put through even after the agrarians were toppled, except that peasants had to pay more for 
the land they had acquired.237 
While the land reform was the most radical, the Law for Compulsory Labor Service, 
adopted on June 14, 1920, was destined to become the most famous. In its initial form, it provided 
for the conscription of every male over the age of twenty for a year of labor service, and of every 
female over the age of sixteen for six months of service. No exemptions or permissions for 
substitutions were made. It also foresaw temporary conscription of 3 to 28 days for men between 
20 and 50 years of age. A coordinated assault on the law, both by the suspicions of the Inter-Allied 
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Control Commission on Disarmament that this was a way to circumvent the disarmament 
provisions of the Neuilly Treaty, as well as by the appeals of the Bulgarians bourgeoisie, appalled 
that their children would be conscripted, and accusing the law of being socialist, led to a major 
revision of the law. The “labor army” was reduced, and the purchase of exemptions allowed. When 
the so-called trudovaks (“laborers”) were called up in November 1921, of the forty thousand 
summoned, thirty thousand actually served. They were employed mostly in road construction, the 
construction of railways and canals, the building of a communications’ network, in farming state-
owned lands and exploiting state forests, and the maintenance of public buildings and grounds. At 
the same time, the idea was to instill these young people with discipline, as well as introduce them 
to skills and basic health and hygiene education.238 
The Law for Compulsory Labor Service was a purely Bulgarian idea and its practice 
endured.239 In the end, 774,000 people passed through the Compulsory Labor Service, They built 
196 km of new highways, repaired another 108 km, built 435 km of village roads and 329 streets, 
constructed 108 new bridges and repaired 254 old ones. They repaired wells and fountains, created 
sewage systems, built cooperative homes, community centers, and schools.240 
As Stamboliiski summarized it, “this law will be redeeming for Bulgaria; it is the 
foundation of our reforming activity… The ideas invested in this law will be embraced by all 
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progressive people from different countries.”241 Indeed, in the 1930s President Franklin 
Roosevelt’s administration studied the Bulgarian Labor Service Law as a model for the Civilian 
Conservation Corps.242 
The cooperative movement was no a novelty to Bulgarian social life.243 However, BANU 
enhanced the consumer, producer and credit cooperatives to an unprecedented degree, making it a 
pillar of their program and a state priority, with the goal to unite all Bulgarian peasants into a 
national cooperative network.244 Only through cooperatives could the small and medium-sized 
peasants take advantage of the technologies and knowledge of the market, available to the large 
capitalist farmers. Several experimental producer cooperatives were set up in villages in North 
Bulgaria for the cooperative cultivation of the land.245 
The most important initiative in this respect was the creation of the Grain Consortium, 
which was intended to raise and stabilize the price of grain. It was given monopoly of grain exports 
and offered set prices to the peasants, higher than the ones offered by private traders. It succeeded 
in ending the rampant speculation, although the private grain dealers managed to persuade the 
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Reparations Commission to disband the Consortium on the pretext that it set grain prices at 
artificially high levels.246 
Yet, the cooperative venture persisted in other branches, like fishing, forestry, livestock, 
rose oil, wine-growing and other cooperatives. Most importantly, it made huge inroads in the 
flourishing tobacco industry. The tobacco cooperative Asenova Krepost in Stanimaka 
(Asenovgrad) became “a self-proclaimed Jerusalem for the cooperative world, even going on the 
road to display its concept at international venues such as a trade fair in Rio de Janeiro and an 
international cooperative exhibition in Ghent, Belgium, in 1923.”247 Again, even in the 
circumstances of diminishing state support after the ouster of BANU, the following right-wing 
governments saw in the cooperatives a stabilizing force regulating urban-rural relations and a 
bulwark against communist influence, especially strong among tobacco workers.248 
Designed as an experiment between the local cooperatives and the state, at the end of 1920 
BANU launched a major project to develop Bulgaria’s water resources. The legislation was based 
on the Prussian law but organized on a cooperative principle. Local cooperatives, called water 
syndicates, were formed for irrigation, for the production of electrical energy, drainage, the 
strengthening of river banks, and so on. Major rivers were to be used for irrigation and for the 
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building of dams. Thermal plants were to be built next to the mines. The final goal was to create a 
unified electricity net for the whole country that would not only promote agriculture but endorse 
also the chemical and metallurgical industry.249  
 
In twenty years Bulgaria will become a model for an agrarian country, whose towns 
and villages will get rid of their crooked and muddy streets, and of the people’s 
bloodsuckers. They will be supplied with clean and healthy drinking water, with 
wooded parks, with modern chemical fertilizers, with telegraphs and telephones 
and electricity. They will have highly developed cooperatives, a broad railway 
network with wheat and tobacco depots at each station. Each village will have its 
House of Agrarian Democracy, where lectures will be held and films will be shown, 
and where the peasants will be able to hear recordings of the best speeches of the 
best orators.250 
 
This bold vision gives the lie to the accusations that BANU, like agrarian parties in general, 
in its opposition to the excesses of capitalism, was against modernization.251 
The cooperative initiative was extended also to the urban sector. New apartment blocks 
were built, financed by cooperatives but with private ownership of the apartments. The BANU 
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government set norms, confining each family to two rooms and kitchen, with provisions for larger 
households. This was understandable, given the housing shortage and the influx of refugees, 
coupled with the minimal housing construction during the war.252 Yet, this was one of the most 
unpopular reforms if the BANU government, resented by the urban population, which felt that it 
had been overtaxed in favor of the countryside. 
Indeed, in its fiscal legislation BANU attempted to shift the burden away from labor 
property to other spheres. Traditionally, the bulk of Bulgaria’s revenue came from the tax on land. 
While the agrarian program anticipated a unified progressive tax, the government did not dare 
introduce it. Instead, BANU introduced a sliding progressive income tax reaching a maximum of 
35%. As a whole, the government gave preferential treatment to cooperative enterprises, shifting 
the tax burden toward joint-stock companies.253 The fiscal legislation of BANU incurred huge 
protests from the financial-industrial circles, as well as from its own right wing, and as a whole, 
remained unpopular and weakly implemented. 
Throughout the whole period of its rule, BANU had tense relations with the communists 
who opposed most of their legislative measures. Still, it would be unfair to say that BANU was 
unconcerned with the plight of the working class. Not only did the agrarians introduce the eight-
hour working day, but they believed it unjust that workers had no share in the factories. As Bell 
reports, “legend has it that Stamboliiski was at his villa preparing legislation to this end when his 
government was overthrown.”254 
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The reforms in the educational sphere were directed primarily to the goal of creating more 
and better prepared professional and practical cadres. What was needed, in the view of the 
agrarians, were more engineers, artisans, and better educated farmers. Stoian Omarchevski, who 
became Minister of Education in May 1920, had studies the educational systems of Great Britain, 
Germany and the United States, and was particularly inspired by the ideas of John Dewey.  
Education was made more accessible, especially in the countryside. Until BANU came to 
power, Bulgaria had only four years of free compulsory elementary schooling. The agrarians added 
another three years in the middle school. Huge funds were disbursed for the building of schools, 
and several hundred new elementary and middle schools were opened between 1920 and 1923.255 
The main effort was the change of the curricula of the middle (progimnazii) and high schools 
(gimnazii), and their infusion with more practical subjects, such as agriculture and applied science. 
The traditional five-year high-school program, heavy with literature, history and languages, was 
divided in two parts. The first three years (realka) stressed work-related education, adapted to local 
conditions. Thus, in rural areas, they studied agriculture, in towns, handicrafts and industrial arts, 
forestry in wooded regions, etc. The remaining two years followed with traditional subjects so as 
to prepare students for the university, or else, students could enter professional schools and 
institutes. 256 
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In the realm of higher education, faculties of medicine, veterinary medicine, and agronomy 
were added. One of the major reforms was the orthographic one, which was repealed at the end of 
the agrarian rule, to be adopted again by the communists after the Second World War. It is dealt 
with in great detail in the previous chapter. All in all, the financial support of the University, the 
Academy of Sciences, and libraries was increased. However, the agrarians took also a number of 
unpopular measures that further alienated the opposition both from the left and from the right. 
While some of the reforms have been deemed unsuccessful, such as the health reform, they 
did leave a deep imprint on Bulgaria’s social policies “by introducing into Bulgarian politics the 
notion of preventive medicine and positive eugenics, while also touching upon the sensitive 
problems of child mortality and maternal healthcare.”257 According to the Minister of Interior and 
People’s Health, Raiko Daskalov, who introduced the new law: 
 
It is only the radical reorganization of our healthcare legislation which would yield 
the desired results expected by the state’s investments – a healthy and strong nation, 
capable of meeting all the challenges of civilization and preserving its independence 
amongst the culturally elevated counties of the world. Any merely bureaucratic 
approach toward healthcare has to be dropped on the spot and instead, the slogan of 
public health should be raised: “Healthcare comes as a priority; the people’s health 
comes above all!”258 
 
The Bill for People’s Health was placed before Parliament for consideration in February 
1923, was sent back after the first hearing, and was not heard of again. Remarkably, however, the 
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Agrarians were the only government in Bulgarian history to have prioritized the funding of the 
Directorate for People’s Health above that of the police.259 
To complete the task of this chapter which engages with the problematic of agrarianism in 
the context of its aspirations and limitations, I would like to present an annotated summary of the 
first three years of the publication of the Green International, the Bulletin Mezinárodního 
Agrárního Bureau, 1923, 1924, 1925. In Chapter Two, I discussed the reorganization of the MAB 
as a result of Mečíř's appointment to head the organization in 1926. Subsequently the MAB 
abandoned its Slav orientation and became a pan-European organization. At the time, in order to 
mark that transition better, Mečíř suggested that the MAB had almost ceased functioning and that 
this dysfunctional state had penetrated into the Bulletin, so that even the simple task of publishing 
it regularly failed. That picture is a caricature, as the following survey will show. 
The merit of this exercise in presenting the work in the Bulletin lies not only in the fact that 
it has never been done before. Presenting its work in this way will show the varied initiatives and 
coverage it engaged in and in this way correct the various holes, misrepresentations, and errors in 
the scant literature. For the very few works that have touched on the work of the Green 
International, the organization is either of tangential interest,260 or in the single monograph that 
covers it, it is so skewed through ideological polemics, that it becomes unrecognizable.261 Daniel 
Miller’s meticulous work on the Republican Party unfortunately does not connect to the MAB. He 
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is incorrect in stating that the project was put on hold until 1927 or that its first conference occurred 
only in 1929.262 
 The first issue of the Bulletin of the MAB (1923) opened with a statement printed 
simultaneously in Czech and French. The Czech title translates into "The Idea of World 
Agrarianism [Idea světového agrarismu]" in the common language of diplomacy, but also the 
radical language of the French Revolution, the title expands a step further to, "The Idea of 
Universal Agrarianism [Idée de l'agrarisme universel]."263 It is a credo that extols the virtues of 
the land and its tillers. While there are numerous references to the land as the breeding ground for 
all life and then by extension for civilization itself, this aspect is very quickly hitched to a 
programmatic vision of the peasant as a political subject. "Thus the man living on the land is and 
must be the creative element in the state."264 Without a proper engagement with the peasant, "...the 
world situation will only improve when Europe starts taking care again of the source of its 
existence, [i.e.] takes care of agriculture...."265 The other element to this equation is the peasantry's 
peaceful contribution to the development of the world, which serves as a counterpoint to the 
destruction of the First World War. The rather preliminary programmatic document concludes 
nonetheless with a manifesto: 
 
It is incumbent for the agriculturalists of the world to unite, - while understanding 
their importance and the value of their common and lawful destiny and of their 
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collaboration, - for the good of humanity, for the defense of the social order, for the 
support of the state on the road of peace, and for the security of agriculture, that is 
to say, to fulfill the agricultural idea and to give humanity, to states and to nations, 
by means of food and by the nature of their [agriculturalists'] existence, the firm 
foundation of life, well-being that is physical and moral.266 
 
 The major articles in the rest of the MAB publication for 1923 include informative pieces 
on the effects of the Russian Revolution on Russian Agriculture, (émigré Emelianoff) the 
Yugoslav agrarian movement (Stajič) the BANU (Obbov in emigration in Prague), Poland (Bader). 
The issue includes a long article on the other important component of agrarianism, the cooperative 
movement, "The Agrarian Cooperative Movement in the Slavic World." There is a report on the 
first session of the consultative agricultural commission that is part of the International Institute of 
Labor at the League of Nations by Ferdinand Klindera, the president of the Centrokooperativ, the 
successor to the Central Union of Economic Cooperatives. 
 Only two pages are devoted to the coup d'état in Bulgaria, and that report is sandwiched 
between the cooperative article and the Economic and Industrial Exposition in Gothenburg. 
Cooperation is treated again in its Romanian context. There are even informative articles from a 
broader context: The American Farm Bureau Federation, for example. After a rubric on the 
agrarian press there is a closing section that contains a list of noteworthy events per country: 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Germany, Poland, Russia, United States, and Sweden. 
 Nothing in that first year hints that the MAB could be anything more than a platform for 
the exchange of information about what is going on with the member countries. 
                                                 






 This impression is reinforced by the production from 1924. The MAB could only get out 
one issue (January-March). Švehla contributed an article that mirrors the one in 1923 on the soil 
and peace. Among the general reports is a piece that describes Turkey as an agricultural country 
and another on the Swiss Peasant Union. A longer article on agrarianism by the Russian Social 
Revolutionary, Pitirim Sorokin, is in essence a set of sociological ruminations on agrarianism that 
conclude with, "agrarians of the whole world unite..." Finally there is a longer piece on 
"parliamentarism and democracy."  
 In the rubric "news from around the world," the Bulgarian section only covers the grain 
harvest and the 1923 budget, the Czechoslovak covers the "agricultural week" that includes 
practical courses for agrarians 2-8 March, the formation of a Student Agrarian Club of South Slavs 
in Prague, and the life of the russian agrarian émigrés. For Yugoslavia, the topics are the State 
Agricultural Bank, the agrarian question in Bosnia, Agricultural Education, and Health 
Cooperatives in the countryside.  
 However, not only does 1925 produce three issues, but the first issue reports on and fills in 
the activity in 1924. The major components of agrarianism, parliamentarism, land reform, 
cooperatives start being fleshed out after having been only touched on in 1923 and 1924. Issue 1 
starts with a detailed treatment of the Land Reform in Czechoslovakia by Karel Viškovský, the 
president of the State Land Office. It treats the importance of land redistribution, the content of the 
reform, the results, and also colonization. His conclusions justify the need for the reform, its 
positive effects, and also the compensation of expropriated landowners based on pre-WWI prices. 






exclusively on social and economic considerations."267 Land reform is also covered in Yugoslavia, 
Rumania, but not in Bulgaria. There is an article on Polish Agrarian Parties and another on the 
coup in Bulgaria and the fact that it could not destroy the BANU. 
 This issue is most important for its report on the 1924 conference of the MAB during the 
agricultural exposition in Prague. It was attended by the Savez Zemljoradnika, the Polish People's 
Party "Piast" and the Polish People's Party "Wyzwolenie", the BANU, the Republican Party, and 
the Russian agricultural émigrés (Ivan Emelianoff - before the revolution he had been Chief of the 
Economics Bureau of the Provincial Zemstvo of Kharkiv, then studied economics in Prague from 
1921-1924.  
 The MAB describes the conferences as being, "in one part, a review of the work that the 
Bureau had accomplished...such as mutual convergence [re. the agrarian parties (ve vzájemném 
sbližování)] and in the comparison of the programs and methods of work of the agrarian 
organizations, as well as, in the other part, in the gathering and study of the materials and 
documents of the agrarian movement, its manifestation among all nations, and the tracing of new 
paths that lead to the fulfillment of the demands of agriculturalists."268 
 The sessions of the conference began with a dedication by Švehla to the oppressed agrarian 
brothers in Bulgaria and Russia, and which produced a unanimous statement of opprobrium by the 
secretariat.  Obbov spoke against the Tsankov terror, V. Lazić (UA) on the principles of agrarian 
organizational activity and the necessity of an agrarian organization for all the Slav nations, the 
representatives of the Polish parties M. Downarowicz (Wyzwolenie) and L. Skulski and A. 
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Erdmann (Piast) spoke about the necessity of agrarians to become a force for peace in the foreign 
policy of Poland and Czechoslovakia, Emelianoff on the problems of the Russian agrarian 
emigration, Švehla on the agrarian idea, Klindera on the possibility of international relationships 
for the cooperative movement, and F. Stanek on the necessity of publications on life in the agrarian 
countries and their structures.  
 The conference is summed up as, "All the reports of the delegates to the conference provide 
proof of good unanimous will of all Slav Agrarians to work in order to achieve, by the 
deepening of estate269 awareness, national education, and constructive politics, their share of 
power in the domestic and international politics of their states, where the peasant democracy 
has a duty to introduce the principle of its natural pacifism and consolidation [emphasis in 
the original]."270 The conference concluded with an appeal to "All the people involved in 
agriculture the world over: ...In this century of civilization and humanist ideas, after an era in which 
false social and political doctrines only brought humanity demoralization, famine, and death, 
humanity needs to draw new moral and spiritual strength from the hard work and spirit of the 
agriculturalist, this regenerator of society. This precisely is the meaning and problem of 
agrarianism - to convoke all the agriculturalists of the world to common work [original italics], 
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awakening their awareness of their importance and force, requiring for them a fair share in 
domestic and international power."271   
 The Bulletin then reports on the constitutive assembly of the Union of Slav Agrarian Youth 
(Svaz slovanksé agrární mládeže) in Ljubljana in September 1924. It included organizations from 
Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. The preparatory commission began work in 
1923, first in Prague, then Warsaw, and finished in Ljubljana. There is also information about 
Lauer's Swiss project and the criticism about the organization is very muted. The Russian émigré 
component still finds coverage in the Bulletin, in this issue concerning the creation of a Cossack 
organization.  
The information section's report on Bulgaria describes the difficult position of the 
Permanent Presence of the BANU and reports on the mission of the Representation of the BANU 
Abroad in Prague as the true voice in front of European opinion of the situation in Bulgaria. 
Further, it informs that the Representation Abroad has twice rebuffed efforts of the Krestintern to 
enter into relations with it. 
 In Czechoslovakia, the report is on the creation of the Agrarian Credit Cooperative 
(Zemědělské sdružení pro opatžování úvěru) as a continuation of the logic of the land reform. Also 
on 28 December, 1924 the Agricultural Academy in Czechoslovakia was founded, which was the 
second academy of its kind in Europe after the one in Paris. 
 The report on Yugoslavia comprises an article that criticizes Radić and Pasić from the 
perspective of the Savez Zemljoradnika. In the elections for parliament they dropped from 160000 
                                                 






votes and eleven mandates in 1923 to 126000 votes and five seats and the report analyzes the 
causes of this disappointing result. 
 In sum, even though the Bulletin did not appear regularly in 1924, the impression that the 
organization was not functioning is completely incorrect.  
 The second issue of 1925 begins with the important article of Švehla "The Land and the 
State," which is in essence a rehashing of his ideas in the Party Program of the Republican Party. 
It is followed by a long article entitled "The Agrarian Movement as a Factor for Yugoslav Unity." 
It is a critique of Radić and presents the UA as an agent of national unity. Articles from Russian 
émigrés émigrés are still included due to the pan Slav orientation. 
 A critique by Mečíř prefaces the coverage of the XII International Congress of Agriculture 
in Warsaw. The professional orientation of the Warsaw congress is counerposed to Mečíř's and 
Fiedler's statement at the MAB Congress, "By agrarian politics we wish to be understood not only 
the politics made at the Ministry of Agriculture, but also the general politics and all its branches, 
for it is obvious that there isn't one that does not touch the vital interests of the peasant."272 They 
take a stand against neutral, professional/economic associations and demand real politics that 
reflect the status of agrarianism and the central role of the peasant in society.  They continue, "In 
our opinion we must say to agrarians: Your special organizations are a great thing, but they lack a 
summit from which you can fly the flag under which the fighters for your claims can gather..." In 
a sign on intellectual integrity, the issue prints the work of the congress and the details of it in its 
5 sections. 
                                                 






 The report of the Second Conference of the MAB that took place again in May during the 
agricultural week shows the activity of the organization. The attendees were the same as in the 
previous year, with the exception of the absence of Wyzwolenie. The conference was concerned 
with organizational, economic, cultural, and propaganda questions. In addition reciprocal 
excursions were organized for agrarians so that they could visit different countries, as well as for 
students of agrarian theory and practice. The congress elaborated the stand of the MAB concerning 
the Congress of Agriculture in Warsaw as well as Lauer's agricultural organization.  
 The congress also approved resolutions to collect information on agricultural statistics, the 
propagation of the idea that aid should be given to the Bulgarian agrarians, to begin preparation 
for the next congress, and to prepare a Slav agricultural exhibition. 
 Then, another article reports on the law from June 25, 1925 to extend insurance to the self-
employed from injury and also to provide retirement. Its implications for agrarians is discussed. A 
long article by Obbov describes the Bulgarian Agricultural Bank and states that its origins are 
almost cooperativist (he means the origins from the Tanzimat reforms of Midhat pasha). Obbov 
treats the Stamboliiski reforms and extensions to the bank. The article is intended to serve as a 
proof of the utility of cooperation and makes the case through the example of the Bulgarian tobacco 
insdustry. 
 The issue welcomes the easing of the agricultural policies in the Soviet Union starting in 
1925 and then concludes with an analysis of the land reform in Yugoslavia. 
 The third and last issue for that year starts with a letter to the MAB by Gabriel Fleurant 
“Agricola” from France who would a few years later found the Parti Agraire et Paysan Français 






Paysan).273 The similarity in positions between Fleurant and those advanced by the Republican 
Party are warmly welcomed. 
 The issue prints Švehla's speech at the Republican Congress in 1925, "Agriculture, War, 
and Peace." The arguments are that Regeneration after total destruction comes from agrarian 
democracy. The goal is to avoid war, "To achieve this goal, the agrarian/peasant has to achieve 
power in all countries and to create a state of affairs which will bring to the world peace, and 
through peace - work, bread, liberty."274 
 The issue includes an article on the Land Code of the Soviet Union from 30 October, 1922 
and its supplement from 29 March, 1923 which is very scientific and measured. Also, it contains 
a theoretical piece on international politics and the international agrarian organization by Hodža. 
He argues that there is nothing besides agrarianism that can unite the Slavic peoples with the chief 
goal being the consolidation of peace. "And I ask you, which principle, which economic or social 
program could penetrate into all the classes of the Slav peoples so profoundly so as to unite them, 
to form a bridge between not only Slav people, but also non-Slavs, so as they have the same 
interests."275 Neither nationalism, nor clericalism, nor socialism can accomplish this work that 
Hodža terms the consolidation of Europe! 
 In one of the first open broadsides against Bolshevism by the MAB, Hodža writes, "For the 
moment, we must consider the Bolsheviks as a permanent menace directed both against 
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agrarianism and pacifism which should become the principle of international politics."276 He 
concludes that despite a softening in the USSR, exemplified by Bukharin, the sole policy of the 
agrarians is to have a unique front of all agrarians.  No cooperation. 
 Another impressive contribution to the issue is the report that Otokar Frankenberger from 
the Ministry of Agriculture presented to the Czechoslovak academy of agriculture, "New 
Agricultural Policy." It is a criticism of the spirit of consumption and the liberal economic 
orthodoxy that the best return on investment (i.e private interest) translates into the best 
productivity (the public good). His counterpoint is that the conception of the public good cannot 
be abandoned to the invisible hand, but that as an ideal it depends on moral and cultivated 
individuals, a democratic people whose members are equal in their rights, and that prevents the 
supremacy of a class, whichever that is. Thus agricultural economic policy, in order to achieve this 
has to be interventionist, in other words political. And that demands an etatist intervention to stop 
agricultural exploitation through price and tariff policy.  
 Georgi Vulkov then contributes on the condition of the BANU, the achievements of 
Stamboliiski, and repressions. Despite the adopted position of criticism for the project of Lauer, 
the Bulletin also reports on the International Conference of Agricultural Associations in Berne that 
took place on the 23-24 September, 1925. It even prints the articles of the association. Before 
concluding with the news section from around the world, the issue also contains through coverage 
of the Congress of the Republican Party at the time of its twenty-fifth anniversary. 
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 On can clearly see the amount of activity undertaken in even the first three years of the 
Green International's existence. In the subsequent years the Bulletin continued to inform with the 
same high standard on the activities of the MAB and on the state of agrarianism. The MAB was 
never a revolutionary institution but that does not mean that its informative thrust and its politics 
of soft power justify its dismissal. The Krestintern had a tight organizational structure, the support 
of the Comintern and the Soviet State behind it, as well as the partnership of the national 
communist parties, and still it could not break into the village. If the Green International did not 
adopt more aggressive tactics, it was because of the constant belief that agrarianism was viable, 
and could offer a solution not only to the peasants, but also to the world. 
 This chapter established the tension between the aspirations of agrarian political reform 
and the constraints that hindered the implementation of the aspirations. The agrarian moment took 
place during some of the most brutal decades of European history. War, reconstruction, a Great 
Depression, and another war, provided a base line to a tune of repression, challenges to 
parliamentarism, coups d’état, and dictatorships. The resilience of agrarianism through these 
challenges, I argue, is an eloquent testament to its strength.  
 The chapter looked at several moments of astonishing strength that normally have been 
treated as moments of weakness in the literature. The reason for this erroneous assessment, I 
argued, was due to the excessive focus on ideology in the study of agrarianism. As a result, my 
critique was differentiated from the classificatory approach to agrarianism in classical studies of 
populism as well as the recent effort to synthesize agrarianism in East-Central Europe that is 
hindered by a structuralist frame. While I argue that the fate of agrarianism was context-specific 
and that it produced the three faces of agrarianism in the national contexts that are the site of this 






parliamentarism, land reform, and the cooperative movement. As an illustration, this chapter thus 
illuminated these initiatives in the radical agrarian phase of Bulgarian history. The next chapter 
returns to the mode of a case study in order to mine one example of the repression exerted over 
the agrarian parties, that of political delegitimation through charges of treason and corruption. The 
more brutal tactics of political murder, white terror, and police repression are better known, so this 
example of “soft” power is useful as a means to flesh out the broad array of tools that the opponents 



















Delegitimizing the Agrarian Alternative:  
The Diptych of Stamboliiski's Corruption and Radić's Treason 
 
This chapter examines two interventions to delegitimize the agrarian movements of 
Bulgaria and Croatia. By manufacturing a charge of venal corruption against Stamboliiski, 
Tsankov's regime attempted to fundamentally discredit and erase the systemic alternative offered 
by BANU' reforms up to 1923. Profiting from Radić's trip to Moscow on June 2, 1924 where he 
joined the International Peasant Council, the Krestintern, the Belgrade government proclaimed the 
Obznana against the CRPP through the law for the protection of the state on January 1, 1925. The 
charge of treason against Radić encompassed the CRPP as well and virtually outlawed it. As Mark 
Biondich writes, "The party was to be suppressed, its leadership jailed, its newspaper banned, and 
its archives seized - in other words, it was to be placed outside the law."277 Thus, this chapter 
explores the articulation of these delegitimation campaigns, analyzes the responses to them, and 
comments on their broader theoretical and historical significance. 
The daily newspaper of the Democratic Party, Priaporets, began its first issue since the 
coup d'état against the agrarian regime of Alexander Stamboliiski on 9 June, 1923 with the 
following lines, “A regime of bloody and disgusting tyranny, the memory of which will burn the 
clear forehead of the Bulgarian with shame, collapsed under the pressure of its crimes and unheard 
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of debauchery.”278 With little variation, this was the general tone of coverage in the news organs 
of the traditional political parties that had been in opposition to the BANU regime. While these 
were easily lumped together by communist historiography under the rubric of “the bourgeois 
press,” these newspapers did not just represent the parties that constituted the Democratic Alliance 
that seized power on 9 June, 1923, but also the socialist press. From the center-left to the far right, 
therefore, the coup was euphorically welcomed. The language announcing the fall of 
Stambolliiski’s regime is striking in its avoidance at referring to the actors and actions that actually 
brought the regime down. Instead, the extensive use of the passive voice makes it seem as if the 
“druzhbashi,” the pejorative appellation used to refer to the united agriculturalists, caused their 
own fall.279 In order to effectuate this rhetorical sleight of hand in which the coterie of officers and 
Macedonian autonomists that sadistically hacked to pieces the prime minister of a lawfully elected 
government disappears and is replaced by a group of “corrupt” despots that brought about its own 
downfall, the press committed its resources to describing the purported moral degeneracy in all 
                                                 
278 Priaporets 11 June, 1932 Issue 128. Only three issues earlier, this same newspaper published a 
front page article entitled, “In cultured countries and in ours.” The article relates how an Italian 
deputy who had spoken against the repressions of the fascist government had been severely 
beaten upon exiting Parliament and how the whole political establishment had denounced this 
episode. To mark the difference in cultures between civilized Italy and the tyranny of the 
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spheres of the agrarian regime. This can be perfectly seen in the inversion of the famous 
chastisement of the sins of the city by Stamboliiski by the Socialist Party’s newspaper, Narod, 
which included an exposé entitled “From the druzhbashki Sodom and Gomorrah.”280 
 
A Microhistory of the Corruption Trial 
 
The keystone in this concerted discrediting of the BANU regime was the personal 
corruption of Alexander Stamboliiski. By 13 June, the site of the “Sodom and Gomorrah” had 
narrowed specifically to the house of Stamboliiski in Sofia.281 The initial reports were 
sensationalist lists of ‘compromising’ materials found in Stamboliiski’s residence that supposedly 
showed him as one of the richest men in Bulgaria – one that lived like a king. Boxes of condoms, 
pornography, and heaps of silk female lingerie attested to his lasciviousness, while a myriad of 
pomades, creams, and perfumes was the proof of his vanity. Most important, however, were sums 
that included 1.25 million Swiss francs, nine million French francs, and one million Bulgarian 
leva. Based on the current exchange rates, these sums were valued at 23 million leva.282  
 A tendentious announcement by the minister of finance was published in every pro-coup 
paper between 13 June and 15 June, 1923.  Although the titles differ slightly from case to case, the 
fact that the text is identical suggests that it was printed verbatim from an official source provided 
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for the purpose. While the statement begins with the announcement that the Cabinet of 
Stamboliiski had budgeted yearly six million Swiss francs for the “protection of the cause of the 
fatherland,” but which instead of going to foreigners, was used by the people close to the former 
ministers to “reap a richer yield,” it quickly moves to the personal misdeeds of Stamboliiski.283 
The account states that Stamboliiski used a top secret decree No. 737 of the Council of Ministers 
to receive four million Swiss francs, the equivalent of 120 million leva, on 15 March, 1923.284 
Suspicious assessments abound such as, “When he [Stamboliiski] ordered that this operation be 
known only to three clerks who were to execute it, he told to some of them personally, “I will treat 
any disclosure equivalent to treason,”” but the reported ‘facts’ are as follows:  four checks were 
prepared for the Banque Fédérale Genève, Société de Banque Suisse, Credit Suisse, Union de 
Banque Suisse; Stamboliiski’s son-in-law, Ivan Boiadzhiev received them on 18 March, 1923 and 
left for Switzerland; he returned on 16 April, 1923 with Swiss banknotes; he was escorted by 
security from the railway station to Stamboliiski’s homestead, from where the money 
disappeared.285 The final summation of this “unprecedented theft” was that for a country the size 
of Bulgaria, it even “exceeds the Panama Affair.”286 
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 The delegitimation of the agrarian regime particularly through the lens of Stamboliiski’s 
malfeasance continued through the summer of 1923, although the only additions toward the end 
of June consisted of an inventory of all the banknotes found in his apartment. Amidst the different 
currencies found, the more substantial sums consisted of about two million Swiss francs, 200,000 
French francs, and two million Bulgarian leva.287 The September Uprising and the atrocities in its 
suppression marked the end of the preoccupation with Stamboliiski, at least in the press. However, 
the propaganda machine of the Democratic Alliance, headed by Alexander Tsankov, maintained 
the offensive until the end of 1923 through the publication of a remarkable series of brochures. 
Entitled Druzhbashkiia Rezhim –Dokumenti, the twelve volumes in the series was the work of an 
anonymous, but grandiosely titled Commission for the Examination of the Archives of the Former 
Ministers.288 With the exception of the first two, which are devoted specifically to Alexander 
Stamboliiski, each of the brochures treats a topic designed to defame the deposed BANU regime. 
Some reflect the evaluations in the foreign press about the “ministerial change of the 9th June” or 
about the BANU regime in general; it goes without saying that only negative ones are included as 
proof of the opprobrium of the entire civilized world.289 Others, such as “Partisan Gangrene in the 
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School,” compensate for a scarcity of ‘documents’ through rhetorical flair.290 While the authors 
take pains to ‘document’ their revelations, this effort rarely follows any conventions for citation. 
Only the sustained invective holds together the jumble of quotations, transcriptions, and facsimiles. 
In addition, the most damning of these ‘documents’ cannot be found anywhere else, which could 
lead one to conclude that they were either forgeries or that they were discarded by the commission 
once its work was done. This makes it extremely difficult to evaluate this corpus as a source. One 
thing is clear, however. As a piece of propaganda, the series was a state of the art production. 
 Only the first two brochures on Alexander Stamboliiski are of concern here.291 The sections 
“debauchery,” “baronial life,” “scams,” “poverty and riches,” and “thefts” are in essence 
recapitulations of the scandals in the press. Together, they amount to half of the volume of the two 
brochures. The last section, “thefts,” however, is the most massive and best documented, for it is 
on corruption that the final dismissal of Stamboliiski and his political project hinges. It’s 
conclusion is clear, “Despite his loud boasts about ‘breaking the ice’ and ‘widening of the 
horizons,’ despite the numerous ‘predictions’ for ‘imminent Spring’ and ‘a rich harvest,’ 
Stamboliiski was leading our fatherland towards a catastrophe – political and economic 
catastrophe, - which would have been more horrible than the catastrophe during 1918.”292 As 
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evidence for the catastrophe, the authors maintain that Stamboliiski withdrew 147,186,460.46 leva 
from the Treasury between 2 February, 1920 and 16 March, 1923. 120 million of these directly 
refer to the 4 million Swiss francs; the remainder reflects a long list that was provided by the 
Ministry of Finance concerning payments made to or at the bequest of Stamboliiski.293 In this 
category, for example, one finds the travel expenses of Stamboliiski or various payment orders 
that most likely refer to normal administrative activity. Without sufficient data to allow the reader 
to determine for what these sums were intended, let alone whether they reached their destination, 
their inclusion is meant only to suggest that the prime minister used the Treasury as his personal 
bank.  
 The brochure is significant also because it provides a final accounting of all the sums found 
in the house of Stamboliiski in the village of Slavovitsa, his Sofia apartment, and in his cowshed 
near the capital. The tally was prompted by injunctions No. 4214 of the Ministry of Finance from 
25 June, 1923 and No. 16583 of the Central Directorate of the Bulgarian National Bank from 26 
June, 1923. The resulting Act of 26 June, 1923 was issued by a committee composed of Bulgarian 
National Bank officials, the representative of the mayoral office, the director of the Budget Office, 
and a judicial magistrate from the Sofia regional court.294 The committee counted 1,941,200 Swiss 
francs, 187,050 French francs, 15,500 Czech crowns, 620 British pounds, 20 dollars, 19,160 lei, 
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3,672 German marks, 98,000 Austrian crowns, 909 Hungarian crowns, 340 Polish crowns, and 
2,002,067 leva.295  
 All the property of Alexander Stamboliiski was seized on the grounds of his corruption as 
it was elaborated by his detractors above.296 However, the political instrumentalization of the 
corruption charges against him demand some verification, at the very least. To some degree, this 
can be done through an analysis of the responses that the agrarians gave in their own press. 
Additionally, the archival records of the Bulgarian National Bank can corroborate the sums in 
question. Records from the People’s Courts after 9 September, 1944 can contribute testimony from 
the individuals who were involved in the coup of 1923. The most important documentary base, 
however, consists of a parliamentary bill from 22 March, 1941 for the restitution of Stamboliiski’s 
property to his inheritors and the legal proceedings which followed. The juxtaposition of these 
sources to the propaganda of 1923 does not exonerate Stamboliiski. Instead, the competing ethics 
of two systems come into focus.  
 
The Agrarian Response 
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 The coup, the arrests that followed, and the conditions of the white terror meant that the 
organ of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, Zemledelsko Zname, was only able to resume 
publication in Sofia after 16 February, 1925. In the meantime, Zemledelska Zashtita under the 
editorship of Kosta Tomov became the temporary organ of the BANU from its first issue on 18 
December, 1923. This paper was shut down on 10 June, 1924 by governmental order No. 25237 
because issues 67 and 68, marking the anniversary of the coup, had been dedicated to all the 
murdered agrarians.297 Occupied with responses to much more serious attacks and faced with the 
challenge of reestablishing the crushed organization of the BANU, the paper only responded once 
to the corruption charges against Stamboliiski. “The millions found at the home of the late prime 
minister Al. Stamboliiski are state funds, and not stolen money, as the unscrupulous government 
people claim. Issued properly with an act from the Ministerial Council No. 1 from 15 March, 1923, 
Protocol No. 26, were 4 million Swiss francs or 120 million Bulgarian leva, of which a part was 
spent for government purposes and the remainder was found. For the spent sums the deceased kept 
a record.”298  
 Outside of Bulgaria, the Representation of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union Abroad 
was under less direct pressure, even though its head, Dr. Raiko Daskalov, was gunned down in the 
streets of Prague on 26 August, 1923. The Prague edition of Zemledelsko Zname began publication 
on 15 September, 1923. The paper’s chief goal was to rally public opinion against the Democratic 
Alliance and to end the depredations against the BANU. Indignation over political assassinations 
and repression took precedence over the smear campaign against Stamboliiski. Nonetheless, the 
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paper printed a direct response to the Druzhbashkiia Rezhim brochures in the 14 December, 1923 
article, “Why was Stamboliiski killed?”299 The article adopts the position that the baseness of the 
accusations in the brochures is a reflection of the baseness of the killers of Stamboliiski. “The 
brochures are an accurate representation of how the killers of Stamboliiski view the “crimes” of 
the agrarians as well as of the scale of shameless slander, which they employ as proof for their 
positions….”300 Even though the article directly addresses only the first two brochures on 
Alexander Stamboliiski, curiously, there is not a word about the dominant charge of corruption. 
Instead, the focus is Stamboliiski’s activities during and shortly after World War One. In a 
paradigmatic example of specious logic, Druzhbashkia Rezhim faulted Stamboliiski for continuing 
to engage in the organizational activity of the BANU while incarcerated as a political prisoner for 
his opposition to the World War. Not only did he not honorably serve his sentence quietly, but his 
activities in prison and his support of the Radomir rebellion were molded in that brochure into a 
variant of the stab in the back thesis! The Zemledelsko Zname article gleefully dismantles this 
travesty and on that basis answers the question with which it began. “Al. Stamboliiski was killed 
for the cause of Panslavic unity, for the cause of peace, for the cause of progress.”301 The focus on 
these projects is indicative of the priorities of the agrarians concerning the defense of particular 
aspects of Stamboliiski’s legacy; corruption is as much a non-sequitur as pornography.  
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 Nevertheless, in passim, Zemledelsko Zname wrote on two occasions in 1924 about the 
found sums. In a special issue from 14 June, 1924 that was devoted to the commemoration of the 
first year since Stamboliiski’s assassination, the paper points a finger at Captain Harlakov, in 
whose custody Stamboliiski was killed. The paper charges that a bag containing several million 
leva belonging to BANU was taken by Harlakov and was used by him to construct a house in 
Sofia.302 The other banknotes were state funds, the paper maintains, and Tsar Boris supposedly 
knew about them and ordered that Stamboliiski be not persecuted for this matter. The appeal to 
the authority of the king in the same sentence, in which the paper refers to him as Boris Posledni, 
Boris the Last, is jarring and cannot be verified.303 On 15 December, 1924 a short, solitary 
announcement proclaimed, “The Representation Abroad has prepared a full exposition concerning 
the ministerial decree with which four million Swiss leva [sic] were released to Prime Minister 
Stamboliiski for special purposes.”304 This exposition was never printed and the curious and 
completely decontextualized statement about its preparation reflects the BANU’s position that it 
was only necessary to demonstrate that the funds were issued legally in order to fully exonerate 
Stamboliiski from any wrongdoing. The Prague Zemledelsko Zname did not have to face any 
censorship, yet it virtually ignored the corruption scandal. The implications of the conception of 
corruption seen here that normalizes the authoritarian and arbitrary manner in which Stamboliiski 
could operate with state funds will be discussed bellow. Suffice it to say here that this did not 
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trouble the propaganda machine of the Democratic Alliance either, for their only concern was to 
show that Stambolliski had appropriated the funds for his personal use.  
 The charges that Zemledelsko Zname leveled against Harlakov can be evaluated through 
the documentation left by the People’s Court after 9 September, 1944. Harlakov and his superior, 
the chairman of the Central Directorate of the Military League, Colonel Ivan Vulkov (General at 
the time of the interrogation), were questioned about their role in the 9 June, 1923 coup. Their 
testimonies, although at times contradictory, are an invaluable source and were effectively used 
by Alexander Grebenarov to show the roles of Tsar Boris and IMRO in the coup.305 They are also 
the most immediate source about the found sums in Slavovitsa, albeit that the testimonies were 
recorded over two decades after the events and in a context in which downplaying culpability was 
advantageous. Harlakov was in charge of carrying out the order to liquidate Stamboliiski and his 
statement is governed by a strategy to shift responsibility upward. He stated that the Swiss and 
French francs that he found were described by a commission and that he personally handed them 
over to Gen. Lazarov, Col. Z. Georgiev and others on his return to Sofia306. Harlakov reported that 
Stamboliiski had personally told him that the money had been given to him, “...to establish contacts 
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with individuals abroad, in order to ease Bulgaria’s situation.”307 He also claimed that the sums 
amounted to 18 million, but that he later found out that only 4 million reached the bank.308 
 Vulkov’s statement, conversely, tends to devolve responsibility downward, although in a 
measured way. Being one of the chief organizers of the coup, he was able to contextualize his role 
in a fascinating web of relations that accommodates competing interests and disobedience and fills 
nearly forty pages. He related that he received the chief quartermaster, Col. Stoianov and a 
committee composed of some of the participants in the Slavovitsa events that brought a protocol 
of the found money. He remembered that the sum was around 20-22 million and he ordered that it 
be handed over to the Bulgarian National Bank. Three or four days later, lieutenant Krustev came 
into his office to report that he had turned in three million leva that he had received from Harlakov. 
Krustev’s hope had been that he could receive some material assistance given his financial 
hardship, as a reward for the voluntary return. According to Krustev, Harlakov had also taken 
money. Vulkov’s report avoids taking a position and only states that Harlakov categorically denied 
this.309  
 The two testimonies contradict themselves with regard to how a unit of IMRO under the 
leadership of Velichko (Velikoskopski) Voivoda arrived in Slavovitsa to assist in the murder of 
Stamboliiski. Harlakov stated that the Macedonians were sent to keep an eye on him while Vulkov 
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argued that Harlakov had a secret agreement with Velichko and brought the Macedonians in spite 
of a prior decision by the Military League to accomplish the coup specifically without any 
potentially compromising connection to IMRO. In any case, IMRO was rewarded with between 
one to eight million leva from the money found in Stamboliiski’s villa, depending on the source 
one finds more credible.310 
 Given the numerous irregularities and dissatisfied with the manner in which Harlakov had 
acted, the Central Directorate of the Military League discussed whether an inquiry should be 
started, particularly with regard to the murder of Stamboliiski and the money. The decision was to 
have no inquiry under any circumstances because it would compromise the army’s image of itself 
and its image before the nation and the world. Vulkov states: “In any case, [the inquiry] would 
have been unlikely to produce results given the mood and the regime.”311 The Ministerial Council 
of the Tsnakov regime confirmed this decision with no deliberation. The institution of a transparent 
and responsible, or to say it differently an ‘uncorrupted’ governmental ethic was clearly not one 
of the regime’s exigencies.  
As to the reports that the money was turned over to the Bulgarian National Bank, they can 
only be confirmed with regards to two million Swiss francs. The Bank did receive a letter from the 
Ministry of Finance on 25 June, 1923 that asked it to receive from the judicial authorities, who 
were currently holding them, all the sums and valuables found with the former agrarian 
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ministers.312 The administrative council decided to convert all foreign banknotes and gold into leva 
and to place the sums in interest bearing accounts. Then, on July 16, 1923, the council specifically 
discussed the almost two million Swiss francs that were ‘confiscated’ from Stamboliiski.313 The 
problem was that the 500 and 1000 franc notes could not be sold in Bulgaria, and therefore the 
Bank decided to deposit the sum in its Swiss bank accounts, where the money would bear interest 
and also increase the bank’s foreign currency reserve. There is no account of any other funds to 
have entered the bank, which is curious given that the administrative council described the receipt, 
banknote by banknote, of a package from an anonymous sender that contained 98000 Swiss francs, 
60000 French francs, 14 gold Napoleons and 99 gold half Napoleons on 4 April, 1924.314 
Protestations that Stamboliiski had not used the funds for their intended purpose notwithstanding, 
the fate of the confiscated money shows an even greater disregard for budgetary precision.315 
 1923 marked the nadir of the Bulgarian monarchy in the interwar period. Not only had 
BANU established majoritarian rule, but its championing of the republican idea moved in the 
direction of the rewriting of the constitution and drastically limiting the monarchy.316 Conversely, 
1941 was arguably its zenith, for although Boris lost some of his room to maneuver in international 
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affairs with Bulgaria’s joining of the Axis powers in March, his control of internal politics 
tightened, as can be attested to by the extraordinary expansion of the draconian Law for the 
Defense of the Nation, that same law that Tsankov had first passed in 1924 to crush agrarian and 
communist opposition. The less than two decades separating these dates mark not only the 
delegitimation and exclusion of BANU as an autonomous force from politics, but in the aftermath 
of the Zveno coup of 1934 and Boris’ countercoup in 1935, of all political organizations in general. 
The restoration of ‘parliamentarism’ in the late 1930’s under Boris proceeded under the continued 
ban on organized political life. At precisely this moment, when finally the memory of Stamboliiski 
had been made irrelevant, the rubberstamp XXV Narodno Subranie passed the “Bill for the 
rendering to the inheritors of the former prime minister, Alexander Stamboliiski, his former 
immovable property, now belonging to the state,” on 22 March, 1941. 
 
The Restitution Court 
 
 Dimitur Kushev, the minister of agriculture and state property, appended a description of 
the motives behind this bill that he was sponsoring. He argued that the property in question 
consisted of fields amounting to about 40 decares [under 10 acres] of land with two structures on 
them in the vicinity of Sofia and a villa in the village of Slavovitsa. The appraisal of the fields and 
structures was 135,000 leva, while the villa could not be sold at auction for its starting price of 
70,000 leva.317 Due to the paltry value involved, Kushev writes, “Given that this concerns the 
                                                 






property of a former prime minister and in order to assist his heirs and provide them with a 
keepsake, it would be just and beneficial if this property were turned over in ownership and 
possession to his heirs.”318 Parliament concurred with this evaluation and the matter of 
implementation was referred to the judiciary. 
 The willingness of the political establishment to finally resolve the outstanding questions 
surrounding the arbitrary and embarrassing seizure of all of Stamboliiski’s property is a clear 
indication that the strategy of delegitimation through recourse to charges of corruption had 
achieved its purpose and was no longer necessary. The return of a few fields would not only 
enhance the moral standing of the regime, but would also eliminate the disparity between the 
hundreds of millions that Stamboliiski had supposedly stolen for his personal ends and the trivial 
amount of property that was actually in his name. That is why it is so surprising that the court that 
presided over the restitution adopted a maximalist interpretation of legally acquired property and 
initially refused to return anything that Stamboliiski had not possessed prior to World War One. 
The documentation of this case, and in particular, the explication of the court’s final decision, is 
remarkable for several reasons.319 First, in reflecting the claims of the heirs of Stamboliiski, it 
provides the first justification and explanation of his possessions that defends his integrity and 
differentiates between the assets that were seized en masse. Second, as a consequence of the court’s 
insistence to evaluate all the assets together, the documentation is a very thorough evaluation of 
all the available information. Third, it betrays the bias of the court given the fact that it passed the 
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burden of proof to the heirs rather than assessing which property would have been subject to legal 
seizure in the first place and also its extremely narrow definition of legally acquired assets. The 
position that the court adopted, although legally sound, indicates the operation of a double standard 
in a politically informed corruption trial. The irony of its verdict is that as a precedent intending 
once and for all to bring clarity to the problem of corruption, it overreaches to such an extent so as 
to make it inapplicable. 
 Stamboliiski’s heirs were his widow, Milena Stamboliiska, who also represented his son, 
Asen Stamboliiski, still a minor, and his married daughter, Nadezhda Boiadzhieva. The protocol 
that they submitted to the court is complicated by the inclusion of the property of Nadezhda’s 
father-in-law, also a plaintiff, for he too had been subject to confiscation. Nonetheless, Milena and 
Asen requested the return of fourteen pieces of immovable property, some household items and 
about 400,000 leva. Nadezhda’s claim was to two parcels near Sofia and one third ideal parts of 
three pieces of immovable property and one half ideal parts of two farm plots. The court accepted 
that the total value of this immovable property was about 725,000 leva. However, it decided to 
pass judgment not only on the claims of the heirs, but also on the other property that was seized 
and which included the banknotes that remained from the notorious 4 million Swiss francs. This 
whimsical addition was justified by the court’s supposed desire for comprehensiveness.320 In fact, 
however, the inclusion was made necessary by the maximalist agenda of the court.    
 In a paradigmatic example of doublethink, the court declared, “Given the described assets 
of the [suspected] of graft Alexander Stamboliiski and Grigor Boiadzhiev, according to articles 14 
and 16 of the special law for confiscation of illegally acquired property, the mentioned persons, in 







the case of Al. Stamboliisiki his heirs, must establish the legal origin of this said property, 
consequently the burden of proof is on them to prove that it was acquired legally.”321 Presumed 
guilty unless proven innocent, Stamboliiski’s heirs nonetheless complied and submitted a 
declaration that listed the income from Stamboliiski’s fields and vineyards for the years 1912-
1923, his salaries, and the funds he received for travel and daily expenses. The submitted total was 
4,557,814 leva, but the court accepted only 3,594,029 leva.322  
 Since the value of the requested restitution was under three quarters of a million, and that 
would have been affordable given Stamboliiski’s earnings, the court added the villa in Slavovitsa 
at an inflated price. According to the testimony of the architect Georgi Lulchev, the same villa that 
could not be sold for 70,000 leva was valued at 1.5 million leva.323 The court’s opinion that 
Stamboliiski could not have saved enough to purchase all this property is questionable. However, 
in the process of collecting evidence, the court was able to discover an irregularity which most 
likely does signify malfeasance on the part of Stamboliiski. This irregularity emerged from the 
examination of how the 4 million Swiss francs were spent. The court established that Stamboliiski 
had given 100,000 Swiss francs to the secretary of the Agrarian Union, Milo Petkov, 110,000 
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Swiss francs, 50,000 French francs and 42,282 dollars to Stoil Stefanov, 212,000 French francs to 
S. Kaluchev, 50,000 French francs and 503,000 leva to M. Borikov and the heirs of A. Frangia, 
but most importantly, 309,000 Swiss francs to his in-law, Grigor Boiadzhiev. It appears that some 
of the money that Boiadzhiev received was used to pay off some of the mortgages Stamboliiski 
had taken out between 1920-1922.324 The court never established how much money actually was 
misused; it sufficed to combine this fact with the money that was found in order to produce a 
verdict that only returned property that was owned prior to World War One. 
 Unfortunately, this decision was not as tidy as the court would have liked it to be and it had 
to be revised following an appeal. First, the court had to revise upward the ‘legal’ earnings of 
Stamboliiski by over 1 million leva. Second, the court had to modify its decision that declared all 
the property near Sofia to have been paid by the money given to Boiadzhiev. In fact, when forced 
to actually quantify the illegal purchase, the court found that it only affected 5 pieces of immovable 
property that were purchased in 1921-1922 for the sum of 391,666 leva!325 In the end, some of the 
land near Sofia was returned.  
 As mentioned earlier, the restitution process is remarkable because its findings pretended 
to objectivity whereas the argumentation was sloppy and unsubstantiated. Further, in its initial 
decision, it stubbornly persisted in perpetuating the idea of all-encompassing corruption by 
Stamboliiski despite the political will to the contrary. Without intending to do so, however, the 
court’s findings show that at best, Stamboliiski could have misused 391,666 leva for his personal 









benefit. On the other hand, all his property combined, of a value slightly exceeding 2 million leva 
if the court’s exaggerated valuation of the villa in Slavovitsa is accepted, is still not even half of 
all the money he received legally between 1920 and 1923. This does not correspond to the image 
of depravity that the propaganda machine of the Democratic Alliance constructed. Further, the 
court records allow the researcher to perform an interesting calculation. The value of all the 
banknotes that were found in Stamboliiski’s houses were worth slightly less than 2.5m Swiss 
francs based on the June 12, 1923 exchange rates. The sums that the court found Stamboliiski to 
have given to various people were worth close to 850,000 Swiss francs. The missing 650,000 Swiss 
francs were worth about 10.8 million leva at the time of the coup and they are remarkably close to 
the amount of money that is supposed to have gone to the murderers of Stamboliiski. The 
Ministerial Council of the Tsankov regime refused to start an inquiry that would have embarrassed 
them and the Military League. After all, using state money ‘recovered’ from a corrupt prime 
minister to pay his assassins is not the best way to mark a turn to propriety from the ‘morally 
degenerate rule of the peasants.’ 
 Stamboliiski’s corruption is laughable if confined to the few fields that he had bought. Not 
so is the corruption of the political ethic and the procedural rules of government that his 
authoritarian and arbitrary disbursement of state funds shows. The way Stamboliiski managed the 
state, including the demand that his ministers provide him with signed letters of resignation prior 
to assuming their duties, indicates a governmental style that tended to erase the boundaries between 
the state and the political party in power. In 1923, BANU had achieved its goal of samostoiatelno 
pravitelstvo (independent administration) based on majoritarian rule. It was poised to radically 
transform the social landscape of Bulgaria and the idea that BANU was a government for the 






done in the name of the people was concerned.  Tsankov’s Democratic Alliance could have 
effortlessly demonstrated this corruption, but it chose instead to focus on fantastical “colossal 
thefts.”  
 The reason was that the establishment of economic democracy for the benefit of the people 
(the population in 1926 was still 79.76% agrarian) was at the heart of the program to set up a 
government of and for the people. The exposure of procedural corruption would not have resonated 
with the masses since it could easily be dismissed as a small aberration on the path to social justice. 
On the other hand, egregious graft could delegitimize the whole project by suggesting that state 
assets were being systematically plundered by a political elite under the cover of empty populist 
slogans. It did not matter if Stamboliiski’s corruption had to be invented, so long as the peasant 
alternative modernity could be ended. Dimitrina Petrova has written, “The concept of democracy 
in the Program of BANU contained the tendency to surpass the limits of the bourgeois democracy 
practiced in Bulgaria. People’s rule (народовластие), towards which the union was striving, was 
emerging as a specific democratic regime within the bounds of the capitalist system, in which the 
upper bourgeoisie is limited economically and socially, and the national masses receive broad 
social and political rights and the opportunity to influence the administration of the country.”326 
The list of the platforms and policies of the agrarian government is too long to be included here, 
but a few examples can set the tone.327 One of the first positions that BANU adopted immediately 
                                                 
326 Dimitrina Petrova. Samostoiaelnoto upravlenie, 28. 
327 For further information see: Bell, John. Peasants in Power: Alexander Stamboliiski and the 
Bulgarian Agrarian National Union 1899-1923. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977. 
Барев, Ценко. Принос към Историята на Българския Земеделски Народен Съюз: Борба, 







after the First World War was to push for the confiscation of illegally acquired assets and taxation 
of profiteering during wartime. The law from 21 February, 1919 progressively taxed the difference 
in profits during the period 1915-1918 when compared to the baseline of 1914. Only after the 
BANU parliamentary delegation walked out because of the refusal by the government to enact a 
law for confiscations of illegal earnings or for the restitution of requisitioned livestock did the 
threat of a cabinet crisis force the passage of the diluted law of 12 April, 1919 for confiscation. It 
is important to note that at the same time BANU was enforcing a political culture that prohibited 
its deputies from serving as intermediaries in business deals or from being stockholders.328 The 
law for labor property from 12 May, 1921 reveals the implementation of the idea that land should 
belong to those that worked it and as a consequence set the maximum size of family holdings to 
300 decares.  
 
Making Sense of ‘Corruption’ 
 
 What is the appropriate theoretical framework which can make the charade around 
Stamboliiski’s “corruption scandal” intelligible? It is mostly in the past couple of decades that 
corruption has been theorized chiefly in the context of delegitimizing communism as a system, 
and it is this theoretical framework that can prove retrospectively most revealing in making sense 
of the accusations against Stramboliiski. A concern with corruption understood in relation to the 
                                                 







moral degeneration of the polity or the deterioration of regimes has been a preoccupation of 
Western political thought from Plato and Aristotle. This classical tradition is founded upon a 
linkage between broad institutional decay and a subversion of the practices which underlie it, i.e. 
the deviations from the common good. That linkage was problematized after the Second World 
War by the process of decolonialization and by the expansion and transformation of political 
science as a discipline, each in its own way. The turn toward quantification informed the 
functionalist work of the 1960s that focused on the ways in which corruption operated as an 
informal system in its own right, often with salutary effects.329 The application of rational choice 
theory also resulted in market approaches that sought to examine corruption as transactions.330 It 
was the sidelining of the ethical aspects of corruption in those approaches, however, that produced 
a reevaluation beginning in the 1990s. The reintroduction of the normative in what could be called 
neoclassical approaches was an effort to tackle corruption as a systemic phenomenon that seriously 
erodes liberal democracy.331  
This is the theoretical conjuncture in which also the present-day preoccupation with 
combating corruption has to be situated. This preoccupation is visible at all levels, setting the 
public policy agenda of international bodies such as the UN or the European Commission, the IMF 
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or the World Bank, down to the nongovernmental level of Transparency International or the 
International Chamber of Commerce. Yet there is a fundamental disparity between the general 
consensus regarding the raison d’être of the crusade against corruption, the tally of the negative 
effects and repercussions of corruption, and the ambiguities and lack of agreement that plague 
efforts to establish a comprehensive and operative definition that can serve as a firm foundation 
for the former. Definitions which center on the transgression of the rules governing the exercise of 
public office for the purpose of private gain engage in a trade-off that limits the breadth in favor 
of precision because of their legalistic conceptualizations. Broader definitions which focus on 
deviant behavior that subjugates public to private interests can only provide the basis for rigorous 
comparisons of corruption across time and space if they engage in a positivistic reification of 
‘public interest’ into ideal-types. In order to avoid this trap, this second set of definitions is forced 
to dilute its precision and the result is the recourse to public opinion data whenever the values or 
the perceptions of public interest have to be specified.332   
The tension between the quantifiable/structural and subjective/perceptual aspects of 
corruption tends to recede from view when corruption is politically instrumentalized. Within the 
hegemonic sphere that is established by the anti-corruption discourse, the imprecise boundaries of 
the concept do not function as a hindrance, but allow enough flexibility to make corruption an 
ideal policy tool, particularly in the guise of scandal. In addition, the instrumentalization of 
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corruption for political ends lends itself particularly well to the extension of vices from the personal 
to the systemic level. Indeed, when operational within a particular system, an instrumentalized 
anti-corruption can play an important ethical role that calibrates social norms.  
But that is not so with extra-systemic cases; the concealment of contradictions cannot be 
maintained when a particular system confronts an ‘other.’ The gap between the normative and the 
subjective becomes the battleground on which the power relations between these systems play out. 
Of interest is not the divergence of ethical norms this reveals and the resultant case for some form 
of relativism. Rather, the normative claims that one system imposes on another are indicative of 
the effort to shore up a rattled fictional coherence, to delegitimize a rival, and most importantly, to 
deny that a viable alternative ever existed. It is the claim of this chapter, that the obsession of the 
capitalist system with the particular type of corruption that involves personal pecuniary enrichment 
is far from coincidental and is informed by the logic of capital accumulation within a free market 
economy. The private drive to amass, it is argued, is best defended from degenerating into 
corruption within the liberal market democracy. Therefore, it is imperative to delegitimize any 
alternative systems whose aim, at the very least, ideologically, is to excise that type of self-interest 
in the first place. 
To better situate this chapter within the vast and multi-disciplinary literature on political 
corruption, an examination of the major themes and approaches is warranted. For, this chapter’s 
detailed case study is not primarily a positivistic correction to historical misrepresentation. Rather, 
it insists that the principles structuring the micro-history to follow are illustrative of broader 
practices and operative logics which can be traced in a variety of social settings and comparative 






directed, and the way they ultimately operate as a legitimizing tool in the context of systemic 
transition.  
Unfortunately, a large portion of the social science literature on corruption is unsuitable for 
such an examination. Despite variations in approaches ranging from structural to interactional to 
functionalist, this scholarship is unified by a taxonometric methodology that strives to firmly 
define and classify the various types of corruption in order to then propose solutions. One end of 
the spectrum of these policy-centric studies is occupied by work such as Transparency 
International’s Rapport Mondial sur la Corruption 2004: Thème Special:la corruption politique 
which reduces the definition of corruption to the ‘misuse of public power for private gain” and 
whose methodology relies on corruption perception surveys.333 At the other end, more nuanced 
approaches, of which Jain, Arvind K. The Political Economy of Corruption is a good example, 
complicate the treatment of corruption through the assertion of the inseparability of economic and 
political analysis.334 Nonetheless, a positivistic and moralizing component is retained. 
To better grasp the assumptions underlying this type of scholarship, one can turn to the 
edited volume by Alan Doig and Robin Theobald, Corruption and Democratization.335 It identifies 
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the 1990s as the moment in which corruption came into the spotlight as “the most predominant 
issue of public concern” which, “[i]n addition to its effects on aid, […] is also widely held to deter 
investment, undermine good government, distorting government policy and leading to a 
misallocation of resources.”336 It identifies six causes for why the concern with corruption is 
supposed to have grown: 1) the end of Cold War caused a reexamination of great power support 
of manifestly corrupt regimes, 2) the undesirable consequences of dismantling of state socialism, 
3) globalization having increased competition and the threshold for corrupt transactions, 4) the 
revolution in information technologies and expansion of financial services, 5) the upsurge of 
financial scandals, 6) the illicit drug trade.337 A response to these causes is to be achieved through 
anti-corruption strategies organized about three elements: an anti-corruption agency, reform of the 
public sector, and promotion of strong civil society.338 The restriction of corruption to a chain 
leading from postulated cause, to enactment, to curtailment, leads to essentialism with regards to 
the treatment of aberration through normative identity binaries concerning the notions such as the 
‘self’ or the ‘modern.’ 
I reserve a more detailed commentary on this point for the conclusion of the chapter, but 
suffice it to say here, that the central place of the end of the Cold War and the ‘unsatisfactory’ 
performance of the post-socialist states owes much to the paradox that normative accounts of 
corruption encounter when they have to explain why the fall of the corrupt socialist system and 
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the subsequent democratization produced more corruption rather than its opposite. It is clear, 
however, that the linkage between perceived corruption and post-socialism is of paramount 
concern to those studies that can be grouped under the rubric of the transitology of Eastern Europe. 
For example, the trajectory of the work on corruption by Leslie Holmes moves from a 
linkage of corruption to legitimation crises that brought about the collapse of communism in The 
End of Communist Power: Anti-corruption Campaigns and Legitimation Crisis to a more 
developed positivistic, social science classification which relates the attempts at definition to the 
enumeration of causes, consequences and measures to combat corruption in Rotten States? 
Corruption, Post-Communism, and Neoliberalism.339 The latter study especially is based on the 
premise that corruption is a serious problem and strives to arrive at some normative criteria to 
address it. Other works on post-socialist states adopt the approach of indexing and reports, 
although policy implications are never abandoned. Two ways in which these works unfold can be 
seen in Daniel Smilov’s and Jurij Toplak’s Political Finance and Corruption in Eastern Europe: 
The Transition Period and Betty Glad’s and Eric Shiraev’s The Russian Transformation: Political, 
Sociological, and Psychological Aspects.340 
 Political Finance and Corruption in Eastern Europe is fascinating for the way it resists 
the ‘othering’ of Eastern Europe while at the same time preserving the normative view of 
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corruption as an impediment to progress. It does so through the revival of the currently 
unfashionable functionalist paradigm in the guise of defending democratization. Specifically it 
warns that anti-corruption rhetoric should not be exaggerated and “should not eclipse concerns 
about the stability and legitimacy of party systems in transitional democracies.”341 The call for 
temperance is justified by, “After all, recent attempts to portray corruption as a major cause of the 
poor performance of democratic regimes, or even widespread poverty, are yet to be fully 
substantiated. On the other hand, anti-corruption drives and rhetoric have often led to the 
destabilization of democratic systems, or have prevented their consolidation.”342 That said, the 
work is a standard index of case studies that affirm the treatment of corruption as an impediment 
to ‘progress,’ the only caveat being that the defense of democracy has primacy over anti-corruption 
drives. 
The Russian Transformation: Political, Sociological, and Psychological Aspects contains 
Brian Kuns’ “Old Corruption in the New Russia.” That chapter attempts to be nuanced by stressing 
that, “a legalistic conception of corruption obscures a proper understanding of the power struggle 
currently underway” and indeed, it refers to James Scott’s treatment of corruption as the un-
institutionized influence of wealth in a political system.343 However, it is still trapped within the 
normative condemnation approach to corruption and ultimately relies on the legacy of socialist 
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mentalities as the explanatory model, “the roots of corruption in the Russian Federation are to be 
found in the inadequacy of the Soviet command economy.”344 
In seeking to define corruption in a normative way in order to be able to generate policies 
for its elimination or containment, this literature begs the question of the power relations that 
underlie not only how corruption is defined but also how the anti-corruption discourse is 
instrumentalized. Contextual nuances notwithstanding, such as Smilov’s, this body of scholarship 
is incapable of addressing the contested politics (or poetics) of corruption and its critique as a 
discursive practice. Said differently, “Postsocialist ‘transitology’ [of which corruption is a 
dominant trope] is, of course, the legacy of a conceptual schema wherein socialism is seen as 
capitalism’s opposite.”345 The breaking of teleological accounts of a linear transition, of which 
Katherine Verdery’s What was Socialism? What Comes Next? is a notable example, by implication 
requires a reassessment of the way corruption and initiatives to counter it have been practiced post-
1989. 
The corrective to the above can be seen in a small but sophisticated and stimulating body 
of anthropological work on corruption which seeks to “interrogate the idea of corruption as a 
category of thought and organizing principle, and to examine its political and cultural 
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implications.”346 Products of the cultural turn, these studies are concerned with the construction of 
meaning and processes of representation. In a counterpoint to the universalist tendencies of the 
structural and interactional approaches of the social sciences, Cris Shore and Dieter Haller write 
in Corruption: Anthropological Perspectives:  
 
To sum up, and to borrow a phrase from Levi-Strauss, corruption is ‘good to think 
with’: we may not be able to unravel the paradoxes surrounding it, but we can learn 
a great deal about the world by interrogating the idea of corruption and exploring 
its many different manifestations. … In particular, it can help us to understand what 
corruption means in different parts of the world and how it is imbedded in everyday 
life; why intolerance to corruption is greater in some places than in others; how it 
becomes institutionalized and reproduced; and the distinctions people make 
between what American political scientist A.J. Heidenheimer (1989a) termed 
‘white corruption, ‘grey’ corruption and ‘black’ corruption – distinctions that go a 
long way towards explaining why everyday forms of corruption become accepted 
and institutionalized.347 
 
This approach not only opens up a whole new set of questions, but has methodological 
implications as well. Namely, it abandons data collection in the form of corruption perception 
surveys, statistics, or media coverage in favor of Geertzian ‘thick description’ of the manifestation 
and reproduction of corruption in everyday life. The ethnographic approach situates corruption at 
the interstices of morality and power. Yet that is far from condoning corruption through recourse 
to relativism:  
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To put it briefly, when dealing with the complexity of corruption and abuses of 
power, we need to identify what aspects of the system encourage or generate illicit 
practices (illegal and non-illegal), what aspects could instead generate real changes 
and how people experience and speak about these changes. These issues point to 
the need to assess the precise identity of the dividing line between the legitimate 
and the illegitimate and of that between the legal and the moral. The next critical 
step lies in addressing the exact relationship of the protagonists in public life to 
formal law and its production and to their perceived legitimacy in the broader 
society.348 
 
These works that examine the narratives of corruption and the politics involved are 
byproducts of the cultural and linguistic turn. The focus on discourse as a way to get at the 
dynamics of knowledge production and the exercise of power can lead to insights that can serve 
as stimulating departure points for theoretical critique. In an extreme form, these can take the shape 
of Ruth Miller's  The Erotics of Corruption: Law, Scandal, and Political Perversion, which 
through the teasing out of the discursive similarities between corruption scandals and pornography 
is able to expose the paradoxical 'othering' of the liberal state.349 
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I too am interested in the operational logics of the anti-corruption discourse. However, 
rather than aiming at a theoretical critique, I want to focus on them- as political tools within very 
particular historical circumstances. I believe that the contribution of the historical profession to 
this problematic can best be made through the vehicle of micro-history, where a particular case 
can serve as an anchor for broader ramifications. The Stamboliiski corruption scandal has 
remained unexamined for nearly a century, trapped within the normative condemnations and 
finger-pointing of the parties involved. The consequences manifest themselves not only as hurdles 
to establishing a documented account of the events, but also as obstacles to the examination of the 
socio-political implications of the scandal. The fact that the Stamboliiski scandal has been de-
politicized by virtue of its antiquity allows a type of analysis that can decouple it from the 
existential implications that contemporary ones have. That is to say, via the reexamination of a 
historically contingent scandal from the beginning of the 20th century, insights can be generated 
that are pertinent to the similarly contingent scandals at the end of the 20th century, and by 
extension about the contested understandings of corruption as cultural artifacts.  
   In Bulgarian history, the 20th century was marked by two revolutionary efforts to 
reconfigure the structure and norms of society: first by the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union 
(BANU) in the 1920s and then by the Communist Party after the Second World War. The 
dismantling of these two systems was marked by high profile deligitimation campaigns directed 
against Alexander Stamboliiski and Todor Zhivkov for corruption manifested in personal 
enrichment. The four-year-long Delo #1 against Zhivkov is a well-known fiasco.350 On the other 
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hand, there is no detailed examination of the case of Stamboliiski. Based on archival research, this 
chapter will be the first attempt to gather and analyze the materials concerning Stamboliiski’s 
‘corruption.’ In doing so it will provide a case study of the operative logic of the 
instrumentalization of corruption employed for systemic deligitimation that was discussed above.  
It should be kept in mind, however, that this was not only the case in Bulgaria. A number 
of trials of former communist heads of state involved pecuniary corruption charges but ended with 
dismissal of cases or reduced prison sentences. In Poland, the impeachment proceedings against 
Jaruzelski in the Committee on Constitutional Responsibility in the Sejm reflected charges of 
corruption introduced by the KPN (Confederation for an Independent Poland) which produced so 
much public scorn that they were withdrawn.351 Prominent among the charges that Ramiz Alia 
faced in Albania were abuse of power and misappropriation of state funds, yet even though he was 
sentenced to 9 years in prison, his term was first reduced to 5 years, and then he was released in 
1995 after having served 1 year.352 The 800-page indictment against Honecker in Germany 
included not only the charges for collective manslaughter related to the orders securing East 
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Germany’s border, but also charges that he had stolen $9 million. The trial did not take place on 
health grounds.353 
I would like to make a final point about the centrality of pecuniary enrichment to the high 
profile, grand corruption cases against communist heads of state as well as Stamboliiski. A 
strongpoint of the classificatory social science literature is the categorization of corruption along 
a multitude of practices, from bribery to clientalism, from political party finance to privatization. 
That is useful because the charges against Stamboliiski ignored the truly disturbing corruption of 
public office, the extra-legal discretionary powers which were assumed both by him and his 
accusers, but instead focused only on whether he personally stole public funds. One of the major 
aims of this chapter is to illuminate the reasons for this focus because that, in turn, reveals 
something particular about the operation of corruption charges in the setting of systemic transition.  
This chapter has been consistently excavating the logic of the instrumentalization of 
Stamboliiski’s corruption in order to show its political function. After having performed the 
analytical work to analyze for the first time all the available evidence and to move the discussion 
away from polemical propaganda, its focus has shifted attention from the questions concerning 
what Stamboliiski stole, or if he stole at all, that are integral to the detective story of establishing 
the historical facts. Instead, the much broader set of questions revolving around why his ‘thefts’ 
matter and how they were used have allowed the chapter to concretely illustrate the instability 
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between the quantifiable and subjective aspects in the understanding of corruption which emerges 
with particular intensity when two socio-political systems collide.  
 
Radič's Treason Charge 
 
 In his memoirs, Vladko Maček recounts the episode of Stjepan Radič's return to the 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes the from his trip to Moscow via Vienna on August 11, 
1924.354 Aware that an order had been given to all the border posts for the immediate arrest of 
Radić as soon as he would step back onto the territory of the kingdom, Maček hurried to Vienna 
to warn Radić. After informing the latter of the domestic situation, Maček implored him to remain 
a few more days in Vienna while he would return to Belgrade to resolve the matter. In Belgrade 
Maček would have endeavored either to revoke the arrest warrant or, in the case that was 
impossible, to precipitate a vote of no confidence in the skupština against the Davidović 
government which had just been formed.355 Radić did not agree, answering that the regime could 
be brought down anyway were he to be arrested, and resolved to undertake the return the following 
morning. 
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 At the border, the police, having been warned from Vienna about Radić's imminent arrival, 
immediately sought the travelers' passports. Maček had a properly issued passport that passed a 
suspicious examination. Radić, on the other hand, only had an authorization issued by the London 
police on which were affixed various European visas. As Maček narrates, they were fortunate that 
a whole page was covered with the seal of the Soviet Union and Cyrillic text. Since at that time 
there were no diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, the official assumed he was dealing with 
a special visa from Belgrade and, with the courtesy of a deep bow, allowed the voyage to continue. 
  Maček suspects that this was immediately reported and a second attempt was made to 
rectify the official's error. A few hours into Yugoslav territory, another official demanded to see 
Radić's papers. Tersely Radić retorted that he has no passport since he is travelling in his own 
country and that passports are only checked at the border. Maček concludes the story with, "This 
is how this official, too, went away without having completed his work."356 
 I narrate this story here directly as it has been recounted because its factological utility is 
secondary to its revelations about the mindset of the Croat Republican Peasant Party's leadership. 
Whether or not the officials' inspections of their documents were orchestrated by Belgrade or 
overlooking the implausibility that an officer that can identify the travelers would be illiterate 
enough to confuse a Soviet visa with that of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, the fear 
and expectation of an arrest was present in the calculations of the travelers. Counterpoised to the 
intimidation, one can also observe a genuine audacity that goes beyond the willingness to take 
risks into the hypothetical adventurism of bringing down regimes. In this seemingly innocuous 
                                                 







anecdote, one can read the confrontational dynamics between the CRPP and Belgrade that were 
fueled by mistrust and paranoia.  
 I argue that this mindset of confrontation is the key to explaining the drama of Radič's 
actual arrest when it came at the start of 1925 not with a whimper but a bang. Not only was Radič 
arrested and charged with high treason, but article XVIII of the Law for the Defense of the Realm 
was invoked to protect public order and the security of the state against the entire Croat Republican 
Peasant Party's apparatus. Wayne Vucinich writes, "The CRPP was dissolved on the ground that 
it had joined the Peasant International and thereby had become an integral part of the Comintern. 
Meetings and publications of the CRPP were prohibited, its archives were confiscated, and steps 
were taken for the prosecution of its leaders. Stjepan Radić, Vladko Maček, and others were 
arrested on January 5, 1925, and brought to trial."357 The obznana (notification) against the CRPP 
was accompanied by a delegitimation campaign in the press that included the publication of forged 
documents. In addition, it was marked by an inconsistent admixture of legal and extralegal 
maneuvers. This produced absurdities such as the fact that the top leadership's arrest contravened 
their parliamentary immunity. While in prison, Maček continued to regularly receive his salary as 
vice-president of the National Assembly as well as his thousand cigarette monthly quota. While 
he could continue to represent the skupština to visitors in his prison, his signature was affixed to 
changes to the articles of the electoral commission without his consent.358 
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 Some background is necessary to contextualize the Belgrade offensive against the CRPP. 
On the international front, it involves Radič's efforts to break the stalemate in Yugoslav domestic 
politics through an appeal to the Great Powers, first through a campaign in London to garner 
support for Croat republicanism, and second through the ill-fated trip to Moscow. Domestically, it 
concerns the negotiations the CRPP led with Davidović's Democratic Party (Demokratska 
Stranka). 
 In London from the 17th of August, 1923, Radić sought to gain support for the Croatian 
cause. He conducted a lecture tour amongst Labour politicians, but could not translate sympathy 
into meaningful support. By November, all Radić could report was that his situation was getting 
better every day because, "the Croat Question is increasingly becoming a part of the current policy 
of the two Great Powers [Great Britain and France] and two other such states [probably a reference 
to the USSR and Italy], which can help us the most."359 On December 22, Radić left London 
without having secured official backing for the CRPP position. He would remain in Vienna until 
his voyage to Moscow on June 2, 1924 to join the Krestintern gave him the  Meanwhile the 
political situation in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes had changed with the resignation 
of Pašić on the April 12, 1924. Ljubomir Davidović of the Democratic Party was charged with 
forming a government on July 24. Having dropped the policy of abstention in March in order to 
form an opposition bloc with the Democratic Party, the Yugoslav Muslim Organization, and the 
Slovene People's Party, the CRPP was offered four ministerial posts. Although the CRPP was 
supportive of Davidović, it would only agree to enter the government on September 15, 1924 after 
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lengthy but inconclusive negotiations. The Democratic Party was pushing the CRPP to renounce 
its republican and national-federative program, to restrict its activities only to parliamentary 
means, and to recognize the monarchy and the Vidovdan constitution. Radić was insisting on Croat 
autonomy, that every ministerial post have a Croatian representative attached to it, and that the 
Croatian Ban would become a vice-prime minister.360  King Alexander was opposed to the entry 
of the CRPP unless it renounced its republicanism. Biondich succinctly summarizes the intrigue 
that followed, "On 8 October the king orchestrated the resignation of the Minister of Defense 
General Stevan Hadžić, who explained his resignation in terms of Radić's 'defeatist speech' on 5 
October about Yugoslav policy towards Albania. On 12 October Radić delivered a vitriolic speech 
attacking the Belgrade political establishment, for Hadžić's resignation was intended to undermine 
the Davidović cabinet and to prevent Radić's participation."361 When Davidović was forced to 
resign on 15 October, the stage was set for Pašić's return in November. Due to the strong 
opposition, Pašić immediately dismissed the Skuština and called for new elections on 8 February, 
1925. 
 A Machiavellian view of the repression against Radić and the CRPP that started with the 
coming of 1925 would treat it as an attempt to destroy its chances for doing well in the election. 
Given the unprecedented levels of intimidation and the ubiquitous presence of police and soldiers 
                                                 
360 Luiza Reviakina, Kominternut i Selskite Partii na Balkanite: 1923-1931. Sofia: Akademichno 
Izdatelstvo "Prof. M. Drinov, 2003, 91. Reviakina quotes a speech by Radić in the Skupština 
that was printed in Izvestiia, No.225, 5 October, 1924, "They want a rupture between Moscow 
and me as well as with the Peasant International... We were recognized abroad as 
representatives of the sovereign Croatian nation and I am convinced that at the moment when 
our existence as a nation would be threatened on the part of the Serbs, the USSR will be able 
to impose its political line. The same goes for England and France." Ibid, 92. 






that revealed a de facto state of emergency, this argument carries weight. Neither is it compromised 
by the strong showing of the CRPP that secured for it the second largest block in the Skupština 
after Pašić's National Radical Party. Nonetheless, to do so is to ignore the fear and anxiety that 
Radić's republican program and his demands for a resolution of the Croatian question caused to 
the monarchy and the adherents to a unitary state in Belgrade. "It was this trip to Soviet Russia 
and the CRPP's accession to the Krestintern that ultimately provided the NRS with a suitable 
pretext to employ harsher measures against Radić and his republican movement."362 The pretext, 
as it was articulated in the charges against Radić, was the defense of the state against revolutionary 
efforts to subvert and partition it with communist help. It is telling, too, that the Law for the 
Defense of the Realm was designed to exclude the Communist Party from the political scene in 
1921 and it was now being applied against the CRPP for its alleged transformation into the arm of 
the Comintern. It was a pretext, too, because it will be shown that Radić's entry into the Krestintern 
was accomplished at his own footing and while preserving the autonomy of the CRPP. 
Consequently, the most satisfying characterization of the offensive against the CRPP is to treat it 
as a delegitimation campaign designed to weaken its organizational strength and political prestige 
through the misrepresented association with the bête noire of communism. 
  In actuality, Radić accomplished the accession of the CRPP into the Krestintern on his 
own terms, without ceding the authority and independence of his party. He agreed that the program 
of the Krestintern - the necessity for a worker-peasant bloc, the provision of land to the peasants, 
the right of workers to nationalize factories, the freeing of national minorities, the formation of a 
                                                 






Yugoslav federation as well as a Balkan federation - coincided with the program of the CRPP.363 
But beyond that, in the 27 June, 1924 letter-request for membership to the Presidium of the 
Krestintern he wrote, "[the CRPP] will preserve its program and tactics, which coincide with the 
chief aims of the Peasant International - with their united efforts, peasants and workers to prevent 
the emergence of new wars and to take power in their own hands to improve the fate of all who 
labor....The CRPP recognizes the just demands of the workers, including the nationalization of 
industry. Thus, the realization of the Peasant republic in Croatia will be at the same time be the 
realization of a Workers republic and all the aims of the working class."364 Radić was even able to 
have Yugoslavia represented in the Krestintern not as a country, but as nations living in it. All this 
was possible because the Krestintern counted on garnering enormous legitimacy for the newly 
founded organization through the attraction of one of the most powerful peasant parties. 
 The reality of the careful and circumscribed entry of the CRPP into the Krestintern was 
irrelevant to the domestic delegitimation campaign in the Triunine Kingdom. Already on 
December 18, 1924 a forged document entitled "A Contract Made between the Comintern and the 
CRPP," signed by Zinoviev and Radić was published in the newspaper of Pribičević, Rec. 
Consisting of 22 points, it claimed, among other things, that all propaganda and agitation by the 
CRPP was to be of communist character and in accordance with the resolutions of the III 
International, it called for the creation of parallel illegal organizations to be mobilized for class 
warfare, penetration and agitation in different arenas such as the village, national minority parties, 
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or trade unions, it required work against the League of Nations, and that not only did the CRPP 
have to follow the directives of the Comintern and the precepts of communism, but it would have 
to change its program to accord with these.365 The forgery was immediately challenged, even from 
the Krestintern itself. In a December 23, 1924 letter, the vice- general secretary Dombal, writing 
on behalf of the Krestintern informed Radic that they were ready to undertake a campaign in the 
European press to expose the forgery and the terror and asked him whether Radić thought that this 
would be useful and would suit him.366  
 The incrimination against Radić were based on scant evidence and doubtful reports as to 
his activities. A significant portion comprised speeches he had given, which could be defended as 
part of his role as a political figure. As stated, the major charge was that by joining the Krestintern, 
Radić had also joined the Comintern and had undertaken the path of revolution. His insistence on 
the separation of the Krestintern from the Comintern as only a peasant organization was met by 
the prosecution with efforts to find more evidence. To aid Radić, the Krestintern offered to send 
Dombal as a witness in his trial.367 
 In effect the whole episode was blackmail. There was no communist conspiracy, no 
treason, no plans to foment revolution and armed struggle, or to break up the state. In the 
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prosecution one sees the fears of Belgrade and the king and these fears find expression in the 
manufactured delegitimation campaign. 
 It is important to view the attack against Radić and the CRPP as a delegitimation campaign 
instead of as brute repression. Unlike the Communist Party, which had been completely banned in 
1921 under the same article of the Law for the Protection of the Realm, the CRPP was permitted 
to run in the February elections. Given its success in the election, Pašić and King Alexander wanted 
to avoid making Radić a martyr. Maček reports a statement that Pašić made tête-à-tête to Radić's 
defense attorney, Trumbič, "I know very well that Radić is as far from communism as am I. I know 
very well that it was Radić himself that saved Croatia from bolshevization in the years 1919-1920 
through his peasant movement. But, so, politics cannot be sentimental, so I have to use methods 
that can lead me to the finish."368 The overtures by Belgrade towards Radić to resolve the conflict 
were reciprocated because Radić did not want to risk the destruction of his party. On March 4, 
1925 the CRPP dropped 'Republican' from its name and became the Hrvatska Seljačka Stranka 
(Croatian Peasant Party). Further, Stjepan Radić asked his nephew, Pavle Radić to read the 
following text in the Skupština on March 27, with which he recognized the monarchy, the 
Vidovdan Constitution, and the unity of the state:  
 
We recognize the unitary political state based on the Vidovdan Constitution 
with the Karadjordjevic dynasty at its head, all the while taking into account 
the conduct of the positive politics that are understood as the will that the 
Croatian people three times a row clearly expressed at elections with regard 
to the political facts and the total political arrangement as it is today. The 
correction of these facts and this arrangement which we can approve 
according to our will and awareness, has to be subject of a review of the 
                                                 







Constitution, specifically a National Agreement between the Serbian, 
Croatian and the Slovenian nations. We have never fought against this state 
and its interests. But from the aforementioned facts that we have pointed out, 
resistance originated in the people itself, something that from afar was 
incorrectly interpreted as anti-state, although it was spontaneous and not 
organized by anyone. But if this situation were to continue and become more 
acute, especially as it was during the last election and even after the election, 
it could be fatal for the whole of our future. And for the sake of our future 
together and for the sake of the unchangeable will to deal with the Serbian 
people, we will do everything so that the Croatian nation instead adheres to 
cooperation in the national concord. But it can only be based on factual and 
actual equality that has to be achieved through the correction of previous 




 With this, the way was paved for the CPP to cooperate with the politics of the National 
Radical Party. Days after the new government of Pašić was formed, on July18, 1925, King 
Alexander amnestied Radić and the leadership of the CPP, and they were able to enter into a 
coalition with Pašić. 
 The historiographical interpretation of the resolution of the crisis of Radić and the CRPP 
at the start of 1925 follows several tropes. The older generation of synthetic scholarship 
exemplified by Joseph Rothschild in East Central Europe between the Two World Wars but also 
Richard Crampton in Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century satisfies itself with commentaries 
about the erratic and destabilizing behavior of Radić or "His tactics were difficult to understand 
and much of the confusion in the next few years followed from his maverick conduct which 
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became 'the despair of all those Serbs who honestly desired cooperation with Croatia.'"370 The 
Croatian national press but also communist scholarship already from 1925 due to the 
disappointment over Radić's abandonment of the Krestintern, vacillate between accounts that  
either focus on the repression by Pašic and Serbs, or fault Radić for his capitulation. Hrvoje 
Matković in Povijest Hrvatske Seljačke Stranke concludes that "The price was too high (the 
recognition of the centralist constitution!), but it will soon be shown that it was about a temporary 
retreat and tactics." These analyses miss the point of the significance and implications of this 
manufactured delegitimation.371 
The bolshevization charges were a straw man. It was more than clear that they were used 
as a pretext, but this turned them into a two edged sword. The strong showing at the polls in the 
1925 elections demonstrated that even under repression and intimidation, the CRPP could get the 
popular vote in Croatia. Thus the question of the charges against Radić and his tactical behavior 
needs to be seen and interpreted in light of the legitimation and delegitimation strategies employed 
by all sides in the first years of the Triunine Kingdom after the 1922 Vidovdan system was 
promulgated. Through the boycott and refusal to participate, the CRPP was testing the limits of 
acceptable behavior and what could be achieved. This, I contend, is the key to understanding the 
                                                 
370 Richard Crampton. Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century-and After. 2nd edition. New York: 
Routlege, 1997, 136. Joseph Rothschild. East Central Europe between the Two World War. 
Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974. 
 
371 Hrvoje Matković. Povijest Hrvatske Seljačke Stranke.Zagreb: Naklada Pavičić, 1999, 201. Also 
Bosiljka Janjatović. Stjepan Radić: Progoni - Zatvori - Suđenja - Ubojstvo, 1889.-1928.. 







reasons that took Radić to London and Moscow in the first place anyway. In the symbolic capitals 
of the two alternative, but increasingly acknowledged political worlds (the USSR had been 
recognized in 1924 by the Labor government of the British Empire, and was moving out of its 
diplomatic isolation), Radić was trying to gauge what kind of external support he could garner for 
an adjustment of the domestic system of the Triunine Kingdom. Similarly, the response of the 
Karađorđević monarchy and Pašić was an analogous tactical maneuver to push back within the 
boundaries of the system. In this collusion of tactical interests, Pašić and the king were trying to 
prevent a trial because of the publicity, sympathy and support that would produce for Radić, and 
likewise, Radić wanted to avoid a rupture of the system that would produce the complete 
marginalization and destruction of the Peasant Party as a political force. The resultant 'compromise' 
should therefore not be treated simply as a euphemism for Greater Serbian chauvinism and 
repression. At its core it was illustrative of the confrontational nature of politics and the search of 
optimal and possible modi operandi within the present circumstances.  
All of this makes the outcome – the Radić and Pašić coalition and the recognition of the 
State -- so significant. In a sense this episode has to taken as a political reset, and not judged in 
hindsight within the teleological narrative of the unsustainability and collapse of the interwar 
Yugoslav project. Even more importantly, attention to this episode brings into focus the wide 
options of coercion and chantage that were part of the political playing field in the 1920s. The 
involvement of the Krestintern and the Soviet Union illustrate the creative involvement of the 
peasant movement into the major currents of European history. Likewise, the censoring of the 
CRPP through the charges of manufactured bolshevization attests to the fears and uncertainties of 
the unitarist program. The Bolshevik support for federalization (but, interestingly, not that of the 






the autochthonous demands of the CRPP and its republican program. Thus, the delegitimation 
campaign against Radić is best understood as a maneuver to force a differentiation between 
communism and agrarianism that, at its extreme, would cause the abandonment of the republican 
idea and the recognition of the monarchy. The CPY was banned through the same law for the 
defense of the state that was being applied against the CRPP.372 By retreating from its application, 
Belgrade in effect created the conditions in which the CRPP could further distinguish itself from 
communism. The CRPP, a political player that was too big to be ignored from accommodation 
within the political landscape, would be tamed by becoming structurally a party within, not without 
the triunine political system. The failures of this compromise notwithstanding, this delegitimizing 
episode had as its effect the legitimation of a CRPP as a political party pared from its 'dangerous' 
program and finally ready to join in the political game of the Triunine Kingdom. 
 Unlike in 1921 with the case of the Communist Party, the 1925 offensive against the CRPP 
did not follow the previous script. The party was not banned and repressed. Rather, delegitimation 
served as a coercive wedge to force a conceptual disassociation. Although the ties between the 
CRPP and Moscow were tenuous and based on the attempts of both parties to profit from the other, 
nonetheless the possibility of an accord was threatening enough for the repressive fist of Belgrade 
to be raised. This fist did not fall because the soft power component, what I have been treating in 
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terms of delegitimation, was sufficient to rupture the potential elaboration of a radical peasant-
worker front. In removing this potentiality, delegitimation opened another: the means for an end 
to the politics of abstention and the entry into Yugoslav political life. 
 In contrast to the Bulgarian case, delegitimation in the Triunine Kingdom did not operate 
as the discrediting and supersession of a rival systemic vision. Nor did it mean the cooptation of 
the Croatian Peasant Party. What delegitimation actually produced was the reimagination of the 
party program, its horizon of possibility, and its positionality within European politics. The volte-
face was actually a tactical reset, a second chance, one of the very few that the ungenerous interwar 
decades would grant to the Peasant moment. 
 That being said, I would like to emphasize the recourse to delegitimation in contrast to the 
outright outlawing of parties as was the case with the Communist Party in both countries. The 
Komunistička Partija Jugoslavije (Communist Party of Yugoslavia) was the target of the Obznana 
of 29 December, 1920 over deaths in a miner's strike. The Obznana prohibited Communist activity, 
resulted in the arrest of the leadership, the seizure of party property, and the closure of its press. 
The limits of its scope were that Communist deputies in the Ustavotvorna Skupština 
(Constitutional Assembly) were allowed to continue their work and point 5, which prohibited any 
disturbing manifestations in Belgrade during the work of the Constitutional Assembly seemed to 
suggest a terminal date for its validity. On 21 July, 1921, less than a month after the Constitution 
was adopted, however, the Communist terrorist cell Crvena Pravda succeeded in assassinating the 
Interior Minister and author of the Obznana, Milorad Drašković. This act, rather than 
compromising the Obznana as intended, polarized opinion against the Communist Party and 
resulted in the passage of the Zakon o zaštiti javne bezbednosti i poretka u državi (Law for the 






Party. Similarly, in Bulgaria, the Zakon za zashtitata na durzhavata (Law for the Defense of the 
State) was passed on 4 January, 1924 as way for Tsankov's Democratic Alliance to crush the 
Communist Party after the failed September Uprising of 1923, although the broad language of the 
law was applicable to any party promoting revolutionary struggle. 
 This chapter chronicled two strategies that were employed to pressure and delegitimize 
agrarianism. It supplemented a minute excavation of two events with a theoretical analysis of their 
implications. In this way, the chapter served as another demonstration of the continued relevance 
of the study of agrarianism.  
 The boogeyman of the interwar capitalist order was terror and revolution and that is why 
the disproportionately weaker Communist Parties in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were outlawed while 
the Agrarian Parties were allowed to continue to operate albeit under various degrees of repression. 
It was the inverse with the communization of these countries after the Second World War, where 
oppositional political activity was disallowed and the Agrarian alternative was brought to an end. 
If the interwar capitalist system could contain the peasant alternative, the post-war communist 



































 Drawing the Curtain 
 
 The third chapter of this work explored the instrumentalization of nationalism in the 
context of agrarianism. In its latter half, it argued for the inseparability of the agrarian program 
from the elaboration of nationalism in either a more muted or vocal form. That argument was 
framed in relation to the Subaltern Studies project since both intellectual exercises are motivated 
by the need to account for difference from a homogenizing and essentializing doxa, to perform 
that critique from the perspective of ignored and marginalized groups, and finally, through an 
archaeology of the 'forgotten,' to impress the indispensability of alternatives, be they on the level 
of discourse, practice, or in aggregate categories such as modernities. These connections between 
the two projects, notwithstanding, the second part of Chapter 3 also critiqued a representation of 
Europe by scholars such as Partha Chatterjee that denies it the very reexamination it demands for 
the rest of the world. The counterexample I employed was that the vibrant alternative that the 
agrarian political parties of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia elaborated between the two 
World Wars demands space between the elimination of the peasantry in the West through the 
irresistibility of capitalist logic, and its eradication in the East through Stalinist collectivization 
and terror. 
 Lest it seem unfair that I single out a critically progressive body of scholarship that I 
admire, I want to insist that the enormous condescension of posterity towards the agrarian 
alternative is ubiquitous and even more reductionist in the synthetic historiography of Eastern 






entitled, "Ideological Currents in the Inter-War Period," feigns completeness by affixing anti-
Semitism to the usual suspects: communism and fascism.373 The classic History of the Balkans: 
Twentieth Century by Barbara Jelavich skips peasant political subjectivity in favor of a brief sketch 
of traditional peasant life: “Although the position of the peasants has been discussed previously, 
the emphasis has been primarily on the great events - the wars, revolutions, and catastrophes - that 
changed the political status of the lands they inhabited. [sic! the peasants as observers]. Less 
attention has been devoted to those aspects of their lives that were relatively unchanging over the 
centuries, in particular village and family relationships. Although it is difficult to offer valid 
generalizations for the entire Balkans, an attempt will be made here to summarize the material 
conditions of peasant life and to comment briefly on family and village relationships.”374  
If political history struggles with the inclusion of social forces, then surely an economic 
and social historian of such stature as Ivan Berend should be able to devote more than seven pages 
to the peasantry in his section "Social Changes: New Forces and Factors." Yet this section from 
his Decades of Crisis: Central and Eastern Europe Before World War II chiefly focuses on land 
reform.375 As tempting as it is to confront this scholarship with the subject of its oversight and the 
weakness of its explanations for the disappearance of mass peasant politics through the simple 
provision of counterexamples, the result would remain unsatisfactory without an alternative 
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explanation. While the complex social transformations that took place during the socialist period 
after the Second World War and again after its fall in 1989 remain outside the scope of this work, 
this chapter will strategically probe a few events and developments that will suggest the 
mechanisms through which the agrarian political project was isolated and excluded politically after 
the Second World War. The disappearance of agrarian politics in the countries of Eastern Europe 
and the disconnected anti-communist agitation of the exiled agrarian leadership in the United 
States meant that half of the unity that made the agrarian alternative possible was lost. The 
politicized agrarian actor could not survive without the party; he/she became a different actor in 
the encounter with state socialism. Ironically, the party leadership proved more resilient. Some of 
these figures agitated from abroad in the name of the millions of peasants from which they had 
been cut off. Their children came back to reconstitute the agrarian parties after 1989. The tragedy 
is not that the peasantry was doomed to extinction. The tragedy is that there are politicians even 
nowadays that struggle to speak for and exploit the memory of a peasantry that no longer exists. 
 It is my hope that drawing the curtain on the interwar peasant alternative modernity in this 
way will serve as a convincing counterpoint to the dismissive interpretations that lay the blame for 
failure on the supposed absence of a cohesive agrarian ideology, a disconnect between a 
manipulative populist leadership and the peasant masses, on overreaching radicalism, inexperience 
and incapacity to govern.  The golden age of the European peasantry occurred in the most 
inhospitable of times in which structural hurdles and political violence challenged all political 
currents and brought European democracy to its knees. Even faced with such difficulties, peasants 
articulated and defended a more equitable alternative modernity often at the cost of their lives. The 
challenges of reconstruction after the Second World War and the communization of what became 






interwar alternative modernity had to be abandoned, it would be a disservice to the peasantry to 
write it off again. Recent scholarship of collectivization, arguably the most violent confrontation 
between the socialist state and the peasantry, reveals the inputs from below and suggests that 
perhaps the representation of a destruction of the peasantry under communism is less appropriate 
than a vision in which it participated in the construction of a new modernity.376 Verdery and 
Kligman write, "... we treat the collectivization process as instrumental in establishing the nature 
of the new Party-state itself and of its subjects. It was a defining moment both for the apparatus 
that initiated it and for the peasantry who suffered its consequences, with the introduction of new 
relations among Party cadres at various levels and between them and the rural population."377 
 Agrarian politics in the first years of the twentieth century and the first years of the twenty-
first are a gulf apart. In fact, were it not for a continuity in nomenclature, there is virtually nothing 
agrarian in the contemporary political parties. This disconnect is evident even at the level of the 
party programs. For example, the Program of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union that 
Alexander Stamboliiski completed while in prison during the First World War is composed of 
twenty five principles. The first establishes the nature of the political entity:  "The Agrarian Union, 
in its internal structure, in its composition, in its ideas, understandings, and goals is a totally 
democratic (people's rule), political-economic-social organization." Next, however, comes the all 
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important question of social composition, "Principle Two: The Agrarian Union is a purely agrarian 
organization."378 The text of that principle is important for showing just how central the link to the 
social base was: 
 
It [the Agrarian Union] is the representative of the agrarian estate in Bulgaria. 
People from other estates and with oppositional interests and views to those of the 
agrarians cannot be in its ranks. Its principal site of action is the Bulgarian village. 
The natural intelligentsia of the Union is only that one, which emerges out of the 
agrarian estate or has immediate ties to it through a similitude of interests. Deviation 
from this principle is an exception, which can never and should never become a 
rule.... He who would ask that the doors of the Agrarian Union be opened to people 
of other estates, indirectly seeks the destruction of the Union itself, for that would 
create a political party of the type that already exists, thanks to the lack of 
consciousness in the different estates, thanks to old prejudices and delusions, and 
thanks to the perfidy of the greedy for a parasitic life intelligentsia.379  
 
The estate theory of Stamboliiski was the most radical expression in agrarianism of the 
rural/urban divide. The peasant parties of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia did not adopt quite the 
same form, but beneath this superficial difference lie the significant structural similarities. For 
Radić and Švehla, the peasant base was not just any other constituency. Nor were their parties 
imagined as being of the same ilk as their competitors in the political arena, with the exception 
perhaps of the communists. In giving expression to the peasant condition, these parties undertook 
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an ethical intervention that had far reaching implications for their states and societies. The 
outcomes differ as a result of the different national conditions, but that essential departure point, 
at whose heart is the peasant subject, is the crucial unifying factor. 
  Unlike the peasant parties of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia that disappeared during and 
immediately after the Second World War, the BANU was a significant force in Bulgaria after 9 
September, 1944. Even after the destruction of the BANU as an independent political force, the 
left wing of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union had remained in the Fatherland Front and, as 
an ally to the Communist Party, had survived as a pro-forma separate entity until 1989. However, 
as a meaningful political force its powers were all but curbed by the end of 1947. 
 After 1944, BANU appeared as the second political force after the communists, even as it 
continued to fracture. Until 1934, when all political parties were banned, the center-right BANU 
“Vrancha” had been the most influential wing. But its participation in the last government before 
the coup of 9 September, 1944 sealed its fate, and its leaders were arrested and tried by the People’s 
Court. On the other hand, the participation of BANU “Pladne” in the Fatherland Front secured for 
it the premier place in the postwar agrarian movement and participation in the government.380 
 On 23 September, 1944, the leader of BANU “Pladne” Dr. G.M. Dimitrov (Gemeto) 
returned to Bulgaria from emigration in Cairo to a triumphant welcome. In October 1944, he made 
a realistic assessment of the situation in front of the national conference of BANU: “First of all, 
we live in a state of war… Secondly, we have the presence of Russian troops on Bulgarian soil. 
This in itself signifies a lot. This fact gives a new face to our social life… And thirdly, we have a 
                                                 







revolutionary act, such as the rupture of 9 September. These circumstances give a fair idea about 
the atmosphere. Tomorrow it may change, events will unfold, but at this stage the political line of 
the Agrarian Union has to consider these basic circumstances.”381 
 The links of G.M.Dimitrov to England, however, and his position of asserting the strength 
of BANU and opposing the political claims of the communists to be the leading political force, 
made him an easy target, given the circumstances he was so well aware of. Taking advantage of 
the personal rivalries within the agrarian bloc, as well as under strong Soviet pressure and the tacit 
agreement of the western allies, the communists persuaded Nikola Petkov to turn against 
G.M.Dimitrov. By the end of January 1925, G.M.Dimitrov had handed in his resignation from the 
post of Chief Secretary of BANU in favor of Nikola Petkov.382 Put under house arrest, G. M. 
Dimitrov managed to escape to the American Embassy and, after a dramatic flight, ended his career 
in emigration in the United States.383 
 Nikola Petkov became the undisputed leader of the opposition, comprising BANU as well 
as the much smaller Bulgarian Workers Social-Democratic Part, the group “Zveno” and the 
Radical Party. However, the hopes of the communists that he would be more pliant proved false. 
Nikola Petkov was the scion of one of the most tragic political families in Bulgarian history. His 
                                                 
381 Politika, N.6, 17 October 1944, cited in: Bogdanova, Rumiana. “Zemedelskoto dvizhenie sled 
vtorata svetovna voina (Putiat na partiinoto obezlichavane). Markov, Georgi ed. Zemedelskoto 
dvizhenie v Bulgaria: Istoria, razvitie, lichnosti. Pazardhik: Regionalen istoricheski muzei, 
Institut po istoria pri BAN, 2004, 264. 
382 Kalinova and Baeva. Bulgarskite prehodi, 60-61. 
383 Moser, Charles. Dimitrov of Bulgaria. A Political Biography of Dr. G. M. Dimtrov. Thornwood, 







father, Dimitur Petkov (1858-1907), a mayor of Sofia, speaker of parliament, government minister 
and prime minister, and major leader of the Labor (later People’s Liberal Party) was assassinated 
in the streets of Sofia. Both his sons, Petko and Nikola, became prominent leaders of BANU. Petko 
Petkov (1891-1924), a close collaborator of Stamboliiski, was the director of the political 
department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Stamboliiski government. Arrested after the 
coup in 1923, he became later an MP and leader of the opposition, exposing the White Terror 
following the September Uprising. He was gunned down by an IMRO member who was a police 
employee in 1924. Nikola Petkov had been in diplomatic service in Paris and after 1923 stayed in 
France as a journalist. After 1929 he returned to Bulgaria and, alongside G.M.Dimitrov, headed 
the radical wing of BANU “Pladne.” As a member of the Fatherland Front, Nikola Petkov was an 
active participant in the 9 September 1944 coup. A continuous member of parliament, he became 
the leader of the united anti-communist opposition since the summer of 1945. Working under 
increasingly harsh conditions and an incessant campaign against the opposition in 1946 and early 
1947, Petkov’s parliamentary immunity was lifted on 5 June 1947, alongside another 23 deputies, 
the same day the US Senate ratified the peace treaty with Bulgaria, a first step toward recognizing 
the communist regime of Georgi Dimitrov. As Michael Boll concludes, “by now, Washington’s 
policy of concentrating on the containment of Communism outside the borders of Eastern Europe 
aside from Greece and Turkey was too firmly in place to allow a major policy review for the sake 
of a nation in which Ameca has experienced nothing but failures for the past three years.”384 After 
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a trumped up trial Nikola Petkov was charged with espionage, and was hanged on 23 September 
1947.385   
BANU-NP (Nikola Petkov) was dissolved in 1947 after its leader was arrested. A party 
that carried on his name formed in 1989, was one of the founding partners in the oppositional 
Union of Democratic Forces, and picked up the anti-communist struggle. There was an attempt to 
unite the two organizations in 1991, the so-called BANU-United, but that formation could not 
gather the necessary votes to get parliamentary representation. Then, Anastasia Moser, the 
daughter of the agrarian leader G. M. Dimitrov returned to Bulgaria from the United States and 
formed the conservative BANU-National Union.386 The law for the confiscation of the property of 
the totalitarian organizations from 1991, which covered the Communist Party, BANU, and the 
Fatherland Front, further weakened the BANU that had existed prior to 1989, and after BANU-
United merged with the BANU of Moser in 1992, it ceased to exist. BANU could not remain 
united. On the side of the democratic forces, it split into factions following various leaders. On the 
left, already from 1993, BANU "Aleksandur Stamboliiski" separated and became a coalition 
partner to the Socialist Party. As has been the case in the post-socialist period, at best these parties 
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barely met the parliamentary threshold, and their presence in parliament most often is due to the 
broader coalitions in which they participate.387 
 A concise way to mark the gulf separating Stamboliiski's organization from the beginning 
of the twentieth century from the one that bears his name at the beginning of the twenty-first is to 
juxtapose their programs. Of all the BANU factions that populate the Bulgarian political landscape, 
the one that defines itself as center left and has kept the name of Stamboliiski is the Bulgarian 
Agrarian Union "Aleksandur Stamboliiski". Furthermore, from 2001 it has been a constant 
member of the Coalition for Bulgaria that is headed by the Socialist Party. The position that it 
claims as a defender of social justice allows it to claim a continuity to the interwar Bulgarian 
Agrarian National Union, yet its program is nothing but liberal. Its Statutes from 22 November, 
2008, in contrast to those penned by Stamboliiski, provide status quo assurances that the party is 
a democratic one that organizes its activity in full compliance with the country's regulations 
(Constitution, the Law for the Political Parties). Since its chief aims are the "the building of a 
democratic state, governed by the rule of law, as well as a developed civil society, " Article Five 
declares in a hodge-podge of politically correct terminology that, "The Agrarian Union 
‘Aleksandur Stamboliiski’ will assist in the European and Transatlantic integration of the Republic 
of Bulgaria, in the welfare, the moral and spiritual development of the Bulgarian people and of 
every citizen, in the economic and social progress of the nation, for the development of agriculture 
and the Bulgarian village, in the full utilization of the capacities of private, cooperative, and state 
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property, on the basis of the ecological politics of the state."388 If the disconnect with radical 
agrarianism is not obvious due to the generalities in the Statutes, then one only has to turn to the 
Program of the party for confirmation: 
 
The contemporary global processes fatefully affect the future of Bulgarian and 
demand its technological, economic, social, and institutional modernization. The 
Agrarian Union "Aleksandur Stamboliiski" is for the policy that will lead Bulgaria 
out of the current crisis and will secure its modernization in accordance with the 
global changes and transformations in today's world. The creation in Bulgaria of 
a peaceful, free, democratic, and socially just society, in which the rights and the 
higher standard of living will be guaranteed for all Bulgarian citizens, is a core 
social goal of the Agrarian Union "Aleksandur Stamboliiski." This is our, 
agrarian understanding of society, which should emerge as a result of the 
currently ongoing political, economic, social, and other reforms in our country 
[italics mine].389 
 
 The struggle to justify its existence without an agrarian base or without any significant 
markers to distinguish it from any other liberal party makes it imperative for the Agrarian Union 
"Aleksander Stamboliiski" to argue for pro-forma continuity with agrarianism, even where there 
is none. The tension between the radical roots of the interwar BANU with its insistence on being 
the party of the agrarian estate and the current all-inclusive politics is not lost to the authors of the 
Party Program. Therefore the conclusion of their document explicitly references the transformation 
of the party. The honesty of that admission, however, is more than offset by the absurdity of calling 
the current formation a "modern" party in opposition to what it had been before: "The Agrarian 
Union ‘Aleksander Stamboliiski’ renews itself and is transformed into a modern party, in order to 








be in synchronicity with the most progressive trends in European and world development. This 
way the Union becomes strong, vital, and capable of recreating the principles, bequeathed to us by 
our patron, Aleksandur Stamboliiski, in the new political conditions in our country and the 
world."390 
 Unlike in Bulgaria, where the numerical strength and radical roots of the agrarian 
movement allowed some of its currents to persevere through the Communist period, albeit in a 
diluted and co-opted form, the agrarian parties of Yugoslavia were quickly dissolved. In Serbia, 
the left section of the Agrarian Union had become the People’s Peasant Party (Narodna Seliačka 
stranka, NSS) led by Dragoljub Jovanović, and in 1941 entered into a formal alliance with Tito, 
pledging support for the fight against the occupiers and for an alliance with the Soviet Union. 
However, at the war’s end, Jovanović struggled to preserve the independence of the agrarian 
movement against the dictates of the Communist party and stood up courageously in parliament 
in defense of basic democratic freedoms. By mid-1946, he was stripped of his parliamentary and 
university posts, by the end of the year he was even expelled from his own party, and after a show 
trial in 1947 was sentenced to nine years of hard labor.391 
 The demise of the Croatian HSS started already during the war when it had to contend not 
only with the Ustaše but also with the communists. Vladko Maček refused twice the offer to 
become the prime minister of the newly Independent State of Croatia, he was actively opposed to 
the Ustaša regime, and this sent him to the Jasenovac concentration camp and later into house 
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arrest. At the same time, he and the party leadership were deeply distrustful of Tito’s partisans and 
warned their cadres to “keep away from the Reds,” something that left them open to accusations 
of collaboration with the Ustaše, Četniks and government-in-exile. 392  Maček’s wait-and-see 
policy cost him the fracturing of his party, with many members joining the Ustaše,while others 
fought with the partisans. At the end of the war Maček emigrated first to France and then to the 
United States. 
 Thus, 1947 saw the end of even pro forma political pluralism in Yugoslavia. In his speech 
before the Second Congress of the People’s Front in September 1937, Tito summarized the 
situation: “All of the pre-war bourgeois parties have been discredited and have lost their right to 
speak on behalf of the people today. They have shown that they are incapable of running the 
country, that in the new social order their existence is not justified and that it [pluralism] has 
become superfluous.”393 
The political leadership of the agrarian movements that could flee ended up founding the 
International Peasant Union in New York. It included Stanisław Mikołajczyk of the Polish Polskie 
Stronnictwo Ludowe "Piast," G. M. Dimitrov of BANU "Pladne" and Vladko Maček of the 
Hrvatska seljačka stranka. From 1950 to 1971, this organization, which presented itself as the 
continuation of the interwar Green International, published a Bulletin that informed about the 
transformations behind the Iron Curtain and critiqued the socialist experiment. A good way to 
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represent the nature of this organization and to illustrate the points of divergence from the MAB 
is to examine the article "The Great Submerged Movements" that was written in 1949 by Vladko 
Maček, who was the vice-president of the International Peasant Union. Ostensibly, the goal of the 
article, as the first paragraph states, is that "...the Western World still does not know the real 
substance and aims of these peasant parties. I feel that this state of affairs should be remedied."394 
The article lays out a genealogy of the emergence of the peasant parties in order to establish their 
legitimacy. Although in exile and separated from its base, the leadership of the International 
Peasant Union still clung to the social endorsement granted by, "About two hundred million 
peasants [that] live on the territory behind the Iron Curtain and in the Soviet Union itself. Half of 
this peasant population, which before the war was outside Russia and had the opportunity to 
develop politically, formed its peasant parties."395 In a departure from the rhetoric of the interwar 
peasant parties, however, Maček ends his article with an appeal for intervention by the West. The 
novel rhetoric of the article, pregnant with references to the Iron Curtain, anti-communism, and 
the language of rights, reveals a growing sense of isolation and hopelessness. It is important to 
examine this position more closely, because not that many years earlier, the peasant alternative 
was not a peripheral project, but a European one, and as such could appeal to itself and universals, 
rather than to the 'West.' The article concludes with what I consider to be the best self-
characterization of the International Peasant Union, produced in a tone that cannot conceal its 
pathos: 
                                                 
394 The Tablet. Vol. 193, No. 5678, March 19, 1949, 180. 








In the ideological struggle with Communism, peasant movements are already 
emerging victorious. In the struggle to overthrow the imposed Communist regimes 
we combined our forces and formed the International Peasant Union. As such we 
apply for support to free the Western democracies [sic! should read as "the free 
Western democracies." Could this be a slip from the interwar years when 
agrarianism was held up as a more equitable system that could instruct the 
capitalist order?] . The sooner and the more effective this support, the better will it 
serve not only our cause but also the cause of democracy and social justice in 
general. 
The Western world must realize that the peasant movements of Eastern Europe were 
already, between the wars, one of the strongest political factors in this most essential 
part of the European continent. Through the sufferings sustained during the war and 
nowadays, the East European peasants have become even more conscious of their 
human and political rights. The main obstacle to the stabilization of the present 
Communist regimes behind the Iron Curtain, according to the admission of their 
rulers, is the peasants. At present, the peasant movements are by far the strongest 
political groups in Eastern Europe and the future organization of that part of Europe 
can be conceived only as a new order of which peasant movements are the basis 
and rallying-point. 
Only when these facts are adequately understood can the significance of the 
International Peasant Union, formed in Washington, be fully appreciated.396 
 
 The triumphalist transitologists of the post-1989 landscape speak of a return to diversity. 
With the revival of multi-party politics after 1989, peasant parties reappeared, but the disconnect 
that the International Peasant Union reveals is the cause for the marginal agrarian parties that did 
form to not attempt to draw on the interwar agrarian legacy and to not adopt the names of their 
interwar 'predecessors.' The exception to this is the Hrvatska seljačka stranka in Croatia that could 
                                                 







draw dividends from the nationalist legacy of the interwar movement in the context of the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia and the creation of an independent Croatian state. 
 In Croatia, the Hrvatska Seljačka Stranka (Croatian Peasant Party) reformed in 1990. 
Occupying a centrist position, this party has been able to secure parliamentary representation even 
outside coalitions, although in the 2011 elections it could hold on to only one seat. Nonetheless, at 
its high point in 2000, as the strongest party in a coalition with, among others, the Croatian People's 
Party and the Liberal Party, it held 17 seats and 11.26% of the popular vote. As in the case of 
Bulgaria's BANU, the Croatian HSS perseveres as not a completely marginal presence on the 
political scene, but at the cost of stale liberal politics. The language of BANU "Aleksandur 
Stamboliiski" that was critiqued above has a twin in the program of the HSS for the years 2012-
2016. The introduction to that document states, "The HSS as a traditional Croatian Party of the 
political center hereby adapts to the contemporary environment and the fact of Croatia's entry as a 
full member in the EU in July 2013 as one of the biggest historical challenges but also as one of 
the biggest developmental opportunities in modern Croatian history."397 The tasks before the party 
that the document enumerates are, "an exit from the long-lasting economic crisis, the ensuring of 
long-term sustainable economic growth, the opening of space for investment in the economy and 
job creation, balanced regional and rural development (sic), public sector reform, integration in 
the large EU market, and the development of society and the social services in general."398 









Serbia saw the emergence of the Narodna Seljačka Stranka (People's Peasant Party) in 
1990. This party claimed continuity from the left wing of the interwar Savez Zemljoradnika under 
Dragoljub Jovanović. Its strongest electoral results were in the 1990 parliamentary elections, but 
those translated to only 1.35% of the vote. Subsequently it joined the short-lived Democratic 
Movement of Serbia for the 1993 elections. That coalition captured less that 17% of the vote. 
Under the leadership of Marijan Rističević, the party moved to the right of the political spectrum. 
 In the first post-communist years in Czechoslovakia, the Spojenectvo polnohospodárov a 
vidieka (Alliance of Farmers and the Countryside) united the two strongest parties claiming to 
represent agrarian interests, the Československá strana zemědělská (Czechoslovak Agrarian Party) 
and the Political Movement of Agricultural Cooperatives' Members.399 It was not able to pass the 
5% threshold for parliamentary representation in 1990. While there was some limited success in a 
new coalition with the Greens in the Liberálně-sociální unie (Liberal Social Union) for the 1992 
elections in which the coalition took seven seats, the 1996 Czech elections were a failure and 
thereafter that made agrarian politics in the Czech Republic irrelevant. Of the parties that had 
attempted to trace links to the interwar period only the Republikánská strana českosloslovenského 
venkova (Republican Party of the Czechoslovak Countryside) could justify this claim, partly 
through the continuity of old republican members and their descendants, but it could not reach the 
threshold for representation in parliament. 
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 In Slovakia, despite the renewed interest in national figures after the establishment of an 
independent state, among whom Milan Hodža is of particular interest and prominence in the works 
produced by the Slovak Academy of Sciences, the interwar agrarian party was not reconstituted.400 
The Roľnícka strana Slovenska (Agricultural Party of Slovakia) and the Hnutie polnohospodárov 
Slovenska (Movement of Peasants of Slovakia) emerged in the field vacated by the Alliance of 
Farmers and the Countryside that had operated at the federal level in the last years of 
Czechoslovakia. After some small coalition successes, these two parties merged into the Nová 
agrárna strana (New Agrarian Party). That formation existed from 1997 to 1998 and then 




 The communization of Eastern Europe after the Second World War is contemporaneous 
with the closure of the agrarian alternative. That closure, however, was facilitated, and in some 
respects tempered, by the individual histories and trajectories of the agrarian parties, most 
importantly during the war years. Thus the inclusion or exclusion of the interwar agrarian 
organizations in the national or popular fronts of the post-war period was the initial determining 
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condition of the role they could play up to 1948, and in some exceptional cases, after. Bradley 
Abrams, in his article, "The Second World War and the East European Revolution" fleshed out the 
work begun by Jan Gross to complicate the presentation of the communization of Eastern Europe 
as having arrived on the back of Soviet tanks or as the illegitimate product of a seizure of power à 
la Rákosi's Salami Tactics.401 While operating on a macro, structural level, Abrams' analysis 
nonetheless contributes to a problematization of the first post war years that accommodates inputs 
such as the increased influence of the youth or the etatization of the economy. The result is a move 
that at the very least necessitates a reexamination of the period and brings to the foreground the 
actors and processes that were engaged in the post-war contest.  
 The possibility of a variance in options, instead of a clear teleology, also breathes new life 
in the way the historian can evaluate the national roads to socialism that generated their own 
internal discussions within the respective national communist parties until the Stalin-Tito split in 
1948 closed the door. I would like to stress that this approach is not intended as an exercise in 
speculation over counterfactuals; from the start, even those political forces that could secure a 
place in the post-war order were under extreme pressure that did not significantly let up until the 
communist consolidation of power. However, I object to the simplistic reduction that communism 
eliminated agrarianism. If it is absolutely necessary to point the finger at one cause, then in was 
the Second World War. 
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 The clearest case of exclusion concerning agrarianism occurred in Czechoslovakia, the 
country that is otherwise presented as the textbook example of the complexity of communization. 
It was in Czechoslovakia that the Communist Party won the first free post-war parliamentary 
elections on 26 May, 1946 with 31% of the vote. The agrarian Republican Party did not partake in 
those elections, but the reasons for that go back to before the start of the Second World War. After 
the national disaster for Czechoslovakia at Munich, on 29 September, 1938, first Germany annexed 
the Sudetenland by 10 October, 1938 and then Hungary received parts of Slovakia and sub-
Carpathian Ruthenia through the First Vienna Award on 2 November, 1938. The president, Edvard 
Beneš, abdicated on 5 October and went into exile in Great Britain. Until Emil Hácha became 
president on 30 November and appointed the agrarian Rudolf Beran as prime minister on 1 
December, 1938, General Jan Syrový headed a caretaker government of experts. In the meantime, 
Slovakia and Ruthenia received autonomy and Czechoslovakia became a federal republic on 23 
November, 1938. All the political parties of the center and right dissolved and merged into the 
Party of National Unity (Strana národní jednoty) under the chairmanship of Beran.402 The final 
issue of the Bulletin of the International Agrarian Bureau from 15 December, 1938 contains its 
own obituary. Its farewell statement reads, "In these conditions, the Republican Party of 
Agriculturalists and Small Farmers, after having guaranteed that the legitimate interests of 
agriculture would be protected in the new formation, itself took the initiative to liquidate the 
existing political parties and to unite them in one big party, the Party of National Unity."403  
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 Over the course of October, 1938, the activities of the Communist Party were stopped, first 
in Slovakia (9 October), then in the Czech lands and Moravia (20 October) and finally Ruthenia 
(24 October). The Communist parliamentarians preserved their seats until the Communist Party 
was banned outright and its assets were seized under Beran on 27 December, 1938. The Social 
Democratic Party and a part of the Czech National Social Party combined into the oppositional 
National Party of Labor (Národní strana práce) on 11 December, 1938. That formation survived 
until 16 February, 1939 when it was abolished, leaving the Party of National Unity to preside alone 
over the "authoritarian democracy" until the end of the Second Republic on 15 March, 1939. 
 Given this prehistory, the Republican Party was not allowed to reorganize after the Second 
World War. Daniel Miller writes: "In restructuring Czech and Slovak politics after the war Beneš 
was determined to eliminate the grip of the ‘agrarian barons,’ as he termed them, from the economy 
and politics. The Communist party was to serve as a counter-balance to any remaining conservative 
Republican interests. Beneš was to achieve his goals. The Košice Program of 1945, which set the 
agenda for the government of the newly re-created Czechoslovakia, prohibited the existence of the 
Republican party, along with certain other parties, such as the National Democrats, because of 
alleged complicity with the Germans."404 
 The elimination of the agrarians as a political force happened even before the capitulation 
of Nazi Germany. The fates of Republican cadres varied on an individual basis. Beran, for 
example, was sentenced to twenty years in prison. The legacy of the Republican Party, and more 
particularly, the Green International, was revived in a series of show trials in 1952, the main one 
                                                 







of which took place in Prague on 23-26 April, 1952. This revival had the function of finding a 
scapegoat for the failures of and resistance to collectivization. The trial of Josef Kepka, Antonín 
Chloupek, František Topol, Otakar Čapek, Vilém Knebort, Vlastimil Klíma, Josef Kostohryz, and 
Václav Renč was highly publicized. A propagandistic book of almost 100 pages that went through 
a second edition covered the process and stoked the paranoia of capitalist encirclement and 
subversion. Entitled, Agents of the Green International: Enemies of our Village, this book printed 
absurd plots and confessions that amalgamated imaginary class enemies with conspiratorial 
international organizations. The forced confession of Renč states: "The aim of our anti-state 
movement, directed by the Green International, was to destroy the independence of the 
Czechoslovak Republic and to connect her to the so called European federation. According to our 
plan which is backed by the U.S. imperialists, all countries of the peoples' democracies would 
become Fascist agrarian colonies of the USA."405  
 The show trial thus reveals a combination of components that revived an antagonism 
directed towards an already defeated 'enemy.' In the context of collectivization, suddenly the 
kulaks [vesničtí boháči] became "the last bastion of reaction," a "fifth column."406 The 
International Peasant Union was transformed into a tool of American imperialism, while Milan 
Hodža's wartime proposal for a Federation in Central Europe was turned into an American version 
of the Third Reich's plans to convert the eastern lands into a breadbasket. 
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 Kepka was sentenced to death, Renč received a sentence of 25 years imprisonment, and 
the remaining defendants, life imprisonment. Other processes connected to the Green International 
followed in 1952, involving almost 200 people.407 It is tempting to consider these processes as a 
final absurd flurry before Stalin's death and the start of de-Stalinization. However, the State 
Historical Archives in Sofia contains a curious folder in Fond 361k: the Representation of BANU 
Abroad. This archival unit entered the collection of the archive at an unknown date, but its 176 
pages are still contained in their original folder that bears the name of the Directorate of Police, 
State Security (from the interwar period), except that Police has been scratched out and replaced 
with a hand-written People's Militia (formed on 10 September, 1944).408 The first sixty pages in 
the folder appear to be a later addition and contain a few letters and a long report about the state 
of affairs in Bulgaria by Kosta Todorov. What follows, however, is one of the largest caches of 
extant documents from the interwar Green International, the MAB. This folder is the part of Rudolf 
Beran's personal archive that concerns Bulgaria. It was meticulously translated, annotated, and 
processed by the Bulgarian Interior Ministry. Not only was it of interest to the Bulgarian services 
but a question in Russian concerning one of the documents suggests that it was scrutinized by 
Soviet agents as well, perhaps offering a clue about how the archive arrived in Bulgaria.409 
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 I will quote two sections from the summary report that characterizes the significance of 
this material in order to show the topics of interest to the communist functionaries after the Second 
World War:  
 
The output correspondence of the International Agrarian Bureau to Beran, 
concerning Bulgarian questions, covers the period from 18.10.1934 to 31.8.37. It 
can be seen from the file that the MAB was a branch of the political intelligence 
section of Beran and of the Czech agrarian party. This Bureau used its links with 
the Bulgarian Agrarian Union to collect information about the political situation in 
Bulgaria.... The political goals of the Bureau were the establishment in Bulgaria of 
a single-party, strong, agrarian rule and the creation of a "Great Yugoslavia." In the 
pursuit of these goals, the Bureau interfered in the internal affairs of the Agrarian 
Union by acting in favor of unification of the individual fractions of the Union. 410 
 
Then, with regards to the period after the Second World War: 
 
...the correspondence reveals the tight links which existed between the Bulgarian 
and Czech agrarians. Some of the mentioned figures have left the ranks [излезли 
от строя] (sic!), for example Beran was sentenced411, Vulkov was hung, etc. Others, 
however, for example Ursin, occupy leadership positions in Czechoslovakia and 
extremely reactionary political positions. It is well known, that the majority of the 
agrarians, after the breakup of their party in the Second Czechoslovak Republic, 
flowed into other reactionary parties, chiefly the Democratic Party of Slovakia and 
the National Socialist and the Lidova in the Czech [lands], where they successfully 
act in leadership positions. On the other hand, the link between Bulgarian and Czech 
reactionaries did not end completely during the time of the occupation.... It is 
natural in these circumstances to expect that the links between Bulgarians and 
Czechs, based on the above-mentioned relations, will begin to develop anew in the 
soil of a common struggle against the communists.412 
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If this dissertation has been about rescuing the agrarian alternative from the enormous 
condescension of posterity, it has avoided a number of strategies. It has avoided the mode of 
approaches that define and reify a static peasant subjectivity. It has refused to place itself in the 
position of arbiter over whether agrarian programs and praxis were viable, nor evaluate them on 
their merits. Neither does it adopt a rigid mode of classification that through a standard 
comparative analysis could either distill an ideal type or a series of divergences from it.  
This dissertation has been about capturing the richness of the agrarian moment in a 
historical setting that empowered the peasant subject and mobilized that subject towards a revision 
and reimagination of the social field. Although the treatment of the Bulgarian case received the 
most attention, because it had the momentary opportunity to implement its sweeping and 
uncompomising vision, this dissertation has also complemented its analysis through the treatment 
of the more constrained Yugoslav and Czechoslovak agrarianism. Together, these three countries 
were the founding members of the Green International (alongside Poland) and their historical 
trajectories represent the three paradigmatic faces of left of center agrarianism.  
 Individually the chapters in this dissertation are self-contained thematic 
explorations of key aspects of the interwar agrarian experience. Together, they add up to an 
illustration of the utility of reintegrating the agrarian experiment into the interwar historiography, 
and provide a frame for the study of agrarianism that can escape the constraints of the classificatory 






experience to current topics and debates is meant to serve as a further justification to why this 
history matters. 
This dissertation has recast the first half of the twentieth century as the Golden Age of the 
European peasantry. Excessive emphasis on the destruction and disappearance of the peasantry 
after the Second World War has tainted most scholarship with a negative fatalism concerning the 
inevitability of this decline. Worse, these “losers” in history have not received sufficient scholarly 
attention because of the assumption that they simply don’t matter. In sharp contrast to this 
orthodoxy, I argue that in the period between the First and Second World Wars, the peasant became 
a political subject, understood his plight, and organized in defence of a third road between 
capitalism and communism. This is why this period was a Golden Age; for the first time peasant 
self-awareness could articulate an agrarian modernity.  
The second foundational premise of this dissertation is that without the reintegration of 
agrarian history, the interwar period cannot properly be understood. This premise does not derive 
from a positivistic claim for total inclusion, but is motivated by the self-evident fact that any 
political actor in the interwar period, regardless of his standing on the left or the right of the 
political spectrum, had to assume a position in relation to agrarianism and the peasant. At the 
moment when the peasant was articulating his own subjectivity, nationalists, fascists, communists 
and others were deeply engaged in articulating competing subjectivities for him. This interplay of 
interests around agrarianism not only makes a proper history of agrarianism indispensable for the 
understanding of the interwar period, but also opens the door for exciting new research into the 






Therefore, the contribution of each chapter of this dissertation is twofold. Each chapter in 
the alternating series of broader synthetic work or microhistory first provides a reassessment based 
either on the introduction of new source material or the novel reading of previously examined 
archival sources, and second, relates its agrarian history either to its contemporary context through 
linkages to topics such as nationalism, the federative idea, or strategies of political delegitimation, 
or to contemporary historiographical issues and debates such as alterity or theories of nationalism. 
It is fair to say, then, that the very structure of this dissertation is a demonstration of why 
agrarianism matters, back in its heyday, and now. 
Chapter One argued that the agrarian movements of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and 
Czechoslovakia were forged in the revolutionary formation and transformation of these countries 
during the First World War. The socio-economic and political impact of the war created the 
conditions that propelled agrarian political formations to the forefront of national politics. In 
comparison to their marginal positions prior to the war these parties were confronted with a 
radically transformed socio-political landscape in which pre-war forces and institutions were 
discredited, severely weakened, or even expelled. In this vacated landscape, the agrarian parties 
could flourish. 
The experience of war also radically transformed the parties themselves. The articulation 
of a vision for the post-war order coupled with an enormous expansion of the parties’ base meant 
organizational and programmatic change so that these parties could adapt to their role as a major 
actor, if not the principal one, on the national stage. Further, the consequence of mass politics in 
the demographic context of half to three quarters of the population being engaged in agriculture 
produced a legitimacy and urgency in the parties based on the recognition that the time of the 






While the war defined the central position of the agrarian parties in the postwar period, the 
individual positions that they adopted and the trajectories they took produced a rich variation. This 
chapter thus introduced the proposition that the four autonomous peasant movements that emerged 
out of the ashes of the First World War represent the three faces of the alternative modernity that 
was articulated in the Golden Age of the European Peasantry: agrarian radicalism in Bulgaria, the 
peasant nation in Yugoslavia, and centrist agrarianism as the guarantor of parliamentary stability 
in Czechoslovakia. 
  Chapter Two contextualized the projection of agrarianism on the world stage through its 
organization, the International Agrarian Bureau. For reasons related to the dearth of material, the 
negative evaluation from its communist affiliated competitor, the Moscow based International 
Peasant Council, better known as the Red Peasant International (Krestintern), its reactionary 
designation during the communist period after the Second World War that even generated show 
trials against its ‘agents,’ but also the scholarly neglect that has plagued the study of European 
agrarianism outside certain well-trodden aspects of national history, the historiography that 
touches upon this organization is plagued by mystification.  
As a counterpoint to this unsatisfactory scholarship, my intention in this chapter was to 
foreground the potentialities and the alternative developmental streams that contextualize the 
founding of the International Agrarian Bureau. The chapter argued that the history of the 
crystallization of the International Agrarian Bureau in 1923 is explained by multiple currents in 
the development and implementation of agrarianism and that two frames are useful for 
contextualizing that history: the federalist idea itself and the competition with the Krestintern. 
Further, the international stage, despite the hopes and efforts of the agrarian parties to recast it, 






why the institution was a “failure,” the chapter insisted that the recasting of the Green International 
in the 1920s and 1930s can be better explained by focusing on the configurations of the 
international situation, as well as on the competition with the Krestintern. 
Chapter Three, introduced the practice of alternating chapters between case study analysis 
and broader synthetic work. It brought together the agrarian movements of Bulgaria and Croatia, 
which receive a very different treatment in the literature. Whereas the Bulgarian case has been 
described as anti-national(ist), the Croatian is represented as the embodiment of a national 
movement. The chapter demonstrated that this polarity ossifies and essentializes the complex 
relationship of the agrarian movements to nationalism and the imagined community at a moment 
when the character of that community was being transformed through the introduction of the 
peasant subject. The first part of this chapter illustrated how the different outward expressions of 
nationalism in the Bulgarian and Croatian agrarian movements were in fact based on very similar 
conceptions of the peasant rights and the peasant state. 
At the heart of this chapter was a case study of the conflict over the implementation of the 
Bulgarian Agrarian National Union’s orthographic reform in 1921. This micro-history was 
wrapped in several layers of analysis that contextualized this episode and permitted its relation to 
several currents in nationalism studies. The chapter traced the correspondence between the 
conjunctural chronology of changes in Bulgarian orthography and the mutable nature of Bulgarian 
nationalism by opposing this inquiry to the continuing influence of the civic/ethnic antinomy in 
the scholarly literature of Eastern Europe. The orthographic reform re-imagined the national 
community and in a significant, structural way paralleled a shift in the organization of the nation. 
It was intended to and eventually succeeded in recasting the role of the Bulgarian citizen. The 






showed that the spelling reform was much more than a matter of sociolinguistics. It marked a 
fundamental change in the Bulgarian polity and was associated with a moment of restructuring, 
democratization, and reshuffling of elites, the rearrangement of norms that favored different social 
and cultural constellations. In other words, the picture of nationalism that it elicited is one that 
intimately grapples with one of the most central political processes of the modern Bulgarian state 
– the question of democracy and popular sovereignty. Theoretically, this second part elaborated 
an opening in the treatment of East-European nationalism that drew inspiration from the work of 
the Subaltern Studies Group. While a strict transposition of concepts is counterproductive given 
the contextual differences, the critical juxtaposition of East-European agrarian nationalism to the 
emancipatory project of Subaltern Studies facilitates the extraction of the former from the stale 
narratives that obscure and suppress the radical agrarian merger of the nation, the peasant state, 
and the peasant subject. 
Chapter Four is a turning point in the dissertation, at which the aspirations of agrarianism 
are confronted with contextual limitations. The chapter began with a focus on the Bulgarian 
Agrarian National Union’s Representation Abroad in Czechoslovakia after the coup d’état against 
the Stamboliiski regime in 1923. It related its activities to the politics of the Republican Party that 
was hosting it in Czechoslovakia. In exile, the Representation Abroad represented one of the 
lowest points in the political fortunes of agrarianism in the interwar period. Yet my analysis aimed 
to show the significance and potentialities even there. The Representation Abroad’s biggest 
achievement was that at a time of seeming hopelessness that anything could be done to restore 
political normalcy and a semblance of democracy in Bulgaria, its members tenaciously kept the 
spark alive for themselves, the beleaguered BANU, their agrarian partners in the MAB, and in front 






This chapter offers an alternative definition of agrarianism that is predicated on three 
universal initiatives that underwrite the agrarian project: parliamentarism, land reform, and the 
cooperative movement. In this way it avoids the pitfalls of classificatory definitions and an over-
emphasis on ideology. 
Chapter Five discussed the delegitimation campaigns against the agrarian movements in 
Bulgaria and Croatia. This chapter returned to the method of case study investigation that is then 
layered in theoretical analysis. As in Chapter Three, the resonance of neglected moments of 
agrarian history in contemporary scholarship justifies the importance of this history. 
This chapter examined the charges of corruption against Stamboliiski as drama: the way 
charges are articulated, how they are directed, and the way they ultimately operate as a legitimizing 
tool in the context of systemic transition. The instrumentalization of corruption for political ends 
lends itself particularly well to the extension of vices from the personal to the systemic level. 
Analyzing the growing theoretical literature on corruption, this chapter reached the conclusion that 
the obsession of the capitalist system with the particular type of corruption that involves personal 
pecuniary enrichment is far from coincidental, and is informed by the logic of capital accumulation 
within a free market economy. According to this logic, the private drive to amass is best protected 
from degenerating into corruption within the liberal market democracy. Therefore, it is imperative 
to delegitimize any alternative systems whose aim, at the very least, ideologically, is to excise that 
type of self-interest in the first place. 
The second case study in this chapter examined the charges of treason brought about by 
Radić's trip to Moscow and the entry of the CPPP into the Krestintern. The delegitimation 






of the CPPP through the misrepresented association with the communist menace. It was essentially 
blackmail, a maneuver to force a differentiation between communism and agrarianism that, at its 
extreme, might cause the abandonment of the republican idea and the recognition of the monarchy. 
Terror and revolution were the monsters against which the interwar capitalist order was trying to 
protect itself. It succeeded in outlawing the disproportionately weaker communist parties in 
Bulgaria and Yugoslavia but was forced to accommodate the agrarian parties albeit under various 
degrees of repression.  
The concluding Chapter Six tackled the problem of the denouement of the agrarian moment 
during the Second World War and the years immediately following its conclusion. It began in a 
historiographic mode that challenged the simplified model of the elimination of the peasantry as a 
political subject in the West through the irresistibility of capitalist logic, and in the East, though 
Stalinist collectivization and terror, and called to task the exclusion of agrarianism at the level of 
the survey literature in the East-European field. In marking the end of the agrarian alternative, this 
chapter refused to locate it in a “tragedy” of communization. The real tragedy, it argued, was begun 
in the separation of the agrarian political elite from its base during and after the Second World War 
and is complete now, in the post-socialist period, in the grotesque revival of agrarian parties that 
struggle to speak for and exploit the memory of a peasantry that no longer exists. In marking the 
Second World War as the revolutionary and transformative moment that took away the relevance 
of agrarian politics, this chapter complemented the treatment of the First World War as having 
created the conditions for its initial elaboration. Touching on recent work on collectivization, this 






constituted itself as a political subject in the interwar period, was transformed as much as it 
transformed itself in the encounter with state socialism.413 
While the conceptual breadth and ambition of this dissertation do not allow it to flesh out 
many aspects of interwar agrarianism, the framework that it provides can serve as the foundation 
for further study. The nuanced framework that it proposes can breathe new life into this subject 
and can finally allow agrarianism to receive its proper due as one of the most original and 
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